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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Christopher D. McGill 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of English 
 
June 2012 
 
Title: Figuring the Beast: The Aesthetics of Animality in American Literature, 1900-1979 
 
 
“Figuring the Beast” analyzes the work of Jack London, Ernest Hemingway, 
Robinson Jeffers, and Elizabeth Bishop to reveal literature as a register for a cultural 
anxiety over human-animal relations that developed throughout the twentieth century. 
For each of these writers, literary expression was a forum for attempting to solve, or 
“figure out,” complicated ethical questions regarding animals. And, in addressing these 
questions, each writer also had to answer the question of how best to figure, or 
characterize, nonhuman others in their work. “Figuring the Beast” thus pursues the close 
connections between questions of ethics and representation. 
This dissertation begins by analyzing the relationship between literature and 
theories of animal mind developed around the turn of the twentieth century. The second 
chapter then reads a selection of Jeffers’s work and argues that, despite his medical-
science background and his philosophy of “Inhumanism,” his poetry rehearses 
anachronistic habits of figuring animals. The next chapter analyzes the function of 
nonhuman characters in London’s The Call of the Wild and White Fang. I examine how 
he employs scientific theory and narrative technique to address questions about animal 
interiority that became contested in the United States during the early decades of the 
twentieth century. My analysis of Hemingway’s “The Short Happy Life of Francis 
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Macomber,” Green Hills of Africa, and The Garden of Eden builds on my argument 
about nonhuman characters in London’s work. I show how Hemingway’s writing 
displays concern for, and even empathy with, animals even as he routinely aestheticizes 
their deaths and suffering. Chapter V then analyzes Bishop’s methods for poetically 
figuring animal others. I argue that Bishop develops significantly different methods for 
figuring animals poetically than are present in Jeffers’s work. My reading of Bishop’s 
work is grounded in her reflections on the observational techniques of Charles Darwin, 
but I argue that she interpreted Darwinism in a vitally different way than some of her 
predecessors—an interpretation that led her to emphasize variety and alterity rather than 
fitness and competition. In my conclusion, I discuss how the responses to animals 
developed by each of these writers persist in contemporary film and literature. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: 
TRACKING THE ANIMAL IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN CULTURE 
That’s interesting! He’s a scientist who’s a poet. 
—Charlie Rose, commenting about 
Charles Darwin in an interview with 
E.O. Wilson and James Watson 
(December, 2005) 
 
 Whether he is aware of it or not, Hawkeye, the Labrador retriever companion of 
Navy SEAL Jon Tumilson, earned his 15 minutes of fame. On August 25, 2011, 
MSN.com featured Hawkeye’s story on its front page, under the title “Dog Stays with 
Fallen SEAL’s Casket.”1 Ultimately a “human interest” piece, the report’s headlining 
story is that of Hawkeye, whose owner was the “one of 30 American troops, including 22 
Navy SEALs, who were killed when a Taliban insurgent shot down a Chinook helicopter 
with a rocket-propelled grenade on Aug. 6 [2011].” As the story’s title suggests, though, 
the feature’s hook revolves not around the deaths of Tumilson or his fellow combatants, 
nor around any of the social or political reasons that they were in Afghanistan fighting in 
what has now become the longest sustained war effort in the history of the United States. 
Rather, the story’s main narrative builds through its description of the actions of 
Hawkeye during Tumilson’s funeral ceremony. The report compares Hawkeye to “a 
fellow soldier on a battlefield [who] refused to leave [Tumilson] behind.” It continues,  
Hawkeye was photographed lying by Tumilson’s casket in a heart-
wrenching image taken at the funeral service in Tumilson’s hometown of 
Rockford, Iowa, earlier this week. Hawkeye walked up to the casket at the 
beginning of the service and then dropped down with a heaving sigh as 
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about 1,500 mourners witnessed a dog accompanying his master until the 
end. 
 By analogizing Hawkeye to a brother-in-arms, this story makes the implicit 
suggestion that his actions that day were rooted in some notion of patriotic duty. By 
describing Hawkeye “like a fellow soldier,” the story’s logic also inflects how its reader 
understands who bears responsibility for Tumilson’s death. As a kind of fellow 
combatant, the story invites us to think, Hawkeye will understand that the insurgents 
responsible for Tumilson’s death have also become his own enemies. The story colors 
this human-dog relationship in hues of fraternal military culture, a motif strengthened by 
the author’s suggestion that Hawkeye’s actions display “loyalty.” Perhaps unconsciously, 
the report’s author has chosen to present Hawkeye in a way that is consistent with 
masculine military culture, choosing “loyalty” as the lens through which to interpret his 
actions rather than “despair” or “grief”—both of which would trouble the brother-in-arms 
motif by introducing emotions to the story that do not so easily motivate retribution. The 
implicit logic of the story further draws on Hawkeye’s actions as a way of naturalizing 
the virtue of U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, a move which is particularly 
heightened when the description of the dog giving a “heaving sigh” and lying down next 
to the casket is followed by Tumilson’s cousin’s comment that the she felt compelled to 
take a picture of the event because it attests to how amazing of a man Tumilson was. 
Hawkeye’s apparent love for his “master,” then, doubles as testimony to the 
fundamentally sound character of Tumilson, in particular, but also by extension of U.S. 
military personnel in general. 
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Regardless of what their companion animals did or did not do, the deaths of all 
the troops who died that day are tragic, as is the death of any victim of violent conflict. 
But what makes Hawkeye’s particular story provocative in the context of a dissertation 
about animals and aesthetics in twentieth-century American literature is how his actions 
are enlisted into a larger nationalist ideological narrative. What’s more, those actions, at 
least for one reporter’s publisher, also differentiated Tumilson from the other 29 troops 
killed that day, none of whose funerals were given individualized, front-page feature 
status by MSN or its affiliates. What gives this story its “human interest” is not so much 
the familiar narrative of a war-hero military tragedy as much as it is what the story 
reports about the behavior of a nonhuman—and what that nonhuman’s behavior seems to 
imply about the United States.  
In telling this story, the report about Hawkeye is itself an aesthetic event, using 
analogy and figurative language in order to present the actions of its nonhuman main 
character. As a web-based, human-interest story, the report moves quickly, but it does 
make a point to establish how the interspecies social dynamic it depicts complicates the 
usually anthropocentric scene of a military funeral. Disregarding typical human decorum, 
both the story and its accompanying photograph report, Hawkeye walks right up next to 
the casket and places himself there, rather than amongst the rest of the attendees. 
Recognizing both the similarity of Hawkeye’s emotions and the otherness of how he 
displays them, the story makes it clear his gesture is not only tolerated the rest of the 
funeral’s attendees, but admired. Thus the story, in eight short paragraphs, illustrates how 
ethics and aesthetics come together in narrative. 
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Movingly crafted, Hawkeye’s story recruits its reader’s sympathy for U.S. 
military personnel and, more subtly, for the military’s mission in Afghanistan. The report 
featured on MSN.com that day builds a story around a dog to attest to the moral fiber of 
Jon Tumilson and to convey an ethical message that the relationships between humans 
and other animals can be surprisingly intense—comparable even to some of the most 
time-honored and revered kinds of human relationships. But, upon scrutiny, the story also 
runs into a set of representational problems: how completely can models of human social 
relations help us understand interspecies relationships? What are the stakes of choosing to 
characterize animals in certain ways? How (and why) do animals get used in order to 
convey messages about human characters? How completely can human beings 
understand the motivations and emotions of nonhuman animals? The questions this piece 
provokes involve what I discuss in the coming chapters as “the problem of animality,” a 
problem that, I argue, motivated numerous responses in the United States throughout the 
twentieth century and that continues, as this short news story illustrates, to grip the 
imaginations of Americans. 
 The problem of animality is multi-faceted, and it addresses issues relating to how 
various writers from a number of disciplines understand themselves in relation to 
nonhumans. The extent to which humans share emotions, sentience, thought processes, 
and even reasoning capacity with other forms of animal life became a pressing question 
over the course of the twentieth century. It also became a major creative site for literary 
writers and artists. Because “Figuring the Beast” examines a group of authors whose 
writing addresses the problem of animality and also interfaces with how that problem was 
approached scientifically in the periods in which they wrote, my inquiry necessitates 
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taking diversity into account, both biological and textual. To elucidate the connections I 
see between the literature and science of the period, I will put literary forms in dialogue 
with scientific writing in a number places. Ultimately, however, my project is most 
interested in the literary techniques that address the problem of animality because I am 
particularly interested in discussing the relationships between animal aesthetics and 
animal ethics as they developed in the preceding century. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, the problem of animality generated responses from an array of 
disciplines, some of which emerged specifically in order to pursue the question of 
“animal mind” that became pressing in the latter decades of the 1800s and generated 
increasing debate in the ensuing century. Before becoming organized into discrete 
disciplines in the latter half of the twentieth century, the problem of animality was 
perhaps most characterized by its thoroughly interdisciplinary place in American cultural 
discourse. In the early 1900s, a range of writers, psychologists, evolutionary theorists, 
philosophers, animal welfarists, and natural historians participated in discussions aimed 
at understanding how and whether nonhuman animals experienced, reasoned about, and 
mentally processed the world around them. Grounded largely in implications of 
Darwinian evolutionary theory that suggest at least some mental continuity in the 
consciousness and sentience of humans and other animals, these debates centered on 
questions of observation, interpretation, description, and anthropomorphism. Ultimately 
these debates were fundamentally ethical, as policy decisions regarding the treatment of 
animals became increasingly connected to questions regarding their mental capacities.
2 
Active participants in this century-long discussion, creative writers and poets 
harnessed this growing interest in the problem of animality and responded to it in an 
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array of forms and through a variety of techniques. In its attempt to understand how 
cultural imaginations of animal life were both informed by and recorded in the literature 
of the United States throughout the twentieth century, this project draws on the fields that 
hang together under the banner of what has come to be called “animal studies” and, more 
recently, “critical animal studies.” As developing academic disciplines go, critical animal 
studies is about as multi-vocal and wide-ranging as they come, and the discussions within 
it come from philosophers, animal rights activists, biologists, ethologists, animal trainers 
and behaviorists, nature writers, critical theorists, and theologians. With a few notable 
exceptions, the voices from literary scholars have been largely silent in the discussions of 
critical animal studies. 
By uncovering the history of how literary expression participated in the 
development of the problem of animality over the course of the twentieth century, 
“Figuring the Beast” reveals the contribution that literature—and the study of it—can 
make to animal studies and to how we might envision the role of literary study within any 
discourse populated by voices from multiple disciplines. Cary Wolfe argues that “animal 
studies,” insofar as it exists as a field of inquiry, needs to intervene in conceptions of 
interdisciplinarity that all too often become, in his words “tepid pluralism[s]” (116). In 
doing so, he argues that  
we should not try to imagine some super-interdiscipline called ‘animal 
studies’ . . . but rather recognize that it is only in and through our 
disciplinary specificity that we have something specific and irreplaceable 
to contribute to this ‘question of the animal’ that has recently captured the 
attention of so many different disciplines: not something accurate to 
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contribute but something specific (and there is a world of difference 
between those two claims). (115-16, Wolfe’s italics)  
Distinguishing the “accurate” from the “specific” alters the stakes of interdisciplinary 
discourse, for such a distinction differentiates being correct from being useful. Thinking 
about interdisciplinarity in this way, Wolfe suggests that no disciplinary perspective will 
be up to the task of comprehensively answering correctly “this question of the animal.” 
Rather, only through what he a later calls a “semantic overburdening” can animal life 
(including human life) be understood and theorized. The obligations of animal studies 
contributors are not, however, any less serious once the demand of accuracy is mitigated 
because what emerges in accuracy’s wake is the obligation of specificity. As Wolfe 
understands it, it is the lack of rigorously developed disciplinary specificities that risks 
turning animal studies to “tepid pluralism,” in which interdisciplinary discourse becomes 
useless precisely because the contributing perspectives are too quick to accommodate one 
another, losing their specificity in the process. For Wolfe, such a theoretical orientation 
necessitates an overhaul of the language of interdisciplinarity. He argues that animal 
studies position itself not as interdisciplinary but rather as “multi” or “transdisciplinary.”3 
This project takes a step toward articulating and developing the specific contributions that 
literary analysis can make to animal studies more generally. 
 While some of the work of this project examines the influences of political and 
scientific developments on how animals were written into literary texts throughout the 
twentieth century, the project, especially in its discussion of the poetry of Elizabeth 
Bishop, also argues that literary expression “spoke back” to other disciplines with its 
representations of animals, thus exerting its own influence on the developing scientific 
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and animal-rights discourses through the period. One of the ultimate goals of the project 
is, then, to demonstrate why poets, fiction writers, and literary critics deserve a seat at the 
table of critical animal studies. For all of what might be gleaned about human-animal 
social relationships from the “Dog Stays with Fallen SEAL’s Casket” story, it is 
important for anyone deriving meaning from it to also be aware of the narrative and 
aesthetic traditions the story activates. Hawkeye ought to remind us all a little bit of Buck 
despairing the death of his beloved John Thornton at the hands of the Yeehats at the 
conclusion of The Call of the Wild because this is the narrative tradition the reporter of 
Hawkeye’s story is drawing on in order to make meaning and capture the interest of web-
surfers. In London’s story too was the fragile relationship between dog and man used to 
convey the wholesomeness of a human character while simultaneously demonizing 
brown others as un-American enemies of the state and destroyers of that precious 
interspecies bond. 
 If one main goal for this project is to argue for the relevance of the study of 
literature to animal studies more generally, the other is to establish how important 
animals were to literary expression and experimentation in the United States from 1900-
1979. The project’s title, “Figuring the Beast,” is meant to suggest two related functions 
that made what I refer to as the problem of animality productive for the writers whose 
work is analyzed in the coming chapters. This problem involves imagining and 
representing living beings who are simultaneously and provocatively similar yet 
profoundly different from humans. Timothy Morton assesses the paradoxical way in 
which human-animal relations are imagined at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
“Saying ‘Humans are animals,’” Morton writes, “could get you in trouble. So could 
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saying ‘Humans are not animals,’ for different reasons” (41).4 But the anxiety that exists 
today and results in the polemical firestorms that can erupt when one relates to animals in 
either direction is the result of over a century’s worth of scientific, philosophical, and 
literary inquiry that increasingly pressured the human-animal ontological divide which 
developed during the European Enlightenment, where certain Judeo-Christian intellectual 
habits became secularized and reinforced by the language and mechanisms of rationality. 
The Christian idea of a Great Chain of Being that Arthur O. Lovejoy described—which 
separated animals from humans on the basis that animals have no souls and lack the 
ability to use logic and language—did not disappear during the Enlightenment period but 
rather informed succeeding generations of taxonomists, natural historians, and 
evolutionary theorists; today, such teleological models of ordering life still condition how 
many humans understand animals. By the late-nineteenth century, however, mounting 
evidence suggested that an ontological, essential division between human and other 
animals was itself irrational, and cultural divisions were beginning to coalesce around 
questions about the similarities and differences between human and other forms of animal 
life. Of all the developing evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century, the writings of 
Charles Darwin most famously challenged the belief that human beings were 
fundamentally distinct from other forms of animal life. Because it was couched in the 
language of rationality and was scientific (by the standards of his day), Darwin’s 
response, which emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, to that ontological 
separation initiated a re-thinking and re-imagination of animal life. As the popularity of 
Darwin’s work ebbed and flowed over the next hundred years, the influences in the 
United States of both his theory and those of his successors grew.
5
 As cultural familiarity 
  
10 
 
with the discourse of evolution increased, so too did responses to the complicated 
questions of similarity and difference to which it gives rise (still troubling today, as 
Morton points out). Even into the late 1950s, Bishop’s reading of Darwin’s work was a 
creative, aesthetic, and methodological touchstone for some of her poetic endeavors. For 
each of the writers examined here, literary expression was a forum for attempting to 
solve, or “figure out,” complicated ethical questions regarding animals. And, in 
addressing these questions, each writer also had to answer the question of how best to 
figure, or characterize, nonhuman others in their work. “Figuring the Beast” thus pursues 
the close connections between questions of ethics and questions of representation. 
 Much of the existing scholarship concerning animals in literature deals with their 
symbolic function. In these works, animals as animals are more or less negligible; what 
matters is what they symbolize. Kenneth Inniss’s work on animals in the literature of 
D.H. Lawrence, for example, emphasizes their role as symbols, and much of the criticism 
surrounding Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick is organized by questions concerning what 
the white whale symbolizes to the novel’s characters or is meant to symbolize to readers 
themselves. Most pertinent to my subject is perhaps the early-twentieth-century response 
of Theodore Roosevelt to creative expression that explicitly sought to present animals as 
animals and resisted the allegorical and symbolic modes that typify literary writing about 
animals. In an interview with Edward B. Clark, Roosevelt commented that if stories 
featuring animals “were written as fables, published as fables, and put into children’s 
hands as fables, all would be well and good” (E. Clark 771); Roosevelt betrays a popular 
bias, though, when he suggests any literary representations of animals that are not 
“fables” are misleading, false, and fantastical.  
  
11 
 
There is, however, also a growing body of scholarship that takes seriously the 
importance of nonhumans in the work of the humanities. Published in 1983, Mary 
Allen’s Animals in American Literature was one of the earliest scholarly works 
specifically devoted to surveying and cataloging the abundance of animal figures 
throughout canonical American literature. And as the field of ecocriticism has developed 
since the mid-1990s and its practitioners have theorized rationales for attending to the 
ecological implications of cultural artifacts and productions, considerations of the role of 
animals in literature have increasingly found a stable critical foundation in which to 
ground themselves; this critical foundation is made more robust by contributions from 
theorists working on animality from other theoretical perspectives, such as Donna 
Haraway (feminist theory/cultural studies) and Wolfe and Jacques Derrida 
(poststructuralism/continental philosophy). Ralph Lutts’s work on the preponderance of 
“wild animal stories” and the nature faking debate (discussed at length in my chapter on 
London’s work and interest in evolutionary science) found an audience in the growing 
ecocritical community of the 1990s. The project Wolfe began at the turn of the twenty-
first century in Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and 
Posthumanist Theory (2003) has more recently been followed up by his further pursuit of 
the theoretical import of animal studies in What is Posthumanism? (2009). Jennifer 
Mason’s Civilized Creatures (2005) provides an historical precursor to my own project 
and considers representations of urban animals in American literature in the second half 
the nineteenth century. Linda Kalouf’s Looking at Animals in Human History (2007) 
examines the presence of animals in art and literature over thousands of years of human 
history. Susan McHugh’s Animal Stories (2011) analyzes animals in several forms of 
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genre fiction throughout the twentieth century, concluding with her call for the 
integration of literary and scientific discourses in what she calls “narrative ethology.” The 
March, 2009 issue of the Publication of the Modern Language Association (PMLA) 
featured a cluster of articles outlining the current state of animal studies in the humanities 
and signaling its recognition as an important, timely field of inquiry. A glance at the 
program from the 2011 conference of the Association for the Study of Literature and 
Environment lists no fewer than 10 sessions dealing with animals in literature. The surest 
sign that the field is becoming a recognized discipline may be that it is now shepherded 
by its own professional organization, the Animals and Society Institute, which explicitly 
draws on its interdisciplinarity by branding itself as the place “where knowledge and 
science meet ethics and compassion.” But even with this growing body of scholarship, 
there is much work that remains to be done if animal-oriented literary scholarship and 
critical animal studies more generally are to sustain themselves as fields of inquiry over 
time. To put it in terms of Wolfe’s theoretical framework, more needs to be done in order 
to demonstrate the specific responses that literature makes to the problem of animality.   
This project aims to build upon the work already begun in this area by bringing 
greater attention to how the problem of animality functioned generatively for four major 
twentieth century writers. In accomplishing this, I develop methods of reading that take 
animals seriously as fictional characters and poetic figures while resisting the dominant 
position in literary studies that animals in literature are most appropriately read as 
metaphors, symbols, or allegories. Situating how literary study risks marginalizing its 
relevance to emerging animal studies discourses, McHugh observes that “[a]nimals locate 
a peculiar paradox of disciplinary concern, one that threatens to render literary studies 
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irrelevant to the species discourses permeating other areas of thought . . . Although 
animals abound in literature across all ages and cultures, only in rarified ways have they 
been the focal point of systematic literary study” (6).6 In her study of the presences of 
animals in the built environments of late-nineteenth century literature, Mason likewise 
refutes the “assumption . . . that their presence in literary texts should be read as a 
construct of the human imagination uninformed in any meaningful way by people’s 
interaction with actual animals” (3). But this lack of an animal-oriented critical tradition 
also presents opportunities for attending to and recovering the important roles that 
animals have played in many forms of literary expression.
7
 This project extends the 
inquiries begun in works such as those of McHugh and Mason, who both aim to develop 
reading practices that more fully consider what literary texts might have to say about the 
interspecies communities they represent and of which they are products. 
 The particular contribution this project seeks to make to emerging scholarship on 
literary animals involves making use of one of literary study’s most standard skills, close 
reading, in order to analyze how figuring (and figuring out) animals functioned 
throughout the twentieth century to produce aesthetic moments in literary texts that were 
also inherently ethical. As an ethical problem, animality functions similarly to the issue 
of otherness that has for some time occupied philosophers, ethicists, cultural 
anthropologists, and literary critics. Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism, Emmanuel 
Levinas’s philosophy of the face of the other, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s work on 
the subaltern each addresses issues of ethics and alterity in human cultures. The problem 
of animal alterity shares certain characteristics that of human alterity, but there are 
aspects to the problem of animality that are unique as well. In his multiple-day lecture, 
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The Animal that Therefore I Am, which I reference in a number of places in the coming 
chapters, Derrida deconstructs the theoretical and general-singular concept of “The 
Animal” and argues for the consideration of animals as ethical others. Derrida attends to 
the multiplicity of similarities and differences between human and nonhuman life—not 
only biological but also cultural. Addressing, imagining, and writing about those 
differences are processes that have ethical consequences, yet tracing the contours of those 
differences also present rich aesthetic opportunities. The following chapters examine 
several aesthetic techniques for dealing with nonhuman otherness and attend to the 
ethical consequences of those techniques, particularly as they advance the possibility for 
moments of interspecies empathy.   
For my purposes, I will consider “aesthetic” any representation of an animal 
produced through figurative or unusually descriptive language, analogy, 
defamiliarization, symbolism, or narrative focalization. As a generative problem, 
animality occasions two related questions that fuel its aesthetic challenges but also its 
aesthetic rewards. The first of these involves how a writer can represent a nonhuman life, 
and its accompanying perceptual, cognitive, and social realities, in a way that conveys a 
sense of an animal’s nonhumanness to a reading audience. Once a writer develops a 
strategy for constructing a nonhuman figure or character, a second question arises 
concerning the extent to which the language used will position readers to identify with 
the animal represented. Animal figures that encourage such identification enable readers 
to understand animals as “persons” in the sense that Gary L. Francione discusses in 
Animals as Persons: “to say that a being is a person is merely to say the being has 
morally significant interests, that the principle of equal consideration applies to that 
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being, [and] that the being is not a thing” (61). Rather than reading animals as symbols, 
which in Chapter II I argue represents them as “things,” reading them as “persons” in this 
way facilitates a habit of understanding nonhuman beings that ultimately can de-couple 
the concept of “person” from that of “human,” which is precisely the ethical move for 
which Francione argues. Aesthetic strategies that figure animals as subjects of their 
unique lives, then, are also fundamentally ethical.  
Several of the aesthetic methods studied in the coming chapters, which I discuss 
in terms of zoomorphism and defamiliarization, have roots in the artistic 
experimentations of impressionism. The development of aesthetic practices that I locate 
in impressionism’s focus on perceptual processes in turn correspond with efforts to best 
capture how individual, subjective perception influence one’s experience.8 James Joyce’s 
stream-of-consciousness technique in Ulysses, which attempts to experientially represent 
a day in the life of Leopold Bloom, is perhaps the most famous example of this kind of 
compositional strategy. Much impressionistic experimentation arose in response to a 
growing recognition of experience as embodied, and it resulted in the re-location of the 
mind from the kind of metaphysical non-space of Cartesian thought (at least insofar as it 
has become commonly understood) to the brain-CNS complex and its associated 
perceptive faculties.
9
  
 For many writers, the increased interest in embodied perception did not mean the 
outright rejection of metaphysical notions of mind or the soul. What it meant for some, 
however, was an increased sense of kinship with other bodies, including nonhuman ones, 
and a growing curiosity about nonhuman experience, especially as Darwinian 
evolutionary theory and its associated discourses of “animal psychology” (early versions 
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of what is now ethology) became increasingly powerful explanatory discourses. In 
Descent of Man, Darwin claimed that “every one [sic] who admits the principle of 
evolution, must see that the mental powers of the higher animals, which are of the same 
kind with those of man, though so different in degree, are capable of advancement” 
(246). In this claim, Darwin voices the paradox that became one of the most compelling 
problems of the twentieth century for theorists, scientists, and writers in a variety of 
fields: animals are both like and unlike humans. Darwin continued the thinking he began 
in Descent in one of his last works: The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. 
And one of his students, Georges Romanes, built on this foundation with his work in 
Animal Intelligence and Mental Evolution in Animals toward the close of the nineteenth 
and into the twentieth century, though the reaction to the highly anthropomorphic 
“evidence” Romanes provided for his claims became a significant factor in the rise of 
behaviorism. Relying heavily on stories from naturalists and pet owners as evidence, 
Romanes argued that many animals possess higher forms of intelligence than was 
generally believed at the turn of the twentieth century. In response to Romanes’s claims 
and often anecdotal evidence, critics began arguing that such work overstated the mental 
capacities of nonhumans. Conwy Lloyd Morgan, for example, argued in 1894 that “[i]n 
no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes, 
if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of 
psychological evolution and development” (59). Building on “Morgan’s Canon,” as it 
came to be known, the work of J.B. Watson began to establish behaviorist models as 
early as 1913 though the field did not reach its zenith until the work of Burrhus Frederic 
(B.F.) Skinner gained wide popularity in the United States toward the middle of the 
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century. Throughout the 1900s, work on the mental capacities and experiences of 
nonhumans proliferated, and, as forms of knowledge became increasingly 
professionalized, questions regarding animals took on correspondingly distinct 
disciplinary flavors. The puzzle of sorting through the mental and experiential similarities 
and differences between humans and other animals continues today in fields such as 
cognitive ethology, and it has been made even more challenging by increasing attention 
to the individual personalities, not only the species characteristics, of nonhumans. 
 One of the consequences of this growing understanding of interspecies kinship 
was an increasing focus of heredity and environment on human behavior, as manifested 
in the philosophy of literary movements such as naturalism; another was a corresponding 
interest in the consciousness, agency, and emotions (personhood, in short) of nonhuman 
animals.
10
 If, as Michael Bell notes, “the relative status of the human was a central 
recognition of Modernism itself” (13), the literary undertakings I will examine in the 
coming chapters also helped to establish and circulate the central premise of one of the 
major literary movements of the twentieth century. Coming to terms with the relative 
status of the human meant, in part, recognizing that human experience is just one of 
countless ways that living organisms experience the world we inhabit together. 
 But to say that such an interest in nonhuman experience “continues” even today is 
slightly misleading, as it implies that interest in nonhuman mentalism(s) remained more 
or less consistent over the twentieth century. During this period a number of different 
approaches to animals developed, and each emphasized different aspects of animal life. 
While behaviorist approaches focused exclusively on observable physical actions and 
resisted speculations about the internal mental experiences of its subjects, wildlife 
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biology devoted most of its energy to controlling, eradicating, or rejuvenating 
populations of animals with little emphasis on the experience or welfare of animals at an 
individual level. In the United States, the middle decades of the century were marked by 
growing emphasis on mechanistic models for understanding the behavior of animals and 
on biological and ecological sciences that focused on population management and 
biodiversity.
11
 During these years, interest in the mental and emotional lives of animals 
waned, though it did not disappear entirely. From the 1950s until roughly the early 1970s 
in the United States, the behaviorism of Skinner dominated much of comparative 
psychology, while the study of animal populations as primarily vehicles for the 
transmission of genetic material framed much biological discourse. In the late 1970s, the 
work of philosophers such as Peter Singer and Mary Midgley and ethologists such as 
Donald Griffin began to revitalize the ethological models from earlier in the century. 
Griffin, for example, states that the intention of his The Question of Animal Awareness 
(1976) is to “examine both the pertinent evidence and its general significance in the hope 
of stimulating renewed interest in, and investigation of, the possibility that mental 
experiences occur in animals and have important effects on their behavior” (4, my 
italics).
12
 That Griffin expressed a desire to “renew” interest in nonhuman interiority 
demonstrates his intention to return an interest in the mental and emotional experiences 
of animals to American biological, comparative psychological, and even popular 
discourses.
13
 The kind of work done by Singer, Midgley, and Griffin (and many others) 
renewed interest in the emotions and consciousness of other animals and gained traction 
through the 1980s and 1990s and growing into the field of critical animal studies as it 
stands today. This project focuses on a sampling of literature produced between 1900 and 
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1979 in order to examine how the influences of what was a booming interest in animal 
experience from those early decades lingered in literary expression through the middle of 
the century, shedding light on why modern ethologists sometimes “point to animal 
fictions as models enabling significant epistemological shifts within animal science” 
(McHugh 212).  
 My analyses of the literary endeavors of Robinson Jeffers, Jack London, Ernest 
Hemingway, and Elizabeth Bishop will pay close attention to how their responses to the 
problem of animality present moments of identification with as well as differentiation of 
human from other animals; I give particular attention to moments where both occur—
moments when identification does not necessarily mean anthropomorphism, at least in 
any simplistic sense of the term. In Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes, Laura Brown 
surveys representations of animals in eighteenth-century Britain, and she argues that 
responses to the “question of the animal” habitually fall into “the two main positions [. . 
.] of anthropomorphism and alterity” (2). Brown traces these responses to two theoretical 
trends. The anthropomorphic position Brown traces to the Darwinian position that, 
because humans and other animals share genetic heritage, we also share mental and 
emotional experience of varying degrees; she traces iterations of this position through the 
more recent work of Vicki Hearne and Donna Haraway. The alterity position in Brown’s 
schema bears a resemblance to the Cartesian argument of an existential difference 
between humans and nonhumans, and she locates more recent forms of this position in 
the work of Gilles Delueze and Felix Guattari and Paul Shepherd. The following chapters 
will certainly draw on the language of anthropomorphism and alterity to discuss the work 
of Jeffers, London, Hemingway, and Bishop, but in examining their work (especially the 
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work of the latter two) I want to depart from the assumption that responses to animality 
typically fall into one of those two positions. While each provides a rough metric for 
measuring how one imagines one’s relationship to other animals, the responses to the 
question I am most interested in rely on a precarious, context-dependent interplay 
between sameness and difference or “anthropomorphism and alterity.” Humans are both 
like and unlike other animals, and the extent of the similarity often bears upon the animal 
(by which I mean the individual animal, not the animal’s species) in question. I argue that 
the perplexing and profound interplay of sameness and difference, especially when it 
comes to un-observable, interior experiences, partly makes the idea of animals 
imaginative and aesthetic.  
In all cases, the responses I consider are aesthetic, as each of these writers self-
consciously produced texts for specific artistic purposes—though some of them, as in the 
cases of London and Jeffers especially, had additional scientific and philosophical 
purposes. What all of these writers have in common is that their work attempts to position 
readers to re-imagine normalized understandings of nonhuman animals;
14
 one of the ways 
they accomplish this is through defamiliarizing representational techniques that use 
nonhuman perspectives as narrative focalizers. Because their perspective and interests are 
emphasized, nonhuman characters generate readers’ sympathetic and empathetic 
identification. This defamiliarization can be both aesthetically generative and ethically 
motivating, and the following chapters will show how these writers use animals and 
animal experience as a means for re-presenting the familiar in a way that also advances 
the notion of nonhuman perspective and, by extension, personhood. When animals are 
presented as having perspective, that is to say when they operate as narrative focalizers, 
  
21 
 
they become characters, and through this they also become ethical subjects. The inclusion 
of nonhuman perspective in literary texts signals a curiosity about and consideration of 
nonhuman forms of being. These situations occasion moments for empathetically 
imagining nonhuman characters or poetic figures.
15
 In the case of some of Bishop’s work, 
nonhumans even become the speakers of poems, though her handling of this technique is 
not without an element of irony. Still, it is through this method of complicating ordinary 
with unfamiliar perception that other-than-human perspectives function. Establishing the 
perspective of an animal character, and authenticating it through defamiliarization, is a 
literary technique that also became a recurrent motif in the fields of ethology, animal 
psychology, and comparative psychology throughout the early decades of the twentieth 
century. As behaviorism replaced these schools of thought from roughly the 1920s into 
the middle of the century, literary expression continued to experiment with ways of 
registering other-than-human perspective, bridging the broader interests in animal 
experience that bookend the century. 
 The chapters of this project are arranged somewhat chronologically, and they 
build toward an analysis of animals in Elizabeth Bishop’s poetry that considers how she 
experiments with animals not only as focalizers and poetic speakers but as fundamentally 
social beings; ultimately Bishop uses techniques that resist speculation on the experience 
of nonhumans and presents them as agents and social actors while preserving a sense of 
their alterity. The first two chapters, however, consider the work of Robinson Jeffers and 
Jack London out of a strictly chronological order. Though he was only eleven years 
younger than London, Jeffers’s career stretched later into the twentieth century than 
London’s (London died in 1916). Despite this, Jeffers’s work makes for a provocative 
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beginning to this project because of his philosophy of Inhumanism and his largely 
symbolic uses of animals in poetry. Raised in a Christian household, but trained in the 
sciences of forestry and medicine, Jeffers’s thinking was progressive and radical for his 
time, but it was also constrained by a tradition of understanding animals as essentially 
different from human beings. That Jeffers’s poetry figures nonhuman animals as different 
in essence from humans is an important point because it is a line of thinking not present 
in the other writers examined here. London, Hemingway, and Bishop still recognize 
important differences between humans and other animals—some of them quite 
significant—but the differences they perceive are more in the order of what Darwin 
termed “differences of degree.” The essential difference maintained in Jeffers’s poetry, 
however, puts animals outside of society and deprives them of consciousness. In this 
sense, the social and intersubjective potential that I read into the work of London, 
Hemingway, and Bishop are generally not present in the work of Jeffers. 
 This is not to suggest, however, that Jeffers’s sizable body of work lacks value to 
literary animal studies in how it conceptualizes and responds to the complexities of 
animality. Jeffers’s philosophy of Inhumanism is a direct attack on the humanist ideology 
that for hundreds of years relegated nonhumans to the backwaters of consciousness, 
emotion, and thought, maintaining that animals were mechanistic, lacked society, and 
were moved to action only by reactive instinct. In response to western humanism and 
what he saw as its centuries of colonization, industrialization, political corruption, and 
large-scale military conflict, Jeffers’s Inhumanism sought to re-value the more-than-
human world and, indeed, the entire cosmos. Jeffers’s philosophy and poetry aimed to 
disrupt what he felt was an incestuous and self-enamored attention that western 
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civilization lavished on itself; he aimed to disrupt the assumption that human beings were 
the privileged children of an anthropomorphic God. While Jeffers maintained a belief in 
what he termed the “wild God of the world,” he sought to impress upon his readers the 
insignificance of their experience, emotions, desires, and achievements in order to 
disabuse them of what he saw as human arrogance and anthropocentrism. Jeffers’s 
philosophy, in turn, has been called everything from nihilistic to deeply ecological. 
 Jeffers’s attack on humanism led him to value animals as avatars for this wild 
God and as fundamentally unified with the rest of existence—a kind of unification from 
which he believed humans, because of consciousness, were alienated. Inhumanism thus 
privileged nonhuman animals while retaining the habit of conceptualizing them as 
fundamentally and existentially different from humans. Jeffers’s poetic exhibits this, as 
he retains methods of figuring animals into his poems symbolically and allegorically. In 
his attempt to turn away from modernist poetics that he felt were becoming increasingly 
self-conscious and esoteric, Jeffers’s turned to ancient themes, perpetuating a poetic 
tradition that primarily used animals and animal imagery as stand-ins for something else. 
Even as he retained these conventional poetic techniques, however, Jeffers put them to 
use for unconventional rhetorical purposes. Jeffers’s symbolism is anti-Romantic, his 
allegory anti-religious. For Jeffers, animals came to represent a lost, unconscious 
immersion with the universe and the fierce savagery and beauty of the wild God that 
permeated it. Because of how it enlists science, evolution, and animals and because of its 
impassioned response to what he understood as humanist arrogance, a selection of 
Jeffers’s work makes a fitting place to begin my analysis of animals in twentieth-century 
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American literature. Jeffers’s work lays bare the idealizations of animals that make many 
poetic responses to it at once rich and vexing. 
 After the analysis of Jeffers’s philosophy and poetry, the project’s attention shifts 
genres and moves to the work of London. Chapter II examines how animals are figured in 
the prose of Jack London, primarily in The Call of the Wild (1903) and White Fang 
(1906). A student of literary naturalism and theories of evolution, London engages 
animality from two sides. One of these is through a kind of “animalization” of his human 
characters, where human actions are figured as a function of instinct and environment 
with little behavioral agency attributed to reason or free will. London’s work of this type, 
particularly a text such as The Abysmal Brute (1911), resembles that of several literary 
naturalist writers. In this sense, London’s work chips away at the differences that for 
Jeffers remain so essential and fundamental. However, London also approaches animality 
from an angle that many other literary naturalists avoid; London complements his figures 
of animalized humans with a number of “personified” nonhumans. This chapter on 
London will develop what I mean by “characterized nonhumans,” but, put briefly, these 
are animals who operate beyond their symbolic elements and become rounded characters 
with consciousness and perspective. In several works, London sought to explore the 
mental experiences of animals, creating stories that, while not narrated by them in the 
first person, foreground their perspective and experience. Buck, the central character of 
The Call of the Wild, and White Fang, both canines, are London’s two best-known 
characters to function in this way. Using nonhuman characters as narrative focalizers 
makes possible for London’s readers a version of what Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze 
discuss as a “becoming-animal,” which for the human reader “is real, even if the animal 
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the human being becomes is not” (238). By encouraging readers to think through the 
perspective of an animal, to feel the world of an animal, and to allow them to 
empathetically identify with the experiences of a nonhuman, London’s fictions, as my 
chapter will show, operate through and activate this process of becoming-animal.  
London’s work is somewhat typical of a larger trend in North American fiction 
from the late-nineteenth and into the first decade of the twentieth century. In The Nature 
Fakers, Ralph Lutts examines the host of wild animal stories published in the period. 
Some of these of stories are narrated in the first person by animals, while others report 
their activities and emotions through third-person narrators. While The Call of the Wild 
and White Fang share their use of nonhuman characters with all of these other works, 
there are two factors that make London’s work of particular interest to my project. The 
first of these is London’s explicit interest in science.16 London saw his writing as 
scientifically valid.
17
 He argued that his texts were “in line with the facts of evolution” 
(No Mentor 109), and he invoked this claim as a defense of both Buck and White Fang 
when critics, including natural historian John Burroughs and President Theodore 
Roosevelt, accused him of “faking nature” by attributing mental states and intelligence to 
animals. London’s rhetorical interweaving of narrative and what he understood as 
scientific facts indexes a period of confusion in the intellectual history of the United 
States regarding the problem of animality, particularly where it concerns the issue of 
animal mind; it is worth noting that this confusion—and the related cultural anxieties 
over how to understand and treat other animals—is by no means now “over.”  
Through the first decade of the twenty-first century, critical animal studies as a 
discipline, has organized itself around similar iterations of these problems and 
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uncertainties. In their essay on the possibilities and challenges of cognitive ethology after 
the “demise of behaviorism,” for example, Colin Allen and Marc Hauser note, “[i]t has 
not gone unnoticed that the current problems associated with the use of mentalistic 
vocabulary to describe animal behavior are similar to those that were faced by 
comparative psychologists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (221). Early 
comparative psychologists, such as Romanes and even Darwin in The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals, relied heavily on anecdotal, narrative evidence to support 
their factual claims, much like London does in his 1908 essay “The Other Animals,” 
where he refutes Burroughs’s mechanistic position on nonhuman behavior. London’s 
work was in direct conversation with these scientific tracts, and it demonstrates the close 
connections between literary and scientific approaches to the problem of animality that 
characterize its history. At mid-century, Cambridge biologist W.H. Thorpe sounded this 
note when considering “Some Implications of the Study of Animal Behavior” in an essay 
published in The Scientific Monthly: 
 If ethologists are right, then, that the guarded subjective approach 
(implying, as it does, something of the viewpoint of the artist) is one 
essential method of acquiring the knowledge of animal nature, I believe it 
will ultimately be found that we have here a most important argument in 
support of those who conclude . . . that empiricism, however necessary as 
a scientific technique, cannot possibly—from the nature of the case—
supply an adequate scientific philosophy. But for a biologist this is 
treading on dangerous ground and I leave it hastily. (318)  
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Thorpe’s thinking on this topic is provocative because he identifies both the imaginative 
step inherent to the project of ethology and his own discomfort with the speculation it 
requires. Imagination, as Thorpe suggests, is the realm of the artist, but he is also quick to 
point out that the “guarded subjective” approach required for studying animal behavior 
necessitates careful imagination and descriptive choices. Literary and scientific ways of 
knowing must come together, then, when responding to the problem of animal minds. 
Thorpe’s anxiety here is echoed almost 35 years later by Allen and Hauser. But London’s 
dog stories reveal how, even in the first decade of the century, combining scientific 
inquiry and observation with literary imagination and language was already rich 
imaginative terrain for the creative writer. Because of his intentional use of “the facts of 
evolution,” London demonstrates ethology as a site where the disciplinary boundary 
between science and literature becomes porous. 
The debate over the scientific veracity of London’s work, coded in the language 
of anthropomorphism, was at its core a debate about the authority of story—and the 
Burroughs-Roosevelt camp did not at all appreciate the claims these stories were making.  
In London’s response to his critics, he tediously worked through the logic of Burroughs’s 
reductive attempt to “disprove that animals reason because they possess instincts” (111).  
London goes on to refute Burroughs’s claims by telling two stories—both rich in the kind 
of descriptive rhetoric also favored in the writing of Darwin and Romanes—about dogs 
he had known. It is through these stories that London attempts to bridge the experiential 
break between humans and other animals (in this case dogs) set up by, for example, 
Burroughs’s binary of descriptions of nature as either real or fake.   
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 London’s writing is also important to my project because of the defamiliarizing 
techniques he employs when writing the experiences of animals. London is not 
considered an aesthetic innovator. To the contrary,  critics often consider his writing, 
especially longer works such as The Call of the Wild and White Fang, to be episodic, and 
today much of his work is categorized as juvenile or young adult literature. But in his 
rendering of nonhuman perceptions can be found techniques that would be developed 
through the early decades of the twentieth century and become quite important to literary 
modernism. London’s use of defamiliarization to represent the perceptions of animals is a 
forerunner to both imagist and stream of consciousness techniques. When London 
attempts to render narrative via the experiences of animal characters, he does so by 
describing things according to their basic perceptual impressions, something akin to what 
Jakob von Uexküll would call a “receptor image” in 1934.18 London’s interest in 
scientific veracity exemplifies the integration of scientific and literary discourses at the 
turn of the twentieth century—a time when the division and professionalization of 
academic disciplines was still in its nascent stages. Both Jeffers and London crafted their 
work not only accommodate to scientific theories of evolution but also to enhance them 
and contribute to the general knowledge of their day. Chapters I and II of this project 
track how their respective literary responses to the problem of animality each took a 
different shape based on genre (poetry and narrative) and philosophical disposition (what 
each took away from the discourse of evolution). 
 The final two body chapters deal with two writers whose work less directly 
responds to the science of their time but is still intimately preoccupied with the problem 
of animality. Even though there is less evidence that either Hemingway or Bishop 
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composed their work to consciously demonstrate scientific principles, there is much to 
suggest that each were aware of certain evolutionary concepts. Born in 1899 and 1911, 
respectively, Hemingway and Bishop were thoroughly the products of the twentieth 
century, a century when the question of biological and experiential kinship (and what that 
kinship means) between humans and other animals was becoming widespread and 
commonplace. As debates such as the Scopes-Monkey Trial pushed evolutionary 
thinking into the public consciousness in the 1920s, two massive world wars and the 
systematic genocides of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia (whose procedures were in 
part based on those of industrial abattoirs in the United States) left the assumptions and 
ideals of rational humanism, which were predicated on the notion that humans are 
capable of transcending animality, in tatters. Historical events of the century 
corresponded, then, with what theories of evolution seemed to imply—that human beings 
probably had more in common with other forms of animal life than had been previously 
believed, which paved the way for the continued re-imagination of how other animals 
might experience, think, and feel. It follows that the writing of Hemingway and Bishop, 
while perhaps less explicitly engaged with evolution, manifests an interest in and sense of 
connection to nonhuman animals that became more widespread as the century 
progressed.  
 In that Hemingway’s work proceeds from London’s in terms of both style and 
genre, the third chapter of my dissertation discusses his varied and complex uses of 
animals. Hemingway’s animal narratives and characters are notoriously provocative and 
have produced a wide range of critical responses.  Any project attempting to understand 
how animals function in American literature of the first half of the twentieth century must 
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comes to terms with Hemingway’s often troubling but always complex figurations of 
nonhumans. Hemingway figures animals in a variety of ways—as game animals, 
symbols, adversaries, victims, and brothers, to name a few—and this multiplicity resists a 
single, all-encompassing reading of how he uses animals.  
 In Practical Ecocriticism, Glen Love’s analysis of Hemingway’s ecological ethics 
develops a method for reading his work that accounts for both the violence and the 
insight with which he wrote about animals.
19
 This method has been developed in more 
recent work on Hemingway’s African writings.20 Some of this writing has only in the last 
few years become widely available as Under Kilimanjaro, published in 2005.  Kevin 
Maier notes that in Under Kilimanjaro, “Hemingway’s perspective on animals, on 
shooting, and on the entire safari endeavor has changed significantly in this narrative 
[when compared to Green Hills]” (119).  Maier argues that Hemingway’s stricter 
adherence to game laws is a key indicator of his changed perspective on animals and 
ecology because it signals a greater respect for the ecological integrity those laws are 
seemingly meant to preserve (although those laws were more about preserving game for 
tourist hunters). Indeed, in Under Kilimanjaro, Hemingway is not solely in Africa as a 
tourist hunter but is temporarily installed as Acting Game Ranger and charged with 
enforcing the Royal game laws on the plains and foothills beneath Mount Kilimanjaro. 
My chapter on Hemingway contributes to—but also problematizes—this growing 
conversation about an ecological turn in Hemingway’s writing toward the end of his life 
by arguing that any heightened ecological awareness Hemingway developed was because 
he read, wrote, and thought about animals in simultaneously aesthetic and ethical ways 
throughout his career. My approach to Hemingway thus connects with the central 
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objectives of this dissertation in two ways: 1) it analyzes the importance of animals to 
Hemingway’s creative and aesthetic projects; and 2) it develops the thesis that close 
reading enables literary ways of knowing animals, which in turn have ethical implications 
that could be more widely attended to in animal studies at large.  
 The chapter analyzes Hemingway’s use of an animal figure or character in the 
historical context of the work in which it occurs. Ecological ethics, not only in 
Hemingway’s writing but also in American culture more generally, changed significantly 
from the 1930s to the 50s. The animals of Green Hills of Africa, for example, are 
constructed quite differently than those of The Old Man and the Sea, which are different 
still from those of “The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber.” To be sure, there are a 
number of animals who figure into texts as little more than symbolic devices for 
establishing the masculine individualism of many of his human characters, which has 
long been a widely held view of Hemingway’s uses of animals. Wolfe examines this 
view in a chapter on Hemingway in his Animal Rites, arguing that “the Hemingway of 
Papa’s code is not representative of the entire career, or even of its most ambitious 
undertakings, but is instead anchored largely in the macho posturing—in both life and 
writing—of Hemingway in the 1930s, a self-commodifying and often desperate chest 
thumping on Hemingway’s part” (123). Philip Armstrong has recently reiterated a similar 
reading. Citing Hemingway’s writing as “the crudest form of redemptive therio-
primitivism” (150), Armstrong argues that “during the first half of the twentieth century, 
the movement known as modernism brought about a parallel discrediting of sympathetic 
and sentimental engagement with animals in the aesthetic sphere” (134). This chapter 
addresses, and in some places refutes, such understandings of Hemingway and 
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Hemingway’s animals by focusing on a literary method of understanding animals that 
develops throughout, not only toward the close of, his career. In my view, critics have 
largely ignored the role that literary aesthetics play in Hemingway’s writing about 
animals. They seek rather to use later philosophical or animal-rights metrics to evaluate 
Hemingway’s work, and I argue that such approaches fail to account for much of how 
Hemingway writes about animals. Rather than serving to discredit the sympathetic 
portrayals of animals that appeared around the turn of the twentieth century, I argue that 
Hemingway’s work is haunted by them, and a significant portion of his literature, even 
early on, recognizes that nonhumans possess unique forms of consciousness, emotion, 
and being.   
This chapter builds directly from the chapter on London by analyzing 
Hemingway’s uses of defamiliarizing techniques when focalizing narratives through the 
perspective of a nonhuman character, primarily through a discussion of “The Short 
Happy Life of Francis Macomber,” published in 1936. Along with my focus on several 
key passages from Green Hills, my discussion of “Macomber” works in conjunction with 
an analysis of other methods with which Hemingway explores relationships between 
humans and animals in later texts. My survey of Hemingway’s animals draws on my 
analysis of two works, both published posthumously, whose geneses were in the 1950s: 
Under Kilimanjaro and The Garden of Eden. However, my central argument involves 
recovering empathetic portrayals of animals in the earlier work—ethical representations 
that have largely been ignored in contemporary accounts of Hemingway’s responses to 
animals. The Garden of Eden becomes particularly relevant to my project’s overall 
argument because at the base of David Bourne’s experience of writing a short story about 
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elephant hunting as a boy with his father lies an argument for a literary way of knowing 
animals; this argument is one that relates to the “Macomber” story but also one that more 
explicitly discusses narrative as an important way to understand animals. The chapter’s 
attention remains mostly on these texts because of their focus on experiences in Africa. 
However, brief discussion of The Old Man and the Sea (1952) also figures into the final 
part of this chapter because in this novella Santiago gives direct voice to some anxieties 
about his relationships to animals that are similar to those troubling much of 
Hemingway’s writing. 
The final body chapter of this project turns again to the poetic mode and considers 
the work of Elizabeth Bishop. The chapter argues that, in a majority of her poems 
featuring nonhumans, Bishop figures animals so as to cast them as kinds of persons, even 
though they remain radically strange and ultimately unknowable in any complete way. 
Still, despite this strangeness, Bishop’s speakers describe interactions with nonhuman 
animals that are both intimate and social. Bishop’s response to the problem of animality, 
then, is distinct from those of the other writers whose work is considered in this 
dissertation. My reading of Bishop’s work builds from her interest in Darwin, an interest 
she shared with Jeffers and London. Bishop’s understanding of Darwin’s writing, 
however, emphasized different aspects of his work than either Jeffers’s or London’s did. 
Where the turn-of-the-century writers tended to focus on natural selection as “survival of 
the fittest,” Bishop’s was interested in how Darwin’s methods of observation and 
description led to speculation and conclusion.
21
 Her perspective on evolutionary 
processes emphasized variety and speciation rather than survival and competition, which 
I argue led her to feature a greater diversity of animal life in her poems than any other 
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writer I consider. As a result, Bishop finds all kinds of affinities among and between 
animals. Rather than positing one essential, ontological difference between humans and 
other animals as Jeffers does (we are plagued by consciousness, they are not), the 
strangeness of Bishop’s animals is a function of their individuality and experiences. The 
strangeness of animal figures in her poems, then, is in part a product of their physiology 
(and in this way it is a function of their species identity), but it is also a product of their 
place, their history, and their culture on both an intra- and an interspecies level. In my 
reading of Bishop’s poetry, her famous fish, for example, is a specified individual—and 
her speaker takes special note of the fish’s particular history. Similarly, the speaker of 
“At the Fishhouses” notes that it is a particular seal who engages in a kind of call-and-
response conversation with her.  
The chapter on Bishop identifies several ways that her poems figure animals as 
individuals. The first of these is simply their diversity. Bishop’s animals represent a 
wider array of life-forms than those of any other writer analyzed here. This diversity sets 
up a kind of matrix of animal life that proliferates differences (both between humans and 
other animals but also among animals themselves). Second, Bishop consistently frames 
her speakers’ interactions with nonhumans as social, foregrounding society as 
fundamentally interspecies and infusing culture with extra-human implications. Third, 
Bishop repeatedly features animals in environments and habitats that demonstrate signs 
of human habitation as well. Bishop’s animals exist in places marked by pollution, 
industry, transportation, or development. These settings all highlight how humans and 
other animals co-exist in and share place. These three poetic strategies, I argue, lead to 
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figurations of animals that foreground interspecies intimacy, communication, and 
generosity. 
In reading Bishop’s animals as nonhuman persons, this chapter also asserts the 
importance of the language of personhood. In choosing personhood as the paradigm best 
suited for reading Bishop’s animals, the chapter engages a larger conversation in critical 
animal studies concerning the language we use to describe animals. This chapter draws 
on the recent work of Morton and McHugh to develop my readings of Bishop’s animals 
as nonhuman and social persons. Morton refers to animals as “strange strangers,” and his 
emphasis on the strangeness of animal life bolsters my argument that, although she 
frames them as kinds of persons, Bishop’s animals remain thoroughly strange. McHugh’s 
description of animals as agents also adds insight to this chapter by foregrounding how in 
several of Bishop’s poems interspecies intimacy and accessibility is a two-way street: her 
concern is not only about how her speakers access animals but also how they access and 
invade the experience of her speakers. While both Morton’s and McHugh’s positions 
enhance my reading of Bishop, I ultimately return to the language of personhood as the 
model best suited to discussing Bishop’s animal figures. In my reading, personhood 
results from Bishop’s focus on the social. Because Bishop’s animals function as social 
actors, they become persons; but, because Bishop remains careful to protect the 
strangeness of other animals, her poems proliferate the category of persons rather than 
assimilate animals to a singular version of what it means to be a person. My chapter 
concludes with the claim that Bishop’s poetry personifies animals without 
anthropomorphizing them and briefly discusses Bishop’s work in the context of what 
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Elizabeth Costello calls a “poetry of the animals” in J.M. Coetzee’s 1999 lecture-novella, 
The Lives of Animals. 
 Following these investigations of the significance of the problem of animality—in 
all of its experiential, aesthetic, and ethical complexities—to the literary projects of these 
four American writers, my conclusion points to how their work has contributed to a 
tradition that inspires interest in a wide array of English-language texts within and 
outside of the United States. The conclusion discusses continued interest in the problem 
by analyzing two recent films concerning other primates, both of which register anxieties 
over human-animal relations and capitalize on the intrigue that continues to revolve 
around questions about nonhuman otherness. In my final chapter, I discuss The Rise of 
the Planet of the Apes and Project Nim as examples of how, even after a century of 
attention, the problem of animality continues to pervade American culture. Respectively, 
each of these films also reveals that historical responses to the problem of animality 
continue to determine the way animals are understood and portrayed, and I argue that 
both films advance logics of personhood that run counter that developed in Bishop’s 
poetry. My brief discussion of Indra Sinha’s 2007 novel Animal’s People, on the other 
hand, makes apparent the continued relevance of models of personhood that are akin to 
Bishop’s. In its conclusion, my project demonstrates how the problem of animality, 
because of its complexity, continues to function as a generative site for the aesthetic and 
ethical work of literature, broadly defined. While London, Hemingway, Jeffers, and 
Bishop each approach the problem of animality differently, my conclusion attempts to 
illustrate that the specific practices of studying historical literature can provide valuable 
methods for interpreting representations of animals. Understanding their approaches to 
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animals illuminates how animality functions as a creative resource for literary expression, 
and it also illustrates how literary expression can enhance the conversations of animal 
studies in a broader context. 
 The project concludes by revisiting the twin assertions that literary study, because 
of its focus on narrative and poetic techniques and forms, can make important 
contributions to animal studies and that the problem of animality, because of its interplay 
of similarity and difference, was an important creative site throughout the twentieth 
century in the United States. Mark Bekhoff, a leading contemporary cognitive ethologist, 
writes in the introduction to his The Emotional Lives of Animals (2007), “we must be 
imaginative in our interactions with other animals” (xxi). Identifying with and 
understanding the experience of any other, be it human or nonhuman, is an exercise in 
sympathy, inference, and imagination, and the presentation of an animal’s interiority is 
both an imaginative and aesthetic moment. Such representations can be informed by 
observation and experience (the more successful ones usually are). In order for them to 
work, the language involved must be crafted to balance the paradox through which 
animals have come to be imagined: they are like us but not like us. If the aesthetic fails, 
the representation falls apart, and readers will resist it as either too anthropomorphic or 
overly mechanistic. This project, in its attempt to articulate the ways that its four subject 
writers have addressed these complications, also takes a step toward developing how the 
disciplined study of language, form, and technique can enrich not only how we talk and 
write about animals but ultimately how we relate to the experiences and emotions of 
animals themselves. 
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Notes 
1. The same story was run under the title “Dog Mourns at Casket of Fallen Navy 
SEAL” at MSNBC.com. 
2. Jeremy Bentham, whose work is discussed the following chapters, connected 
ethics to internal experience as early as the late-eighteenth century when he argued that 
an animal’s capacity for suffering should be the basic guideline for its treatment. Still, a 
mechanistic model for understanding animals remained largely popular in Euro-
American culture until evolutionary theories provided a “scientific” rationale for why 
other animals likely think and feel in ways that approximate the sentient capacities of 
humans. Throughout the twentieth century, a period through which animal welfare policy 
in the United States grew at historically unprecedented levels, ethicists continued to 
discuss the conditions for the ethical treatment of animals as a function of their mental 
capacities. Perhaps the century’s most notable ethicist concerning animal welfare, Peter 
Singer, for example, argues in Animal Liberation that sentience should be the basis for 
ethical consideration and that the greater an animal’s capacity for self-awareness and its 
continued interest in life the greater the ethical obligation humans have toward that 
animal. 
3. Wolfe continues, “What we need, then, is not interdisciplinarity but 
multidisciplinarity or perhaps transdisciplinarity—but a transdisciplinarity understood . . . 
as a kind of distributed reflexivity necessitated . . . by the fact that (by definition) no 
discourse, no discipline, can make transparent the conditions of its own observations” 
(What Is Posthumanism? 116). The goal of such transdisciplinarity, Wolfe argues, would 
be to produce an “enrichment of the object of study [in this case, nonhuman animals] via 
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‘semantic overburdening’” (117). I read Wolfe’s argument as an assertion that what he 
calls, working from Derrida, “the question of the animal” (similar to what I term “the 
problem of animality”) is best understood only by studying animals through multiple 
disciplinary lenses—not to produce a coherent understanding of animals that seamlessly 
unites disciplinary perspectives but precisely to understand the limits and conditions of 
disciplinary responses to that question by placing them in conversation (even conflict) 
with one another. My project is to analyze literary responses to animality by putting them 
in conversation with both scientific and philosophical responses in a way that highlights 
parallels and intersections but also points out incongruities, cracks, and misprisions. 
4. In response to this paradox, Morton proposes the term “strange stranger” as a 
replacement for “animals” because of the latter term’s complicated rhetorical history. I 
take up the “strange stranger” concept in relation to Bishop’s poetry in Chapter V, where 
I argue that Morton’s term, while useful for highlighting difference while bringing 
nonhumans into the social realm, is ultimately insufficient because it only displaces, 
rather than addresses, the anxiety over nonhuman others that is manifested when one 
“gets in trouble” by either articulation of the human relationship to other animals. 
5. This is, for efficiency’s sake, something of a historical over-simplification. The 
influence of Darwin’s theories of evolution, which included arguments for emotions and 
modes of consciousness in other animals that approximate those of human beings, did not 
spread at a steady rate. Indeed, by the onset of the twentieth century, the popularity and 
validity of Darwin’s theory had waned significantly, until the “modern synthesis” of the 
1930s, which combined Darwinian evolutionary theory with developments in the 
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understanding of genetics reinvigorated Darwinian evolution by providing a mechanism 
for the transmission of selected traits (Bowler, Evolution, 233-65 and 289-308).   
6. McHugh further argues that this paradox “threatens to render literary studies 
irrelevant to the species discourses permeating other areas of thought, today most 
obviously through forms like genes, genomes, and protein” (6). My project is an explicit 
attempt to develop how and why literary study should participate in these broader 
conversations particularly because of its ability to contribute to what Cary Wolfe calls 
“semantic overburdening,” which I discuss in more detail later in this introduction. 
7. This paraphrases McHugh’s broader point, in which she concludes “viewed as 
one among many peculiar operations of agency, the metaphorical animal’s ways of 
inhabiting literature without somehow being represented therein presents tremendous 
opportunities for recovering and interrogating the material and representational problems 
specific to animality. But this work also necessarily involves coming to terms with a 
discipline that appears organized by the studied avoidance of just such questioning” (6). 
8. Severe aesthetic experimentations with subjectivity and the fragmentation of 
reliable collective reality are often regarded as two of the distinguishing characteristics of 
modernist literature. Works such as Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, William 
Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury (or most anything else by him) and Joseph Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness dramatize how the experiences of individual characters, or even 
narrators, can introduce unreliability in how a text’s characters relate to one another and 
how its narrator relates to the reader. But the influences that gave rise to this kind of 
aesthetic experimentation can be found in earlier, such as that of Henry James, whose 
effectiveness, according to Linda Wagner-Martin, “stemmed from his belief that human 
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consciousness developed in nonlinear patterns [and that] what a character knew depended 
not on how many years he or she had lived but on how many moments of being, how 
many epiphanies had been experienced” (11). James’s brother, William, worked through 
similar ideas in his The Varieties of Religious Experience, which were based on a series 
of lectures given at the University of Edinburgh in 1901 and 1902.  Concluding these 
lectures, he asks, “Ought it, indeed, to be assumed that the lives of all men should show 
identical religious elements?” To which he answers, “‘No’ emphatically. And [his] 
reason is that [he does] not see how it is possible that creatures in such different positions 
and with such different powers as human individuals are, should have exactly the same 
functions and the same duties” (530). This style of thinking through differences in 
individual history and psychology, and how those differences impact experience, 
inevitably developed into an interest in the experience of nonhuman beings and bodies, 
especially once the Darwinian metaphor of “kinship” had widely circulated through 
culture.  
9. I invoke Descartes here mainly as a foil to introduce the notion of disembodied 
mind that has become largely synonymous with his name in theoretical discourse. As 
Ryan Hediger and Sarah McFarland point out in their introduction to Animals and 
Agency: “Even nonreligious people are still strongly influenced by the Cartesian notion of 
mind: that each person has an intangible, disembodied mind that interacts with the brain 
and the rest of the body . . . . Descartes argued that the soul cannot be explained in terms 
of the physical body” (5). As the language of their description reveals, such notions of 
mind are fundamentally inflected by Judeo-Christian religious theological history. But it 
is worth noting as well that some theorists are working to recover the ecological 
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possibilities of Descartes. Morton, for example, writes that even though Descartes “is 
framed as environmental public enemy number one” (7-8), “Descartes himself begins the 
Meditations with the idea of environment” and that his “aren’t thoughts we should banish 
from an ecological society. Far from being the death knell of human harmony with the 
world, Descartes’ doubting mind is profoundly ecological. There is more faith in honest 
doubt when it comes to feeling our way around the ecological thought, like a blind 
person” (95).   
10. Margaret Norris’s Beasts of the Modern Imagination examines several 
examples of such “bestialized” human characters from the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
11. Ethology as a field continued to develop primarily in Europe during these 
years, where second-wave ethologists such as Konrad Lorenz, Jakob von Uexkull, and 
Nikolaas Tinbergern pursued the implications of the work of earlier animal psychologists 
such as Romanes. Third-wave ethology, which I consider the social-linguistic turn, would 
begin to emerge in both the U.S. and Europe in the mid-1970s. 
12. Griffin specifically identifies the influence of mid-century behaviorism on 
early ethology: “[t]he nature of animal minds was a major subject of investigation until it 
was repressed by behaviorism. [. . .] Darwin, Romanes, Lloyd Morgan, von Uexküll, and 
many other scientists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were deeply 
interested in animal mentality[. . . .] What is new is the accumulated results of a century 
of active and successful investigation of animal behavior. These discoveries have now 
provided a wealth of data about the complexities and versatility of animal behavior[. . . .] 
We can therefore return to the investigation of animal minds” (Animal Minds 4). 
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13. Further commenting on just how far behaviorist discourse had moved from 
ideas about nonhuman thought, emotion, or consciousness, Griffin notes that “it is 
important to emphasize at this point that the tern consciousness is widely and strongly 
held by behavioral scientists to be useless for scientific analysis” (5) and “another 
important point requiring careful attention is the obvious fact that our mental experiences 
include not only images and intentions, but also feelings, desires, hopes, fears, and a wide 
variety of sensations such as pain, hunger, rage, and affection. All such subjective entities 
have been largely rejected from traditional twentieth-century psychology and ethology” 
(6). It is important to note that “ethology” as Griffin referenced it in 1976 is more akin to 
what I am calling behaviorism in this introduction than it is to ethology as it exists today, 
of which Bekoff’s The Emotional Lives of Animals is a more typical work.  
14. In this sense, the way these write figure animals intersects with what 
Lawrence Buell sees as the function of any environmental literature: “Seeing things new, 
seeing new things, expanding the notion of community so that it becomes situated within 
the ecological community—these are some ways in which environmental writing can 
reperceive the familiar in the interest of deepening the sense of place” (266). “Seeing 
things new” and re-perceiving the familiar, however, are also aesthetic tasks—so, as 
Buell’s assertion implies, these representations of animals achieve their ethical strength 
through the effect of their aesthetic method. 
15. The notion of sympathy and the sympathetic imagination was present in much 
literary, artistic, and philosophical thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
“Sympathy,” defined as “fellowfeeling; mutual sensibility; the quality of being affected 
by the affection of another” (489), appeared in Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary in 1755. 
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Later developed further by John Ruskin, Adam Smith, and other artists and intellectuals, 
the concept of the sympathetic imagination has a contested history, and it is often 
associated with the sentimentalist and melodramatic traditions of the nineteenth century. 
Discussion of the sympathetic imagination, then, may seem somewhat out of place in an 
analysis of primarily twentieth century literature, which, especially modernism, largely 
positioned itself as a reaction against Victorian moods. However, it is my position that 
the way that the twentieth-century writers I am analyzing figure animals into their work 
still activates such sympathetic imaginations of nonhumans but do so through different, 
more subtle aesthetic techniques. The importance of sympathetic imagination is still 
argued today: Martha Nussbaum, for example, argues for the relevance of it to social 
justice in her “Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life.” The concept is 
also given specific application to the problem of animality in J.M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth 
Costello (2002), whose title character argues that literary expression is fit for 
conceptualizing other animals because “there is no limit to the extent to which we can 
think ourselves into the being of another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic 
imagination” (80).   
16. It is worth noting here that disciplinary boundaries at the turn of the twentieth 
century, while forming, were not nearly as established as they are today.  And even a 
cursory look at the rhetorical strategies of Charles Darwin or his student Georges 
Romanes (who worked to establish the field of animal psychology, also sometimes called 
and related to comparative psychology) will show how much leading evolutionary 
scientists relied on storytelling techniques when providing evidence for their arguments 
about nonhuman emotion.   
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17. And he was not the only one. As late as the 1950s German ethologist Konrad 
Lorenz was citing London’s work. In King Solomon’s Ring, for example, he writes that 
“Reading between the lines, one can tell from Jack London’s obviously true-to-life 
descriptions that in sledge-dog teams this type of relationship is the rule, and it is most 
probable that it also prevailed among the primitive jackal-dogs of the Stone age” (116). 
18. Von Uexküll articulates a progressive series of image data that lead up to an 
organism’s assigning of meaning to different objects in its environment, or what he calls 
its umwelt: “. . . we have developed an effector image for each of the functions which we 
perform with the objects in our specific Umwelt. This effector image we inevitably fuse 
so closely with the receptor image furnished by our sense organs, that in the process the 
objects acquire a new quality, which conveys their meaning to us, and which we shall 
briefly term functional tone [von Uexküll’s italics]. . . .  The vital things in an animal’s 
world furnish a perceptual image. To reproduce these vital things, and to grasp the full 
significance of their perceptual images, we shall supply these images with a functional 
tone” (15).   
19. Love writes that Hemingway’s “level of understanding of these connections 
—Hemingway among the animals—is deep and insightful, even if its implications could 
not overcome his drive toward tragic individualism. Still I hope not to seem to claim that 
Hemingway would have been a greater author if he had reflected sound environmental 
values. The opposite is nearer the truth. The great power of much of his work arises from 
the tensions between the competing pulls of defiant individualism and the abiding earth. 
But part of the cost of that greatness is a diminished earth and a version of primitivism 
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whose price was still being reckoned by Hemingway at the end of his career, as it is by 
his audience even today” (133). 
20. In addition to the Maier piece discussed below, Cary Voeller’s “He Only 
Looked Sad the Same Way I Felt: Confessions of Hemingway’s Hunters” (2005) also 
pursues this kind of inquiry into Hemingway’s African writing. 
21. The chapter discusses a letter by Bishop to Anne Stevenson in which she 
discusses her appreciation of Darwin and her understanding of his method. 
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CHAPTER II 
UPENDING HUMANISM: 
ROBINSON JEFFERS AND THE IDEALIZATION OF THE ANIMAL 
The sizable canon of Robinson Jeffers’s poetry contains hundreds, if not 
thousands, of references to animals. Jeffers styled himself as a poet of the natural world, 
and his biocentrism determined his lifestyle and his poetics. Jeffers composed a majority 
of his poems while residing at Tor House, which he built on a section of rugged, central 
Californian coastline near the town of Carmel. As a poet, Jeffers isolated himself not only 
geographically but also formally and philosophically. Jeffers’s highly individualized 
poetic style informed his appreciation of animal life and nonhuman nature, and his 
intense philosophical position, which in 1948 he formalized under the name 
“Inhumanism,” regularly serves as the theme of his poems. I begin with a discussion of 
Jeffers’s poetry because it intentionally re-orders humanist, Euro-American values that 
were, by Jeffers’s day, several centuries old. Even in its attack on humanism, however, 
Jeffers’s poetry retains a fundamental characteristic of the humanist world-view: that 
human experience is fundamentally and essentially different from that of other animals. 
Rather than query the assumption that humans are the only beings on earth who 
experience consciousness and some form of rationality, Jeffers’s poetry, through its 
reliance on animal symbols, tends to idealize the unconscious,  and essentially mindless, 
experience he associates with nonhuman beings.  
Jeffers’s “Inhumanism” inverts a number of binary categories that organize the 
life as seen through the prism of Renaissance humanism. One of these is the conceptual 
hierarchy whereby human being—characterized by thought, consciousness, reason, and 
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rationality—is defined over and against animal life—characterized by reaction, instinct, 
mechanism, and a lack of sentience. Such a definition of the human gives rise to a 
number of related distinctions such mind (human) against body (animal) or free will 
(human) against biological determinism (animal). As Kate Soper notes, western 
humanism “appeals (positively) to the notion of a core humanity or common essential 
feature in terms of which human beings can be defined and understood” (11-12). While 
one implication of Renaissance humanist thinking sought to overturn value systems 
grounded in supernatural authority by emphasizing human rationality as the proper 
source of moral thought, humanism was also invested in theorizing a defining human 
essence that, as René Descartes proposes at the outset of Discourse on the Method, “is the 
only thing that makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts.” Just as it attempts to 
define the human in terms of a singular, core feature, so too does humanism define all 
animals singularly, an illogic Jacques Derrida exposes in his critique on the “general 
singular” concept of “The Animal” in western philosophy.1  
In a fundamental way, humanism defined the human in opposition to the animal, 
and it did so primarily through the logic that consciousness, reason, and rationality were 
exclusively human mental traits that distinguished human beings from all other forms of 
life. As the professed poet of Inhumanism, which quite literally signifies a set of values 
that negate those of humanism, Jeffers inverted the conceptual hierarchy that privileged 
human over nonhuman life, but in doing so, retained the habit of defining both humans 
and animals in singular terms. Jeffers’s short poem, “Hurt Hawks,” exemplifies both his 
thematic inversion of this traditional humanist hierarchy and his tendency to use animals 
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as a symbols in a way that implicitly perpetuates the assumption that animals are 
unconscious beings, essentially and absolutely distinct from humans. 
Published as part of the collection Cawdor and Other Poems (1928), “Hurt 
Hawks” lyricizes what at first glance presents itself as the mercy-killing of an injured red-
tail hawk; the poem’s central figure, the hawk, has suffered a broken wing, and he returns 
over the course of several weeks to the home of the poem’s speaker, who has fed the 
hawk in an effort to help him regain his strength and give his fractured wing a chance to 
recover. When it becomes clear that no such recovery is possible, the speaker kills the 
hawk, giving the hawk what the speaker calls “the lead gift” (32). “Hurt Hawks” opens 
with a vivid description of the hawk’s injured wing: “The broken pillar of the wing jags 
from the clotted shoulder” (1). By the poem’s second line, however, the speaker moves 
from a physical description of the bird to a simile suggesting that his “wing trails like a 
banner in defeat” (2). Through this framing of the hawk’s injury as a kind of defeat, the 
animal’s body becomes an index for symbolic meaning. In the space of just two lines, the 
speaker of “Hurt Hawks” has enlisted the injured bird as a symbol for loss, a function that 
“Hurt Hawks” reinforces throughout.  
 Through its fusion of the material body of the hawk with the symbolism of its 
speaker’s values, “Hurt Hawks” becomes more than a poem dealing with the reality of 
death shared among all living beings. The poem uses the hawk to reveal the values of the 
speaker, as it advances the idea of a God from whom “communal [human] people” are 
alienated.
2
 As opposed to the community of human readers, however, the hawk is aligned 
with “The wild God of the world” (“Hurt Hawks” 13). This alignment of hawk/animal 
and God is strengthened a few lines later when the speaker claims that, because he is 
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“Intemperate and savage, the hawk remembers him [God]” (14). The grammar of the 
introductory clause to the line strengthens the symbolic unity of the hawk and God; 
within the poem’s mood, “intemperate and savage” becomes a fitting description of both. 
While the speaker’s physical descriptions of the hawk work to orient his reader’s (and his 
own) sympathetic faculties, the symbolic operations of the poem continue to infuse the 
hawk with metaphysical meaning. Passages that remind the reader of the hawk’s 
suffering, such as “the great redtail / had nothing but unable misery / the bones too 
shattered for mending, the wing that trailed under his talons when he moved” (21), are 
joined with passages that reiterate the symbolism of loss. Although he has apparently 
been able enough to come and go over the course of the six weeks that the speaker has 
been feeding him, the hawk’s injury, according to the speaker, denies him “freedom,” to 
which the speaker can return him only through death. The poem’s conclusion stages this 
final liberation of the hawk:  
I gave him the lead gift in the twilight. What fell was relaxed, 
Owl-downy, soft feminine feathers; but what  
Soared: the fierce rush: the night-herons by the flooded river cried fear at  
its rising 
Before it was quite unsheathed from reality. (24-27) 
These final lines figure something of an essence of the hawk, a fierce, implicitly 
masculine “rush” that exists after the hawk has been released from the feminized, soft, 
and disabled body. The poem’s final lines offer an odd resolution for a sympathetic 
mercy-killing. The speaker’s actions here are not motivated by a desire to assuage the 
hawk’s pain but rather by the speaker’s own experience of a vague metaphysical victory 
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over death. The speaker attempts to corroborate this experience via the cries of nearby 
night-herons, which the speaker suggests are the result of their perception of the “rush,” 
although such a reaction seems more likely a response to the sound of the gunshot. In this 
closing image, then, the life of the hawk is sacrificed for the sake of what amounts to the 
speaker’s own spiritual, metaphysical rush, and the attempt of the poem to deal with the 
reality of mortality is lost under the pressure of its metaphysical goals.  
   “Hurt Hawks” is one of Jeffers’s most anthologized and famous poems, and, as 
is the case with much of his work, there is an array of conflicting interpretations of the 
poem.
3
 The poem is often viewed as Jeffers’s most empathetic depiction of a nonhuman 
figure. Jordan L. Green argues that the poem, “in its violence and perfect linguistic 
failure, challenges our agency and dominion over the nonhuman, and insists that we 
reconsider our ethical position toward the animal and nature” (21). But it is also a poem 
where Jeffers’s method for figuring animals is strongly and starkly at work, condensed 
into a vivid and gripping lyric. In this way, “Hurt Hawks” is generally representative of 
Jeffers’s approach to animality throughout his work, and, where it idealizes the 
experiential purity of nonhuman being (a form of being not plagued by consciousness), 
the poem registers a key historical trend in the history of animals in American literature. 
Consistent with emerging evolutionary scientific discourses regarding the commonalities 
between humans and other animal species, Jeffers’s poetry on one hand attempts to de-
privilege the human as essentially distinct from all other forms of animals and present 
humans as just one of a multiplicity of different species of animal life. On the other hand, 
Jeffers’s poetic habits of symbolism and the tradition of humanist thinking within which 
he is working limit the extent to which his poems can actually figure animals in any non-
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essentialist away. As a result, Jeffers’s poems rehearse both the animal-as-symbol 
tradition and the practice of defining the human against the nonhuman, even if some of 
the traditional figurations of that binary are overturned by his personal philosophy and 
poetic goals. 
The Poetry of Philosophy: Inhumanism and Poetic Technique 
At first glance, there is perhaps no literary figure from the first half of the 
twentieth century whose philosophy and literary values anticipate the rise of animal 
studies and posthumanism more explicitly than that of Jeffers. His philosophy of 
“Inhumanism” attempts to reject anthropocentrism and the humanist essentialism of 
Renaissance and Enlightenment thought, a mode of thought that was itself influenced by 
Christian theology that similarly distinguished human from animal essence. While early 
iterations of this Inhumanist philosophy are present in some of Jeffers’s earliest work, he 
most fully articulated it in the preface to his 1947 collection of poems, The Double Axe, 
where he writes that “[the book’s] burden, as of some previous work of mine, is to 
present a certain philosophical attitude, which might be called Inhumanism, a shifting of 
emphasis and significance from man to not-man; the rejection of human solipsism and 
recognition of the transhuman magnificence” (vii). That Jeffers’s fullest expression of 
this concept came in a prose preface to his poems reveals his belief that poetry should 
engage with other forms of discourse, that it should, in a word, be interdisciplinary. 
Within what we might see as the long history, or perhaps the prehistory, of animal 
studies, Jeffers’s guiding philosophic and scientific principles are early iterations of ideas 
that ground many animal studies and posthumanist theories even into the twenty-first 
century.  
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 Within a history of how animals are represented in literary forms, however, 
Jeffers’s poetry rehearses a practice of human exceptionalism, albeit one in which human 
beings are exceptionally disparaged rather than privileged. Jeffers’s work exists at a 
moment when the ideas that would develop into what is now recognized as “animal 
studies” were just beginning to take shape. His poetry, in its attempt to integrate 
evolutionary science with his inherited Judeo-Christian and humanist worldviews, 
captures many of the contradictions that can still trouble how animals are imagined and 
understood. 
 Jeffers’s philosophy is an early attempt to turn Enlightenment humanism on its 
head. Where classical humanism sees rationality and self-awareness as that which 
elevates the human from the rest of animal life, Inhumanism, where Jeffers figures it 
poetically, posits the same qualities as producing an anthropocentric—almost incestuous, 
in his view—solipsism that alienates human beings from the reality in which the rest of 
animal life is fully immersed.  With few exceptions, Jeffers’s poetic uses of animals, 
which he derived largely from the Romantic and epic traditions he sought to re-make, are 
sometimes inconsistent with the seeming anti-essentialism of some of his theoretical 
positions. Reflecting on his most important poetic themes, Jeffers once wrote, “the world, 
the universe, is one being, a single organism, one great life that includes all life and all 
things” (Themes in My Poetry 23); and, in a letter to an admiring reader, he argued, “Man 
also is a part of nature, not a miraculous intrusion . . . . Man would be better, more sane 
and more happy, if he devoted less attention and less passion (love, hate, etc.) to his own 
species, and more to non-human nature” (Letters 291). Such views suggest that, in some 
ways, Jeffers did not necessarily see humans as fundamentally separate from other 
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animals—even from other forms of matter. Still, I argue that this philosophical outlook 
often gets undermined in his poetry because his symbolic and allegorical uses of animals 
and animal imagery preclude any figuration of animals as genuine subjects of their own 
lives. Animals, in the majority of Jeffers’s poems, serve as avatars of a transcendent—
and an un-thinking—natural reality from which human beings are barred. Thus Jeffers’s 
poetry rehearses the logic that humans are quite distinguishable from all other animals in 
some kind of consistent, essential way. Jeffers’s work demonstrates an intriguing period 
in the history of animal studies, and in this period is some dissonance between the idea of 
kinship between humans and other animals and the expression of that idea in literary 
form. His poems make a suitable jumping-off point for a history of animals in twentieth-
century American literature because it so fully captures a contradiction between emerging 
thinking about human-animal relations and the literary and linguistic forms that might 
express that thinking.  
The Beauty Beyond: Transhuman Magnificence and Symbolism 
  Before discussing Jeffers’s unique form of narrative poetry in detail, I first want 
to examine the theory of symbolic poetic expression developed by Arthur Symons in his 
book The Symbolist Movement in Literature, published in 1899. The symbolism that I am 
suggesting characterizes Jeffers’s poetic use of animals bears much in common with 
Symons’s theory of symbolist literature. For Symons, the symbol presents an image that 
points toward something else, an idea or meaning beyond the image itself; in the symbol 
“the Infinite is made to blend itself with the Finite, to stand visible, and as it were, 
attainable there” (5). Symbolist literature, in this view, is “a literature in which the visible 
world is no longer a reality, and the unseen world no longer a dream” (6). The central aim 
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of the symbol, then, is to use a common referent, or a combination of them, to point to 
something beyond or apart from those referents. Animal symbols, for example, function 
not as or for themselves, but rather as “stand-ins for something else” (Coetzee 95). For 
Jeffers, this “something else” was communion with the invisible force he called the “wild 
God of the world” (13) 
Even though I have yet to find direct evidence that Jeffers possessed or read The 
Symbolist Movement in Literature, Jeffers, in a letter to H. Arthur Klein, does reference a 
critical essay written by Symons (Letters 173). Jeffers was also likely exposed to the 
operations of symbolist technique through an even more influential source, one that he 
shared with Symons: the poetry of William Butler Yeats. Symons’s The Symbolist 
Movement is dedicated to Yeats “both as an expression of a deep personal friendship and 
because [Yeats], more than any one else, will sympathise with what I say in it, being 
[himself] the chief representative of that movement in our country” (v). Symons goes on 
to call Yeats his “one perfectly sympathetic reader, who will understand everything that 
[I have] said, and more than [I have] said, who will think [my] own thought whenever [I 
have] said exactly the right thing, who will complete what is imperfect in reading it” (vi). 
Though much of the book is concerned with discussing the Symbolist movement among 
French writers, Symons’s Preface clearly locates Yeats as a practitioner of the movement 
in English. 
 For his part, Jeffers was keenly interested in Yeats’s poetry, particularly in the 
early phases of his career. Jeffers’s first biographer Melba Berry Bennett notes he came 
to know Yeats’s poetry primarily through Una, Jeffers’s wife; “Una had such a passion 
for Moore and Yeats,” she writes, “that one might say that throughout his marriage they 
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shared his home” (89). The Jeffers’s trip to the British Isles was largely structured around 
visits to places important to Yeats; in a letter to Horace Liveright Jeffers says that their 
trip to Ireland included visits “twice to Yeats’ feudal tower that he wrote the poem about” 
(Bennett 129). In addition to biographical connections between Jeffers and Yeats, there is 
a history of critical conversation comparing their poetics. In his analysis of the 
“passionate detachment” in their respective poetic projects, for example, Gilbert Allen 
argues that both are “post-Romantic writers for whom disillusionment lies at the center of 
imaginative life” and for whom “mass humanity is part of the problem rather than part of 
the solution” (61). The Symbolist techniques central to Yeats’s poetics also informed 
Jeffers’s, though the images on which Jeffers drew were different than many of mystical 
symbols toward which Yeats gravitated. In ways that reflect Jeffers’s sense of history as 
“geological” (which in Allen’s view is different from Yeats’s “cultural” sense of history), 
Jeffers’s symbols most often function through images taken directly from the nonhuman 
world. 
 In a strange way, the symbolic techniques Jeffers uses in his attempt “to give 
more [attention] to non-human nature” ends up pushing the nonhuman farther away; in 
his attempt to de-emphasize the human, all we read about (over and over) is how 
hopelessly alienated the human is from the rest of the universe. This is particularly the 
case when it comes to the role of nonhuman animals in his poetry. The functions of the 
Symbolism, for all it does well, put more emphasis on what is symbolized than on what is 
symbolizing. For Symons, this was Symbolism’s redemption, for he saw in the 
movement a salvation from what he calls the “decadence” of realism (8)—a salvation not 
just of literature but of spirituality. Symbolism, according to Symons, “is an attempt to 
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spiritualise [sic] literature, to evade the old bondage of rhetoric, the old bondage of 
exteriority. Description is banished that beautiful things may be evoked, magically; the 
regular beat of verse is broken in order that words may fly, upon subtler wings” (9). Such 
literature attempts to get beyond the mundane to the beautiful, the everyday to the 
extraordinary, above the earthly to the heavenly.  
In places, Symons’s definition of Symbolism’s purpose—that it should push 
readers to understand their insignificance—resembles Jeffers’s discussions of 
Inhumanism. In his conclusion to The Symbolist Movement, Symons argues that 
symbolism awakens readers from a state of ignorance into an awareness of what he calls 
our “real position,” writing,  
it is with a kind of terror that we wake up, every now and then, to the 
whole knowledge of our ignorance, and to some perception of where it is 
leading us. To live through a single day with that overpowering 
consciousness of our real position, which, in the moments alone it 
mercifully comes, is like a blinding light or the thrust of a flaming sword, 
would drive any man out of his senses. (172) 
This movement from ignorance to awakening parallels the rhetorical goals of Jeffers, 
who hoped his poetry might shock his readers out of self-absorbed anthropocentrism and 
into a fuller sense of what he understood as our ultimately insignificant place in the 
universe. Where Symons suggests that living in such a condition for even a day would be 
maddening, Jeffers devoted his life and work to expressing the kind of “consciousness of 
[what he and Symons believed to be] our real position,” a position Jeffers would describe 
as “involv[ing] no falsehoods, and . . . a means of maintaining sanity in slippery times; it 
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has objective truth and human value. It offers reasonable detachment as a rule of conduct 
[. . .] but it provides magnificence for the religious instinct, and satisfies our need to 
admire greatness and rejoice in beauty” (The Double Axe vii). Symons closes The 
Symbolist Movement by affirming the metaphysical emphasis of Symbolism and by 
reminding his reader that what makes life worth living is less the stuff of life and more 
what lies beyond it: 
And as we realize the identity of a poem, a prayer, or a kiss, in that 
spiritual universe which we are weaving for ourselves, each out of a thread 
of the great fabric; as we realize the infinite insignificance of action, its 
immense distance from the current of life [. . .] it is at least with a certain 
relief that we turn to an ancient doctrine, so much the more likely to be 
true because it has so much the air of a dream. On this theory alone does 
all life become worth living, all art worth making, all worship worth 
offering. (175)   
Jeffers’s particular brand of symbolism can be distinguished from Symons’s in that 
Jeffers intentionally distanced himself from the specifically Christian implications that 
Symons endorsed. Even as he distanced himself from Christian theology, however, 
Jeffers’s methods retained characteristics of the Symbolist movement. Jeffers remained 
committed to poetry that would awaken his readers to a metaphysical truth and that 
would convey to them something important about their place in a universal order—an 
order in which he understood humans to occupy an existentially unique position.  
In its philosophical mission and technique, Jeffers’s poetics bear the influence of 
Symbolism. For Jeffers’s particular moral message, animals could play a critical role: 
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they could signify an unconscious life—free of the emotional turmoil and solipsism that 
he argued defined the human condition—and wholly at one with the wild God of the 
world. In such a poetic, animal bodies, like the red-tail of “Hurt Hawks,” become 
sacrificed to a spiritual economy of meaning, and Jeffers, for all his seeming departure 
from conventional religious sensibility, was nothing if not a priest of the religion of 
Inhumanism. Even as such a position sanctified animal life, however, it failed to overturn 
human essentialism in any significant way. 
Getting Truth into Verse: Narrative Lines, Anti-Modernism, and the Poetic Reality-
Check 
 For Jeffers, the proper function of poetry was to express or communicate coherent 
ideas, which made symbolic and allegorical modes particularly well-suited to his poetic 
goals. By assigning abstract concepts to his poetic figures, he could develop and illustrate 
his philosophical arguments through his poetry. In his view, this rhetorical function was 
rapidly disappearing from modern verse, which he described as “thoroughly defeatist 
[and] in terror of prose, and desperately trying to save its soul from the victor by giving 
up its body. [. . .] becoming slight and fantastic, abstract, unreal, eccentric” (Bennett 79). 
Even as he shared a sense of “disillusionment” (Allen 61) with many of his 
contemporaries, Jeffers poetic response to that modernist condition took an idiosyncratic 
form. He intentionally distanced his poetic project from the “moderns,” and he developed 
his unique prosaic meter, in part, to better suit the expression of an organized 
philosophical outlook that would speak to readers across time. Jeffers argued that poetry 
“must reclaim substance and sense, and physical and psychological reality.” In a 
foreword to the 1938 edition of his Selected Poems Jeffers reveals that 
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 This feeling [of anti-modernism] has been basic in my mind [. . .] It led 
me to write narrative poetry, and to draw subjects from contemporary life; 
to present aspects of life that modern poetry had generally avoided; and to 
attempt the expression of philosophic and scientific ideas in verse. It was 
not in my mind to open to new fields for poetry, but only to reclaim old 
freedom. (79) 
While Jeffers recognized that poetry and prose are distinct from one another, he 
maintains in his foreword that their “provinces overlap” and that the chief feature that 
distinguishes poetry from prose is poetry’s responsibility to “deal with things that a 
reader two thousand years could understand and be moved by” (80). 
 Jeffers poetic, then, is specifically designed to communicate and illustrate his 
“philosophic and scientific ideas.” The notion of “Inhumanism” formalizes his 
philosophical predisposition, and the scientific ideas that influenced both his philosophy 
and his verse were influenced by his reading of Darwin and other evolutionary theorists 
as well as his own thinking about the implications of evolutionary theories. Tracing the 
exact sources of Jeffers’s understanding of evolution is difficult. Even his earliest 
biographer, Bennett, who was a personal friend of Jeffers and his family, notes his 
reticence when discussing his influences and his insistence that the appearance of outside 
influences in his work was always “intentional” (89-90). In a 1937 letter, Jeffers 
addresses the relationship he sees between science, philosophy, and poetry: 
First, as to the importance of science for the artist and for the thinker. It 
seems to me that for the thinker (in the wider sense of the word) a 
scientific basis is an essential condition. We cannot take any philosophy 
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seriously if it ignores or garbles the knowledge and view-points that 
determine the intellectual life of our time . . . . 
 For the contemporary artist science is important but not at all 
essential. He might have no more modern science than Catullus yet be as 
great an artist. But his range and significance would be limited 
accordingly. (SL 254) 
While Jeffers did not see an awareness of current science as an essential component of 
poetry in general, he did see it as an essential component of his poetry. He was a poet 
who aspired to be understood by readers across time, and for him this meant writing 
poetry consistent with what he understood as scientific truths. Jeffers did not want to 
limit his “range and significance” by “garbling” science and philosophy. Jeffers also 
locates the relevance of science and philosophy in the broader category of “thinking.” As 
a “thinker (in the wider sense of the word),” in the end, is how Jeffers would have 
identified himself, and he sought a poetic form that could express this kind of thought. 
For him, this form was necessarily narrative and often prose-like in its execution; Jeffers 
organized his lines around what he called “tidal” rhythms, and punctuated long, complex 
lines with short, emphatic ones.
4 
 Jeffers aspired to develop a unique style because he felt the poetic forms of his 
contemporaries were ill-fitted to the task of expressing his philosophic and scientific 
ideas. He also wanted his poetry to be thoroughly environmental not only in content but 
also in form. For him, the rhythms he strove to maintain in his poems correlated with 
fundamental rhythms in nature, both human and nonhuman. Breathing, tides, pulses, and 
lunar cycles are what ground his sense of rhythm, and they are all things he considered 
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part of the “transhuman beauty” that he wanted his poetry to demonstrate. This, in 
Jeffers’s mind, is what distinguishes poetry from other forms of literary expression, for 
poetry alone “cannot speak without remembering the turns of the sun and moon, the 
ocean, and the recurrence of human generations, the returning waves of life and death” 
(Bennett 108). For Jeffers, poetry was the only form capable of conveying his content, 
even though he had to engineer an anachronistically prose-like style of poetry to do it. 
Jeffers paid a price for his unique form; many reviewers lamented its length and cadence, 
and British critic Humbert Wolfe even “doubt[ed] whether what Mr. Jeffers writes is 
poetry at all” (qtd. in Bennett 133).  
 In this same 1937 letter, Jeffers also writes of his familiarity with the evolutionary 
science of his day: 
I cannot remember what were the first scientific books that made an 
impression on me. My father was a clergyman but also intelligent, and he 
brought me up to timely ideas about origin of species, descent of man, 
astronomy, geology, etc., so that progress was gradual, none of the view-
points of modern science came as a revelation. Studies in university and 
medical school gave me more room to move in, more points of support, 
but never, that I remember, any sudden readjustment . . . . 
 In my writing I have tried to avoid the special vocabularies of 
science (which would seem pedantic or worse) while accepting its 
influence. (Letters 254-55) 
Jeffers’s words display his disagreement with the Christian values of his father but also 
indicate Jeffers’s respect for him. Jeffers’s letter also reveals a deep, comfortable 
  
63 
 
understanding of science, even mentioning the titles of two of Darwin’s work seemingly 
without recognizing that he is doing so. Here and elsewhere, Jeffers’s tone when 
discussing science and evolution is confident and familiar, but it is also casual. He admits 
to accepting the influence of scientific perspectives, but his knowledge of them was 
somewhat inexact and flavored by his own philosophical and spiritual disposition. As his 
letter also reveals, the beliefs of his father fundamentally influenced Jeffers, even though 
Jeffers’s personal metaphysical and spiritual belief system strayed from mainstream, 
conventional Christianity. Evolutionary theory would reinforce Jeffers’s position that 
humans are not a “miraculous intrusion” (Letters 291) into nature; human beings do not, 
in other words, reflect God’s image any more than any other form of life. Inhumanism as 
a philosophy thus proceeded logically for Jeffers from the insight of evolutionary 
history—a logic that, at least on its surface, appeared to refute the position that humans 
occupied some kind of fundamentally unique place in the universe. From this 
combination of sources and epistemological influences emerged Jeffers’s thinking on 
Inhumanism and his re-thinking of inherited views on the similarities between human and 
other forms of animal life.
5 
The Horse That Would Be God 
 Jeffers’s narrative poem “Roan Stallion” (1926) stages a sacrifice of an animal’s 
individual life and interests for the sake of its symbolic value. As opposed to “Hurt 
Hawks,” where it is the speaker who maps symbolic meaning onto an animal body in 
order to rationalize the killing of that animal as a victory over death, “Roan Stallion” 
features human characters whose confusion of an animal’s life with a symbolic, 
metaphysical notion of God precipitates a series of events that ultimately lead to the death 
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of a nonhuman for the sake of reinforcing the integrity of the poem’s human community. 
Set against Jeffers’s usual backdrop of the rural California coast, “Roan Stallion” tells the 
story of California, a woman who, the poem notes in its opening section, is of Scottish, 
Spanish, and Native American descent. California lives an isolated, sustainable but poor 
life with her husband, Johnny, a first-generation European immigrant who is also a 
perpetual gambler and drunk, and their daughter Christine.  
 The poem’s central drama unfolds when California, after a harrowing trip to town 
for supplies, gets caught in a flash flood, during which she has a kind of near-death 
mystical experience and from which she is saved by a horse (the poem’s title figure) her 
husband won in a card game. The experience initiates a series of emotional events for 
California through which she comes to understand the stallion as God. California 
conflates God and stallion when telling her daughter, Christine, of the birth of Christ: 
His mother was named Mary: we pray to her too: God came to her. He  
 was not the child of a man 
Like you or me. God was his father: she was the stallion’s wife—what did  
I 
 say—God’s wife,” 
She said with a cry, lifting Christine aside, pacing the planks of the floor. 
 “She is called more blessed 
Than any woman. She was so good, she was more loved. “Did God live 
 near her house?” “He lives 
Up high, over the stars; he ranges on the bare blue hill of the sky.” In her 
 mind a picture 
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Flashed, of the red-roan mane shaken out for a flag on the bare hills. (136-
42)
6 
California further develops this God-horse complex by telling Christine that when Mary 
“loved / she was not afraid of the hooves” (146). California’s imagination of God is not 
only equine; she also references his hooves as “hands” and talks about how he “shapes” 
(147) his creation. But the traditional anthropomorphic image God is balanced with, if 
not overwhelmed by, the notion of God as a horse, which leads her to invest the roan 
stallion with metaphysical meaning. God not only “shapes” but also “ranges” (141). And 
the stallion’s mane becomes, in the picture of her mind, a “flag” (142)—another 
symbolically charged image that resembles something of the banner-wing of the hurt 
hawk. The animistic God that California imagines is underscored in the poem by her 
Native American heritage, which the poem idealizes in some ways over the corrupted 
European heritage of Johnny, her husband, but which also facilitates the family’s final 
drama. 
 California’s mysticism and her infusion of the stallion with symbolic meaning 
leads her to desire a sexual unification with him as an enactment of her re-writing of the 
conception of Christ. Because of the erasure of the individuality of the stallion under the 
weight of his symbolic meaning, California’s desire for the stallion is much more a desire 
for union with God than it is an identification with an actual animal. Karl Keller notes 
that “California in her religious fancy makes the stallion out to be an anthropocentric 
divinity approximating the transcendent, remote, miraculous God of her visionary 
Catholic piety” (114). On one order of meaning, then, “Roan Stallion” dramatizes the act 
of infusing an animal with symbolic meaning and makes such a process available for 
  
66 
 
critical examination. In California’s mind, where her husband fails, God will succeed—
and God becomes flesh in the figure of the stallion. As in “Hurt Hawks,” the animal’s life 
and interests get almost entirely effaced by the spiritual and emotional needs of a human 
actor; unlike “Hurt Hawks,” it is a character, rather than a poetic speaker (at least at the 
initial level) who subordinates an animal’s interests for the sake of metaphysical 
meaning. On a second level, however, the poem’s narrator mirrors California; over the 
course of the poem, it becomes apparent that California is not mistaken for valuing the 
horse as a God but that she has just infused him with the incorrect set of meanings. As 
Keller continues, the horse “is in reality ‘the savage exultant strength of the world.’ That 
is, it represents within Jeffers allegorical scheme the power and permanence and beauty 
of the creation” (114, Keller’s italics). On one hand, Keller’s reading identifies Jeffers’s 
habit of using animals as symbols for rhetorical purposes; on the other, Keller’s reading, 
in which he takes the horse to be an allegory “in reality” demonstrates how the method of 
“Roan Stallion” induces its reader to continue the practice of reading animals 
allegorically even as the poem seems to be critical of California’s performance of just 
such an operation. 
 As “Roan Stallion” builds toward her slaughter of the horse, California recognizes 
that she lacks the “strength” for the sexual encounter she imagines with the horse. In its 
place, the poem, drawing on the long tradition of horse-as-phallus, substitutes an 
impulsive bareback riding of the animal for the sexual encounter, at least in the poem’s 
most literal reading. This scene gives way to a kind of dream sequence, however, which 
makes possible, by way of figurative language, the interpretation that some kind of sexual 
contact between woman and horse does occur. When approaching the horse, California 
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“leaped, clung hard, and was mounted” (216). This kind of language play, which draws 
on what it means to be “mounted” in two senses, recurs throughout the sequence. The 
narrator describes an image of “A woman covered by a huge beast in whose mane the 
stars were netted” (259); a human figure who “smiled under the unendurable violation, 
her throat swollen with the storm and blood-flecks gleaming / On the stretched lips; a 
woman—no, a dark water, split by jets of lightning” (260-1). Throughout its narrative 
climax and resolution, the poem repeatedly frames the roan stallion with images of 
lightning and thunder, heightening the sense of the god-like symbolism with which he has 
become imbued. 
 In the midst this ride comes one of the poem’s most intriguing moments, which is 
also, in terms of nonhuman figures, one of the most intriguing moments in all of Jeffers’s 
poetry. After California and the stallion climb a hill, they stop to rest, and there is a brief 
shift in narrative perspective that momentarily registers the horse as something other than 
an avatar for Jeffers’s “wild God of the world” (“Hurt Hawks” 13): 
 . . . He avoided 
Her head and the prone body. He backed at first; but later plucked the 
 grass that grew by her shoulder. 
 
The small dark head under his nostrils: a small round stone, that smelt 
 human, black hair growing from it: 
The skull shut the light in: it was not possible for any eyes 
To know what throbbed and shone under the sutures of the skull [. . .] 
(242-46) 
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In these few lines, the narrator backs away from the descriptive language that reflects the 
metaphysical divinity with which California invests the horse and attempts instead, 
however briefly, to represent the event via the stallion’s experience. The reader is asked 
to picture California from above, through the stallion’s perspective, and the narrator 
reveals that, despite the existential and spiritual crisis that drives the poem forward, the 
horse’s concerns, what we can know of them at least, seem to center on rest, food, and a 
desire not to trample his human companion. By foregrounding the horse’s perspective, 
the lines disrupt the poem and problematize the symbolic function of the horse, or at least 
introduce the sense that all that metaphysical baggage is loaded onto the horse from the 
outside, by both California and the narrator. The lines undermine the symbolic thrust of 
the poem and recognize the otherness and strangeness of the horse in a way that more and 
more literary texts will do throughout the twentieth century. 
 The attention the speaker gives to the horse’s perspective is only momentary, and 
the reader’s perspective is quickly aligned back with California’s. The horse as 
nonhuman person—as a being with its own interests and consciousness—becomes once 
again cloaked by the horse as God, the horse as allegorical object. On the night after 
California’s excursion with the horse, Johnny returns with a plan to show California 
“what the red fellow did” (278) to a neighbor’s mare that Johnny had mated with the 
stallion for money. Johnny’s own drunken behavior distinguishes him as Jeffers’s typical 
corrupted human figure against the wild divinity of the horse. While he is distracted, 
California slips away, fleeing to the stallion’s corral for protection and setting up the 
poem’s final ritual sacrifice. When Johnny chases California into the corral “the roan / 
thunder / Struck” and his “hooves left nothing alive but [his] teeth tore up the remnant” 
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(317-18). The poem here repeats the language of lightning and thunder in figuring the 
horse and describes him as “having fed all his fury” (319). The horse becomes the vehicle 
for both God’s wrath and justice. 
 But it is not the death of Johnny that makes up the concluding sacrifice that 
resolves the poem. After the stallion has killed him, California, who has been handed a 
shotgun by her daughter, “moved by some obscure human fidelity / lifted the rifle” and 
“fired three times before the haunches crumpled sidewise, the forelegs stiffening / And 
the beautiful strength settled to earth” (321-24). Though California “turned then on her 
little / daughter the mask of a woman / Who has killed God” (324-25), the poem 
ultimately buttresses the human community via animal sacrifice; as Keller notes, in the 
end California is “instinctively loyal” to the “protective pride [. . .] selfhood [. . .] and 
consciousness” that sustain her “human-ness” (119). Although the arguably more bestial 
character (Johnny) had been already killed, Jeffers could not manage any other final 
resolution to the drama unless the stallion was killed twice over. On one level, the 
sacrifice of the stallion is necessary to maintain the “obscure human fidelity” that, after 
the cross-species alliances developed by the rest of them poem, functions almost like a 
deus ex machina, appearing from nowhere to motivate the final act of violence. But the 
horse must also die because he is God and because California, ultimately human however 
exotic her racial heritage may be in Jeffers’s figuration of her, must in the end be 
separated from God because of her humanity. Any resolution that would have left human 
characters engaged in any kind of ongoing social relationship with animals would have 
been the ultimate lie for Jeffers’s. “Humanity,” after all, as Jeffers writes earlier in the 
poem, “is the mould [sic] to break away from, the crust to break through” (164) if we are 
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ever to experience the sort of oneness with the wild God that other animals do, and, as 
such, humans are fundamentally unable to coexist with other animals in his imagination. 
 Through the character of California, “Roan Stallion” illustrates a kind of thinking 
that characterizes Jeffers’s approach to animality in general. While there are some 
theological points that might differentiate California’s religious imagination from 
Jeffers’s, they share a practice of allegorizing animals and existentially separating human 
and nonhuman experiences. Consciousness, for Jeffers, was the curse of and the hope for 
the human experience alone, which Tim Hunt notes in his reading of “Roan Stallion” as 
an allegory for the relationship between being and knowledge: 
For Jeffers consciousness figures as both a kind of redemption and a kind 
of damnation—perhaps more a redemption intertwined with a damnation. 
It awakens us to nature’s beauty and gives us the power to identify with 
and participate in its transcendence. But this identification—and the 
transcendence—is always partial and temporary since consciousness is 
also self-awareness. Unlike the organisms and objects about us, we are 
always at least partly aware of ourselves. (68, my italics) 
Despite his interest in theories of evolution, some of which were directly challenging the 
notion that the mental characteristics normally associated with “consciousness” are 
exclusive to the human experience, Jeffers could not imagine nonhuman life as anything 
but mechanistic—even if that mechanism did result in a kind of unreflective oneness with 
the universe that he admired. The most prominent evolutionary theorist, Darwin, himself 
had questioned the exclusivity of consciousness to humans in The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals, stating in his conclusion that “In the course of the 
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foregoing remarks and throughout this volume, I have often felt much difficulty about the 
proper application of the terms will, consciousness, and intention” (357).7 Jeffers’s had 
no such difficulty. As he says elsewhere “But man is / conscious / He brings the world to 
focus in a feeling brain / In a net of nerves catches the splendor of things [. . .] His 
distinction perhaps / Hardly his advantage” (“Margrave” 23-27).8 By slaying the horse, 
California reinforces the distinction of human consciousness from what Jeffers’s 
elsewhere calls the “somnambulism of nature” (“Margrave” 26). Even as “Roan Stallion” 
uses allegory to make its Inhumanist argument, Jeffers’s poem remains committed to the 
idea that the poem’s title figure—one of those “organisms and objects about us”—lacks 
self-awareness (even partly, according to Hunt) and consciousness. The method of “Roan 
Stallion” thus exemplifies a larger trend in Jeffers’s work whereby human essentialism is 
maligned, certainly, but never questioned. His symbolism and allegory exacerbate this by 
representing animals as objects whose primary value develops out of their ability to 
signify within a human economy of meaning.   
Hawk, Falcon, Rock: Symbolizing Life as Chemistry 
The lyric poem “Rock and Hawk” formalizes Jeffers’s habit of using animal 
references to access metaphysical emotions. The poem opens by calling direct attention 
to its use of symbolism: “Here is a symbol in which / Many high tragic thoughts / Watch 
their own eyes” (1-3). These opening lines foreground the poem’s symbolic operations, 
but they also introduce an element of solipsism—which of course, for Jeffers, is one of 
the key corruptors of human experience.
9
 The first line sets up an expectation, from 
which the second and third lines divert. The point of the first stanza, then, is not to call 
attention to the symbol itself but rather to the way the symbol reflects back the thoughts 
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of those who consider it. It is not until the second and third stanzas that the speaker 
figures the symbol introduced in the opening line: 
This gray rock, standing tall 
On the headland, where the sea-wind 
Lets no tree grow. 
 
Earthquake-proved, and signature 
By ages of storms: on its peak 
A falcon has perched. (4-9) 
In its third stanza, the speaker reveals that it is, in fact, a falcon that sits on the rock rather 
than the “hawk” of the poem’s title. This confusion of species underscores how a focus 
on symbolic function effaces the actual identity of a figured animal. To call a hawk a 
falcon is a bit like calling a human a chimpanzee (humans and chimps at least belong to 
the same taxonomic family, whereas falcons and hawks do not). This confusion of animal 
bodies, however, will pass under the radar of most readers, as the poem invests meaning 
not into the bird as a bird but rather as an object of metaphysical speculation.  
 The speaker follows its description of the falcon (or is it a hawk?) by offering a 
series of the abstractions that it is meant to symbolize: 
I think, here is your emblem 
To hang in the future sky; 
Not the cross, not the hive, 
 
But this; bright power, dark peace; 
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Fierce consciousness joined with final 
Disinterestedness; (10-15) 
Again the speaker reiterates that an animal as such pales in comparison to what that 
animal emblematizes. Even the seeming recognition of the bird’s consciousness cannot 
really serve to differentiate him from the disinterested rock upon which he perches. For 
what really matters here is not a recognition of the bird’s unique form of personhood or 
experience but that contradictory fusion of “bright power” with “dark peace” that excites 
a kind of sublime metaphysical realization in the mind of the consumer of this scene or 
reader of this poem. And even that seeming recognition of nonhuman consciousness is 
troubled when considered alongside the focus of the poem’s early stanzas, which remind 
us that “tragic thoughts . . . watch their own eyes” and leave the impression that the 
“fierce consciousness” of the final stanza is not the bird’s but rather the viewer’s/reader’s. 
It is this human consciousness, then, that is finally joined with the hawk and rock, which 
together become one undifferentiated emblem. 
 In poems such as “Rock and Hawk,” Jeffers relegates animal life to its chemical 
components. This move is in some ways quite progressive; it anticipates, in a certain 
respect, the argument developed by theorists such as Timothy Morton who argue that 
understanding the interconnectivity of humans and animals (via a process Morton calls 
“unworking”) ought to lead to an understanding of the interconnectivity of animal, 
vegetable, and mineral worlds.
10
 Jeffers explicitly makes a similar movement late in his 
career in the poem “Animals.” Jeffers’s speaker begins this poem by meditating on the 
image of a group sea-lions lying off a beach. In under 20 lines Jeffers moves from these 
sea-lions to the “rapid and furious lives in the sun” (8). These sun-beings, the speaker 
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argues, “are animals, as we are. There are many other chemistries of life / Besides the 
slow oxidation of carbohydrates and amino-acids” (12-13). “Animals” is another poem 
where the contradictory terms of Jeffers’s approach to animals are apparent. He calls the 
sea-lions “life near kin to human, intelligent, hot-blooded, idle and singing” (6), but again 
uses these lives as a springboard to metaphysical atonement with the universe (or at least 
our solar system). 
 Jeffers’s slide from animal to chemical organizations of life is a function of his 
knowledge of evolution, chemistry, and physics. That life and matter, organic and 
inorganic, human and nonhuman, all consist of the same stuff was one of the central 
tenets of his Inhumanist philosophy. Where his aesthetic uses of this knowledge becomes 
troubling, however, is when he elides over how these chemistries can be organized into 
distinct, individualized autopoeitic organisms. It’s where this sliding becomes eliding that 
many of Jeffers’s poems fail to recognize how differences make a difference—perhaps 
not on a cosmic scale but certainly on a local one. Or perhaps it is more appropriate to 
say that the only difference he attends to is the one between humans and everything else. 
So, while there is the recognition that sea-lions or birds of prey, or even rocks and nuclear 
fusions, are animals as “we” are, there is a failure to consider that the biology of other 
animals might distinguish them from rocks or vegetable matter in important ways and 
that their biology might produce a kind of self-awareness (and its accompanying sense of 
alienation from environment). Jeffers in many places comes quite close to making such a 
move—which might provide some ground for cross-species identification through the 
recognition of difference—but his progress in this direction is repeatedly undone by the 
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weight of his metaphysics and by the recurrent figuration of animals as symbols for his 
metaphysical truths.  
First Steps for Querying Humanism 
To this point, the tenor of my reading of Jeffers’s poems has likely seemed overly 
critical, perhaps even dismissive. Though there is, I think, good reason to be suspicious of 
the response to the problem of animality that Jeffers’s work typifies, I also recognize the 
importance of his project to the fundamental re-thinking of humanism that occurred in 
various places over the course of the twentieth century, re-thinking that contributed to 
both environmental justice and animal welfare as we know them today. In her essay “The 
Land and Language of Desire,” Sueellen Campbell identifies “two basic tactics for 
revealing the flaws of old ideas and building new ones” (127). The first of these is 
“largely polemical—to overturn old hierarchies, to take value from the once dominant 
and give it to the weak.” Such a corrective, Campbell argues, paves the way for a second 
“critical tactic [that] is more subtle and radical. This is to question the concepts on which 
the old hierarchies are built. Nature and culture, madness and reason, fact and fiction, 
human and animal, self and other, scientific and unscientific [. . .] all these oppositions 
come under scrutiny, are revealed as artificial, biased, and oversimple” (128). The 
importance of Jeffers’s project in respect to the problem of animality lies in the first of 
these tactics. His forceful, polemical argument, developed in both his poetry and prose, 
overturns humanist paradigms that exalt human life at the expense of animals. Rather 
than praise the characteristic that Descartes argues “distinguishes us from the beasts,” 
Jeffers condemns it—but he leaves largely unquestioned the assumption that there is such 
a common, unifying essence that singularly separates human from animal life. Even if 
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Jeffers failed to radically question the fundamental organizing precept of the “old 
hierarchy,” however, his work still marks an important point in the literary history of 
animality because it begins to query humanist hierarchies of life. 
The goal of Jeffers’s philosophy and poetry was to knock his readers’ 
understanding of their place in their world firmly off its humanist pedestal. In this Jeffers 
succeeds time and again (and again and again—as evidenced by the cry of critics that re-
worked his themes ad nauseum over the course of his career). Rather than glorifying 
consciousness and rationality, Jeffers bemoans them as the cause of human alienation 
from the rest of existence, from that “wild God of the world” with whom he so 
desperately sought communion. But, in his poetic execution of this doctrine of 
“Inhumanism,” Jeffers also retained a practice of imagining human beings as different in 
kind from all other forms of animal life, and in this he perpetuated a method for 
understanding human life that places humanity in an ontologically distinct category of 
existence defined against all other forms of nonhuman life and matter. Jeffers approach to 
animality demonstrates, starkly and repeatedly, the contradictions and complications that 
evolutionary science presents to an intellectual tradition influenced by hundreds of years 
of Enlightenment—and before that Christian—thought. For Jeffers, animals do not differ 
from humans in varying, contextualized ways based on species or individuality; animals, 
in his poetry, for the most part remain singular and symbolic. In the words of Coetzee’s 
Elizabeth Costello, animals “are the stand-in for something else” (95). The value of 
Jeffers work is not that it puts these differences in a biological and experiential context 
but that it reminds us just how difficult a task that actually can be. Jeffers’s is a first step, 
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overly simple perhaps, in what would become an increasingly complicated inquiry 
throughout the century.  
Notes 
 
1. Derrida argues, “[t]he confusion of all nonhuman living things within the 
general and common category of the animal is not simply a sin against rigorous thinking, 
vigilance, lucidity, or empirical authority, it is also a crime” (Animal 48). 
2. Jordan L. Green’s “Violence, Violation, and the Limits of Ethics in Robinson 
Jeffers’ Hurt Hawks” discusses how the speakers address to “you communal people” 
“brings the reader into blunt contact with the speaker, who pulls him or her into the 
hawk’s psychological space and the ethical realm of the poem” (14). In response to 
Green’s reading, I argue that, while the use of “you” does enlist the reader into the value 
schema of the poem, the speaker’s insistence on the metaphysical symbolism of the hawk 
limits the extent to which the reader can engage the psychological space of the hawk.  
3. Jeffers’s career was marked by wild fluctuations in how his poetry was 
received by the reading public. See, for example, James Karman’s introduction to 
Critical Essays on Robinson Jeffers for a review of the spectrum of Jeffers criticism. 
4. In an unpublished preface to Tamar from 1923, Jeffers describes his theory of 
poetic rhythm: “By rhythm I do not mean the dissolved and unequal cadences of good 
prose, nor the capricious divisions of what is called free verse, (both these being 
sometimes figuratively spoken of as rhythmic), but a movement as regular as meter, or as 
the tides” (Bennett 108). 
5. Alan Soldofsky calls Jeffers’s religious vision “anit-Christian” because of its 
rejection of monotheism in favor of pantheism: “Jeffers—a pantheist, anti-Christian 
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Californian—sacralized the inhuman beauty of nature’s cycles of eternal recurrence, 
which he called God, and which he believed determined humanity’s subservience to the 
laws of science” (179). While I agree with Soldofsky’s assertion on the level of Christian 
doctrine, I argue that Jeffers’s approach to animals very much bears the trace of a 
Christian tradition that figures human beings as fundamentally and essentially different in 
kind from other species of animals. That Jeffers’s religious notions would at once seem to 
conform to the “laws of science,” one of which was the Darwinian notion that “the 
mental powers of the higher animals . . . are the same kind with those of man, though so 
different in degree” (Descent 246), but at the same time operate under the inherited 
assumption that human consciousness (much like the “soul” of the Christian tradition) is 
existentially different from that of other animals demonstrates exactly how important it is 
to take note of his understanding of nonhuman life. When readers attend to this 
understanding, we can see that his philosophy is neither as radical as it might seem at first 
glance nor does it really change the way the human imagines itself in relation to other 
forms of animal life. This self-contradicting view is exactly what makes Jeffers’s poetry a 
testimony to just how subtle idealized models for imagining animality can be. 
6. Jeffers’s long lines create formatting challenges when citing his work. As Tim 
Hunt notes in his Preface to The Collected Poetry of Robinson Jeffers, “Jeffers’ [sic] 
verse lines are often too long to be printed as a single line of type. In this edition, such 
lines are broken as close to the right margin as possible without breaking words 
(including Jeffers’ [sic] hyphenated compounds); the remainder of the line is then 
indented and continued as a second line of type. Such lines should, though, be considered 
a single metrical unit” (xi). Where possible, I have repeated the line breaks where Hunt 
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places them in order to even further confusion over line numbering. In the few cases 
where even those lines are too long to be placed on a single line of type according to the 
formatting guidelines of this dissertation, I have double-indented subsequent lines to 
signal a line break that is mine rather than Hunt’s. Line numbers, however, conform to 
Jeffers’s original, which means that left-justified lines and any subsequent indented lines 
are cited as a single unit. 
7. As noted in my introduction, Darwin’s earlier work argued similar points 
regarding emotions and reasoning capacities in other animals. 
8. One of the telling inconsistencies in the understanding of animals that Jeffers’s 
approach to them typifies is that “consciousness” is grounded in “brain” and “nerves,” 
both physiological characteristics shared by a multiplicity of animal life-forms. Despite 
this, the speaker of “Margrave” affirms the inherited Humanist assumption that 
consciousness is man’s “distinction.” 
9. Many critics find Jeffers criticism of human solipsism to be the motivation for 
the recurring theme of incest in his longer narrative poetry. Karman, for example, writes 
that “Just as progeny of incestuous sexual relationships are often genetically defective 
because of the increased probability of disease, Jeffers believed our incestuous 
anthropocentrism lead to mental imbalance. The defect, passed on from generation to 
generation, keeps us within a prison of self-concern” (96). 
10. In “Ecologocentrism: Unworking Animals,” Morton “slide[s] from human 
being to nonhuman ‘animals,’ discovering how these neighbors confront us with the 
trauma of infinite responsibility prior to any specific code of ethics such as ‘animal 
rights.’” He continues, “We shall then slide from the animal to the vegetative, as we 
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recognize in the ‘idiotic’ livingness of life forms an a-rational, ‘a-cephalic’ core. And 
insofar as animals raise the specter of consciousness, we shall be sliding to the mineral 
realm—to the possibility that sentience can be embodied in silicon, for example (the 
question of artificial intelligence)” (75-76). 
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CHAPTER III 
THE LADDER OF LIFE: 
ANIMAL FICTION AND ANIMAL SCIENCE IN THE CALL OF THE WILD AND 
WHITE FANG 
 Perhaps more than any writer in American literature, Jack London used narrative 
story to explore the experiential and cognitive dimensions of the problem of animality. 
Some of London’s most popularly successful and critically discussed works describe the 
mental experiences, emotions, and reasoning processes of nonhuman characters, 
particularly dogs and wolves (and wolf-dog hybrids). If, as the previous chapter suggests, 
much of the poetry of Robinson Jeffers figures nonhuman animals as essentially different 
from humans by symbolically conflating them with the “wild God of the world,” the 
fiction of London pursues the problem of animality from a somewhat different direction. 
The importance of Jeffers’s poetry for critical animal studies is its expression of a 
response to animality that remains common to American culture: the idealization of 
nonhuman existence and an attendant disparaging of the conditions that separate humans 
categorically from other animals and their existence and, accordingly, their experience. 
London approaches the problem of animality from another angle; both The Call of the 
Wild (1903) and White Fang (1906) attempt to personify nonhuman characters, the effect 
of which closes, at least partly, existential and experiential gaps between humans and 
other animals. These stories develop their canine characters through conventional story-
arcs and employ third-person narrators to authoritatively convey the thoughts and 
emotions of London’s nonhuman protagonists. Thus, by exploring the possibilities of 
complex nonhuman psychological and mental processes, London imagines the 
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experiences of these animal characters through emotions and cognitive processes that 
were widely considered exclusively human characteristics at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Even while London’s works emerged from nearly the same period as Jeffers’s, 
his fiction employs a significantly different method of imagining nonhuman existence.
1 
Where Jeffers used animals to symbolize life unified with nature, London explored the 
experiences and history of individual animal characters.  
Naturalism and the Rhetoric of Fiction 
 This chapter distinguishes the response to animality that London works out in his 
fiction from the one that Jeffers’s poetry offers. Where Jeffers renders his Inhumanist 
philosophy through poetic models rooted in ancient forms, London’s prose typifies trends 
popular in literary fiction at the turn of the twentieth century in the United States. In form 
and content, Jeffers’s poetry displays a conscious turn away from his contemporaries; by 
drawing on epic and Romanticist poetics to achieve his rhetorical goals, Jeffers’s uses of 
animals were largely symbolic and allegorical. London’s fiction, influenced by literary 
naturalism and documentary fiction, operates through different formal mechanisms.
2
 
London’s narrative fiction creates meaning through characters, and responding to 
animality through the characterization of nonhumans enabled for him a set of imaginative 
possibilities—as well as problems—that differed from those that accompanied Jeffers’s 
symbolic mode. Conventional literary characters, particularly primary characters, 
generate empathy and perspectival identification from readers. At the turn of the 
twentieth century—a time when literary realism and naturalism were the dominant 
fictional modes—writers sought to win readers’ sympathies with reliable, third-person 
narrators that confidently reported the experiences, emotions, and thought processes of 
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their characters. By understanding the events of a story through the experiential lens of 
certain characters, what I elsewhere discuss as “focalization,” readers come to understand 
and identify with those characters. London’s fictional animal characters develop through 
such techniques, but, precisely because they are not human, he was challenged to 
describe their experiences in a way that could garner his readers’ identification while 
remaining realistic within the conventions of naturalism. Fortunately for him, literary 
naturalism, which itself was in part a response to late-nineteenth-century ideas 
concerning evolution, offered strategies for constructing literary characters that also 
provided reasons for the claim that many animals likely experience thoughts, emotions, 
and consciousness approximate to those of humans.     
At its most basic level, literary naturalism sought to illustrate how social 
conditions, heredity, and environment interact to shape human behavior. The guiding 
principles of naturalism query, if not refute, those of humanism, according to which 
human behavior, at least in its most ideal state, is the result of a set of mental 
properties—intention, consciousness, and free will—that can ultimately be decoupled 
from environmental or biological factors. One of the implications of naturalism is that 
human behavior is influenced by forces of heredity and environment that are commonly 
understood to determine the behavior of nonhuman animals. In their individual 
applications of these ideas, naturalist writers demonstrated these central tenets in different 
ways, and the literature of the movement often had social and environmental justice 
goals. Naturalist literature was generally polemical. London’s involvement with this 
school of thought, with its modes and forms, informed his thinking about the mental 
experiences of nonhuman animals. 
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 The logic of literary naturalism moves in two directions. The first, and most 
common, also grounded what was ultimately one of the objections many readers had to it: 
naturalism bestializes humanity. The first decades of the twentieth century produced 
numerous stories that feature human characters whose actions, thoughts, and emotion are 
determined by the expression of their inherited personality traits (heredity) within their 
social, environmental, and economic situations. The characters of Frank Norris’s 
McTeague, Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie, and Stephen Crane’s “The Open Boat” 
typify this direction of naturalism—as do many of the characters in London’s stories that 
feature humans as protagonists. Margot Norris’s Beasts of the Modern Imagination traces 
the thinking that influenced naturalist writers to the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
She discusses human characters in naturalist works in terms of a “biocentrism” that “has 
two major, related consequences: a subversive interrogation of the anthropocentric 
premises of Western philosophy and art, and the invention of artistic and philosophical 
strategies that would allow the animal, the unconscious, the instincts, the body, to speak 
again” (5).3 The criticism of self-making and unfettered human agency that characterizes 
naturalist literature produces what I call the “beast effect,” where the actions of human 
characters emerge primarily as a function of their interactions with their various 
environments rather than as a result of intentionality and will that precede those 
interactions. London’s The Abysmal Brute, a story about a prize-fighter who retreats from 
urban life—a site of corruption in the story—into the California wilderness, is 
representative of this version of naturalism.  
 London’s fiction explores the influences of heredity and environment not only on 
human characters, however. By seeking to understand the terms of nonhuman experience, 
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he also explored the implications of naturalism from another direction by exploring the 
possibility that nonhuman animals may have thoughts and experiences that significantly 
resemble those of humans. London’s nonhuman characters represent a response to the 
problem of animality that addresses the continuity of human and nonhuman mental 
experience. His response bears on his readers’ understanding of human nature, certainly, 
but it also makes an argument about nonhuman experience. As is the case in the history 
of literary study more generally, however, there is a recurring habit in London studies of 
reading his nonhuman characters as the “stand-in for something else” (Coetzee 95). Most 
critical interpretations of London’s dog stories primarily concern themselves not with 
what the stories suggest about how he imagines and identifies with nonhuman experience 
but rather with how London’s nonhuman characters veil fundamentally human 
experiences; such approaches read Buck, White Fang, and the rest of London’s 
nonhuman characters as what Jonathan Auerbach calls “men in fur” (9). Earl J. Wilcox’s 
1969 analysis of The Call of the Wild exemplifies this method:  
If London were not drawing inferences about man in his “dog-heroes,” his 
entire literary career, particularly in relationship to the naturalistic 
movement, is called into question. For to leave the implications of his 
struggle-for-survival thesis in the realm of “lower” animals is to relegate 
the stories to mere animal adventures. Indeed, there would seem to be no 
London achievement worth quibbling about. But, in fact, in both the first 
stories and the first novel—in which human beings are clearly the 
protagonists—these precise themes and motifs are basic philosophy. The 
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extent to which London makes the Darwinian or Spencerian allegory 
directly applicable to human existence is surely left for the reader to 
decide. (92) 
Wilcox identifies how London explores the twin implications of naturalism when he 
suggests that London infers that human and nonhuman behavior and experience emerge 
through similar conditions. However, Wilcox expects that the significance in London’s 
work lies primarily in how animal characters serve as allegories about human experience 
and existence, even if he is imprecise about the shape that allegory takes. Insisting that 
London’s work is “worth quibbling about” because it is ultimately allegorical, Wilcox is 
anxious to rescue London’s reputation from the abyss of “mere” animal adventure writers 
by assuring readers that his animal characters code lessons about humans. Wilcox’s 
position exemplifies a method of reading that implicitly disavows other animals as 
complex, thinking organisms; by insisting that the proper function of animal characters is 
allegorical, Wilcox perpetuates the assumption that only human experience is varied, 
complex, and interesting enough to make narrative more meaningful than “mere animal 
adventure.” Even as he cites London’s naturalism and interest in theories of evolution, 
Wilcox implicitly rejects the argument that The Call of the Wild treats nonhuman 
interiority for its own sake.  London’s fiction, in this formulation, is useful to Wilcox 
only insofar as it narrates, through allegory, something fundamental about human 
experience.  
This allegorical method of reading London’s work continues to find expression in 
critical discourse. Interpreting London’s work through the lens of Marxist materialism, 
Mark Seltzer, for example, finds a set of disciplinary norms and “systematic 
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management” imposed on industrial workers in the environment of London’s Klondike. 
While effective for revealing the logic of early-twentieth-century economic ideologies, 
Seltzer’s method, which relies on reading London’s dogs as stand-ins for human laborers, 
also effaces the ways in which nonhuman life and labor was (and is) harnessed, so to 
speak, and commodified for the production of wealth (169).
4
 In her explanation for why 
London might have chosen animals for characters, Lisa Hopkins rationalizes London’s 
choice to use dogs instead of human characters as a choice to write in “safer ideological 
territory,” comparing it to “Darwin’s decision to describe the breeding of pigeon’s rather 
than [human] people in The Origin of Species” (99). As Wilcox himself points out, 
however, London did not need to enlist nonhumans as allegories for the purpose of 
developing an argument about the human condition, strictly speaking; he was perfectly 
comfortable illustrating the naturalist position that humans, like animals, are a product of 
their environmental and biological conditions, and he treated the human implications of 
that philosophy in relation to human being numerous times in other works. Thus, there is 
something deliberate about his choice to create nonhuman characters, an intentionality 
that should not be subsumed by an exclusive focus on the allegorical work those 
characters might do. Certainly, the terms on which London understood animals were a 
function of his ideology, and his constructions of nonhuman characters were also 
attempts to naturalize some of his ideological values about fitness and evolution. But in 
choosing to explore nonhuman experience, London was also choosing to address a 
problem that was increasingly occupying literary, scientific, and popular discourse in the 
United States during the first decade of the twentieth century in its own right—the 
problem of understanding and relating to nonhuman experience. 
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Nature Writing, Nature Faking, and the Truth of Experience 
 London was not alone in featuring animals as main characters in novels and short 
stories. In both the United States and Canada, the years surrounding the turn-of-the-
century saw an explosion in the popular genre known as the animal story. British writer 
Anna Sewell is widely recognized for establishing the genre with Black Beauty, an 1877 
novel that features a horse as both its central character and narrator. Decades later, the 
genre boomed in North America. Beginning in the late 1890s, Canadian writers such as 
Ernest Thompson Seton and Charles G.D. Roberts wrote scores of animal fiction 
narratives, eventually becoming embroiled in a highly publicized debate over what some 
critics saw as the artificial anthropomorphic qualities of their animal characters. This was 
a debate in which London would eventually become involved. Ralph Lutts chronicles the 
rise of the wild animal genre and the public debate that erupted over its “personified” 
animals. While these animal stories were at first “a distinctly Canadian form of literature, 
[they] eventually became an important part of popular culture in the United States, 
especially at the beginning of the twentieth century” (Wild Animal 1). The popularity of 
animal stories in these years was enhanced by the increasing ubiquity of evolutionary 
theories, many versions of which suggested a continuity between humans and other 
animals in mental and emotional capacities.  
By the early twentieth century, Darwinian evolutionary theory had been 
circulating popularly for several decades, and the writers of wild animal stories were 
exposed to the logic of evolution at a younger age than some of their natural-history-
practicing predecessors, most notably John Burroughs and Theodore Roosevelt. Stories 
that sought to combine techniques of natural history observation with the implications of 
  
89 
 
what emerging evolutionary sciences seemed to suggest about the emotional and mental 
experiences of animals—and the similarities those experiences might share with the 
experiences of humans—were a product of these converging historical trends, which 
underwrote the animal welfare movement taking place in the decades that spanned the 
century’s turn. Along with a handful of other “animal story” writers, London would soon 
find his own representations of animal experience, in his case the experience of dogs and 
wolves, involved in a very public debate over the truth claims of fiction and the use of 
scientific fact in story making. 
Of this group of writers, London is of particular interest to my project for several 
reasons. First, his works were the most popular of the animal stories produced by a writer 
in the United States. That London’s fiction appears late in the genre’s development attests 
to the contours of the problem of animality in the United States, where, because of the 
popularity of naturalism, arguments surrounding animality were particularly engaged 
with questions of biological continuity between humans and other animals. It was not 
until 1903 that London joined a collection of Anglophone writers who had been 
producing wild animal stories from as early as the late 1870s, in the case of Sewell, and 
through the 1880s and 1890s, in the cases of writers such as Seton and Roberts. For some 
animal story writers, the problem of animality was one of capabilities, and critics such as 
Burroughs and Roosevelt questioned their works on these grounds. William J. Long’s 
1903 A Little Brother to the Bear, for example, recounts his observations, for which he 
vouched personally, of animals performing “surgery” on themselves. For his part, 
Roosevelt in turn called Long “perhaps the worst of these nature-writing offenders” (E. 
Clark 772). London’s animal characters differed from those of Long and Seton, however. 
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Rather than anthropomorphizing their actions, London primarily focused on narrating 
their thoughts and reasoning processes, such as they are in his stories.   
Still, London’s work received some criticism regarding the actions of some of his 
nonhuman characters; Roosevelt, for example, thought London’s portrayal of a pit-
bulldog subduing White Fang in a dog fight to be “the very sublimity of absurdity” (771). 
For London’s part, Roosevelt’s objection on those grounds did not bother him much; he 
just chalked that up to a difference in opinion and left it alone.
5
 Far more troubling to 
London than questions regarding the physical capabilities of his nonhuman characters 
was criticism of his work involving its suggestions of nonhuman reasoning and thinking 
processes. London’s dog characters are conscious, thinking beings, not instinctual, 
mechanistic automatons. While certainly influential, instinct for these characters 
functions more as one of a number of inputs that shapes their thinking and experience and 
less as a trigger for an unthinking, reactive reflex to environmental stimuli. It was also 
this criticism to which London felt most compelled to respond polemically. For London, 
then, the problem of animality was not so much one of external capabilities. The crux of 
the problem for London was “interior” in nature, involving his understanding of the 
mental processes and subjective experiences of animals—and dog and wolves in 
particular. What was controversial about London’s stories was how they suggested the 
dog characters experienced or thought about the events of the narrative. London’s 
problem was finding words and concepts that accurately and “scientifically” narrate 
nonhuman experience. He had to find ways to discuss his dog characters’ “thinking” 
without compromising their authenticity as dogs. Manifested in London’s work, the 
problem of animality was one of understanding the mental processes and emotional states 
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of nonhuman animals—and it was an aspect of the problem that widely occupied writers, 
both scientific and literary, in the period. Whether, and to what degree, the mental 
experiences of nonhumans resembled those of humans was no less a question at the turn 
of the twentieth century than it remains today. When, in 1873, Darwin attempted “to 
observe whether the same principle by which one expression can, as it appears, be 
explained [. . .] in other allied cases; and especially, whether the same general principles 
can be applied with satisfactory results, both to man and the lower animals” (Expression 
18) he intensified a growing interest in questions of nonhuman mind. In doing so, Darwin 
(and the writers who came after him) sharpened growing skepticism of the mechanistic 
explanations of animal behavior that for hundreds of years had more or less dominated 
how Euro-Americans understood nonhuman existence. The three works by London 
examined here, The Call of the Wild, White Fang, and his 1908 essay “The Other 
Animals” are a microcosm of the broader conversations surrounding the question of 
animal minds as it stood in the early twentieth century—conversations that, I think it will 
become clear, continue to resonate in animal studies. 
The thinking his dog characters perform and the experiences they have make 
sense, London believed, according to the logic of evolutionary theory. Animal stories are 
a response to the writings of Darwin and his successors that argue for experiential 
continuity between humans and other animals, an argument that grounded the emergence 
of evolution’s attendant discourses of ethology, animal psychology, and comparative 
psychology. Lutts notes that “the realistic wild animal story was a response to 
Darwinism” (Wild Animal 7), and London in particular sought to give his fiction 
scientific veracity. In attempting “to make [his] stories in line with the facts of 
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evolution,” London blends story with what was understood as fact. His narratives rely on 
a kind of fluidity between disciplinary ways of knowing, revealing how certain “facts” 
can become contested when illustrated in or mapped onto certain contexts. In an essay 
written for Collier’s magazine, London charges his critics with scientific ignorance: 
I endeavored to make my stories in line with the facts of evolution; I 
hewed them to the mark set by scientific research, and awoke, one day, to 
find myself bundled neck and crop into the camp of the nature fakers. . . . 
 Both [Burroughs and Roosevelt] are agreed that animals do not 
reason. They believe that man is the only animal capable of reasoning and 
that ever does reason. This is a view that makes the twentieth century 
scientist smile. It is not modern at all. It is distinctly mediaeval. . . . 
 No, President Roosevelt does not understand evolution, and he 
does not seem to have made much of an attempt to understand evolution. 
(No Mentor 109-10) 
London’s claims reveal his belief that his stories accurately reflect scientific facts about 
animals. His argument not only shows that he saw his work as a complement to science 
in its contribution to human knowledge but also locates a specific concept—reasoning—
that became a rallying point for parties arguing both sides of this version of the problem 
of animality. Because it relates to a host of high-order cognitive functions that complicate 
the mechanistic position held by Burroughs, reasoning became a particularly contested 
term for describing nonhuman mental processes.   
London considered his view that many animals were conscious, reasoning agents, 
validated as he saw them by evolutionary paradigms, forward-thinking and progressive—
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a view somewhat substantiated by later ethologists. As late as 1949, for example, German 
ethologist Konrad Lorenz cited London’s work as evidence of the complex social 
workings of canine culture. In King Solomon’s Ring, Lorenz writes “[r]eading between 
the lines, one can tell from Jack London’s obviously true-to-life descriptions that in 
sledge-dog teams this type of relationship [where dog teams establish a leader among 
themselves and then communicate this social arrangement to their driver] is the rule, and 
it is most probable that it also prevailed among the primitive jackal-dogs of the Stone 
age” (116).6 Lorenz validated some of London’s ideas about the social dynamics of 
canine culture, which supports London’s claim that his way of thinking about animals 
was better aligned with twentieth-century responses to the problem than was 
Burroughs’s.7 Yet, even as he was aligning himself rhetorically with scientific progress 
early in the century, his advocacy of Darwinism put London in a precarious position 
during his most prolific period of creative output. As Peter Bowler notes, “[d]uring the 
early years of the twentieth century, Darwin’s theory of natural selection had lost much 
of its popularity” (Evolution, 289). In the first decade of the twentieth century, other 
theories of evolution—one of which was a kind of Lamarckism that maintained 
categorical and typological distinctions between species—dominated how Americans 
imagined evolutionary processes.
8
  
London’s choice of Darwinian (transformational) rather than typological 
evolutionary theories favored a model of continuity among species somewhat atypical of 
his day. Darwin’s primary explanation for how evolution proceeds—how variation 
becomes inherited via natural selection—lacked an explanatory mechanism at that point. 
More popular than Darwinist evolutionary theory in London’s day was turn-of-the-
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century Lamarckism—which Steven Jay Gould suggests was based largely on a 
misreading of his work by late-nineteenth-century proponents of his theory. The early 
twentieth-century brand of Lamarck’s theory maintained that morphological mutations 
were achieved and transmitted within individual lifetimes.
9
 Lamarckism had the added 
appeal of organizing species into discrete groups with little or no biological continuity 
between them. Darwinian evolution, on the other hand, proposed a common evolutionary 
history among living organisms, whose species differences developed through natural 
selection. Natural selection thus rationalized the biological continuity grounding of 
London’s position that animals experience thoughts, emotions, and reasoning capacities 
that somewhat approximate those of human beings. Imagining this nonhuman interior 
experience occupied a sizable portion of his literary project. 
London’s work, then, is also of particular interest for my discussion of the 
problem of animality because it demonstrates the cross-disciplinary history of discourse 
about animality and the cognitive properties of nonhuman animals in the first half of the 
twentieth century.
10
 The speculative, imaginative even, nature of this emerging discourse 
of animal minds is precisely what many of its critics objected to, and it created 
methodological conflicts among early twentieth-century scientific and natural history 
communities. In 1903 (the same year in which The Call of the Wild was published) 
Burroughs published an article titled “Real and Sham Natural History” in The Atlantic. 
When discussing the work of Thompson Seton, he argued the “line between fact and 
fiction is repeatedly crossed and . . . a deliberate attempt is made to induce the reader to 
cross too” (299). As I will show, London’s narratives make similar transgressions, as his 
canine characters’ fictional behaviors and imagined thoughts are repeatedly explained by 
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the logic of evolution. However, London’s fiction works not so much as a deliberate 
crossing from fact to fiction but more as a deployment of descriptive language that 
problematizes the clarity of such a line to begin with. 
By fictionalizing the result of “scientific research,” London’s dog stories blend 
disciplinary modes. The interdisciplinarity of these stories, London’s attempt to weave 
“fact” with “fiction,” bears on the question of anthropomorphism as demonstrated 
through his work. Placed along the axis of anthropomorphism to radical animal alterity 
that Laura Brown discusses, London’s approach to animality leans more toward the 
anthropomorphic than Jeffers’s. After publishing his dog stories, London found himself 
“bundled neck and crop into the camp of the nature fakers,” and many readers responded 
(and still do) to London’s animals as being misleadingly anthropomorphized. However, 
for his part, London made efforts within his stories to distance the mental experiences of 
his nonhuman characters from those of humans.  
Before turning to The Call of the Wild and White Fang, I will discuss a key 
concept for London’s description of nonhuman interior experience: reasoning. Whether 
or not—and the extent to which—animals “reasoned” was a hotly debated question in 
London’s era. Early in his career, London addressed this debate directly; throughout The 
Call of the Wild, his narrator maintains that the dogs in that story do not reason. Identified 
by René Descartes as the essence that “makes us men and distinguishes us from the 
beasts,” the ability to reason has historically been a crutch for arguments seeking to 
distinguish—we might also say purify—human from animal being. In the early twentieth 
century, Burroughs relied on a similar rhetorical use of reason to argue that animals have 
no need to think. In an abstract sense, reason assembles a suite of complex mental 
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properties that, in Euro-American culture, have traditionally been regarded as exclusive 
to humans: intellect, thought, cognition, and an ability to solve problems or make 
choices. In The Call of the Wild, London attempts to preserve reason as an exclusively 
mental human trait—or at least a trait not possessed by dogs. But his attempt to reserve 
“reason” from Buck, the novel’s main canine character, is betrayed repeatedly by his 
narration of the story. As his canine characters learn from their mistakes, communicate 
with other dogs and humans, respond to new environments, and judge the intentions of 
others, the narrator relies on descriptions of nonhuman behavior that, for all practical 
purposes, can only be only be explained through the concept of reason. Still, The Call of 
the Wild is full of its narrator’s disclaimers that, for all the seeming intelligence he seems 
to display, Buck does not and cannot “reason.” By the time of White Fang, however, 
“reasoning” is recognizably under strain in his work, and by the time he composes “The 
Other Animals” in response to Burroughs and Roosevelt, he almost entirely re-qualifies 
his use of the word. 
In The Call of the Wild, Buck is stolen from his home in the Santa Clara Valley 
and sold to dog-traders providing the nonhuman laborers needed for various tasks 
associated with the Alaskan gold rush. Buck is traded between a number of dog-sled 
teams, each with a unique interspecies culture that informs how effectively it operates. 
Eventually Buck finds the companionship of John Thornton, an American with whom he 
develops a bond that most closely resembles the one he has with Judge Miller at the 
beginning of the novel. After Thornton is killed by a group of native Alaskans, Buck, 
who becomes progressively feral over the novel, joins a pack of timber wolves at the 
story’s conclusion. London’s narrator in The Call of the Wild aligns, or focalizes, the 
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story’s events with Buck’s perspective. As such the narrator is almost constantly 
refracting the story through Buck’s thoughts and emotions. Writing a story in this mode 
presents a number of challenges for a writer who wants to enable his human readers to 
identify with the experiences of his nonhuman main character but also wants that 
nonhuman to remain plausibly authentic as a nonhuman. In The Call of the Wild, reason 
became a concept by which London attempted to preserve the nonhuman authenticity of 
his canine protagonist, but, in order to align his reader’s perspective to Buck’s, he also 
had to describe Buck’s experiences somewhat anthropomorphically—which for London 
did not necessarily mean falsely. The opening chapters of The Call of the Wild are rich 
with examples of what the narrator calls “learning,” which grant Buck a higher-order 
consciousness and the specific ability to observe his environment, make judgments, and 
adjust accordingly. In other moments, Buck variously “learned to trust the men he knew” 
(7), “learned the lesson [that a man with a club is a law-giver]” (12), “learned that 
Perrault and Francois were fair men” (13), and “learned easily [how to toil in dog-sled 
traces]” (16). The story’s human characters reinforce the narrator’s descriptions of Buck: 
“Dat Buck for sure learn queek as anyt’ing,” comments Francois (19). Reinforcing the 
implications of the learning Buck does, the narrator once describes him as an “apt 
scholar” (20). 
The close of the second chapter of The Call of the Wild, however, marks 
something of an abrupt shift for the narrator, who momentarily turns from his narration of 
the story to an explanation of what and how Buck thinks about the events up to this 
point—or, rather, how Buck does not think about them. This shift reveals an anxiety 
about the learning and consciousness that Buck’s character displays over the first two 
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chapters, during which the narrator’s descriptions of Buck have implicitly ascribed to him 
an ability to perform a number of mental tasks that more or less amount to a kind of 
reasoning. The narrator steps in at the conclusion of this chapter to qualify the “learning” 
Buck does in the early sequences of the book. In a passage that directly follows 
commentary on Buck’s “moral nature,” London’s narrator attempts to clarify the 
preceding descriptions of Buck’s intelligence: “Not that Buck reasoned it [the rules and 
laws governing his situation] out. He was fit, that was all, and unconsciously he 
accommodated himself to the new mode of life” (22). London at this point introduces the 
key concept of reason to the representation of Buck. While Buck may be said to “learn” 
in ways that seem recognizable, the narrator suggests that this learning does not amount 
to reasoning, even if the ways in which he has told his story seems to suggest so in 
places. The narrator seeks to defend his characterization of Buck by suggesting that “he 
was fit” and “that was all” and that his learning was “unconscious.” London’s narrator 
here betrays the language of Darwin, who in The Descent of Man suggests that “[o]nly a 
few persons now dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning. Animals may 
constantly be seen to pause, deliberate, and resolve” (76). London’s description of his 
nonhuman characters as “unconscious” is an effort to protect his story from the criticisms 
of those, such as Burroughs, who held the view that only humans perform mental tasks 
that qualify as reason. London’s concession in this area, though, comes at the expense of 
the logic of Darwin’s position that animals do possess some forms of reason, 
consciousness, and emotion, and it’s a concession that exposes the delicate interplay of 
similarity and difference—and even the inconsistency—that characterizes London’s 
“mental continuity” approach the problem of animality.  
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In the remaining chapters of the novel, the narrator often describes Buck as 
performing mental processes that resemble what might otherwise be called “reasoning.” 
When Buck instigates something of a rebellion among a dog-team in order to challenge 
the authority of its lead-dog (and Buck’s rival) Spitz, the narrator says that he does so 
“craftily” (31). At another point, after Buck is punished by the sled-driver, Francois, for 
instigating problems among the team in order to undermine Spitz, the narrator says that 
Buck “was too clever ever again to be caught red-handed” (33). Such passages echo an 
overarching trend in the narrative to figure Buck’s intelligence as a critical component of 
his “fitness.” Buck’s intelligence, cleverness, and problem-solving abilities are arguably 
his most important traits, even more important than his size and strength. In The Call of 
the Wild, then, London removes from reason other mental qualities such as intelligence, 
cleverness, and cunning. 
Perhaps more indicative of Buck’s ability to perform mental tasks that resemble 
reasoning is his seeming comprehension of what is best described as the socio-political 
situation in which he is enveloped—a situation that also encompasses the book’s human 
characters:  
The breaking down of discipline [instigated by Buck’s cunning challenge 
of Spitz’s authority] likewise affected the dogs in their relations with one 
another. They quarrelled [sic] and bickered more than ever among 
themselves[. . . .] Francois swore strange barbarous oaths[. . . .] His lash 
was always among the dogs, but it was of small avail. He backed up Spitz 
with his whip, while Buck backed up the remainder of the team. Francois 
knew [Buck] was behind all the trouble, and Buck knew he knew. (33) 
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London’s narrator here describes Buck not only as socially and politically savvy within 
the culture of the team but also as having a kind of second-order awareness of what 
Francois “knew.” In other words, the narrator describes Buck as having a theory of mind, 
and it is a theory that not only includes an awareness of the minds of other dogs but of the 
minds of humans as well.
11
 Buck knows that Francois knows, so he proceeds to 
undermine the authority of Spitz in a way that precludes Francois from acting on that 
knowledge.  
 Buck is ascribed similar mental proficiency when he “advertises” (39) to Francois 
and Perrault his demand that he be placed as lead-dog after he has vanquished Spitz 
(another feat accomplished less by physical prowess and more by mental dexterity); when 
they finally confront one another, Buck beats Spitz by what the narrator describes as a 
“trick” (36)). Even as he insists that Buck does not “reason,” London’s narrator continues 
to attribute to him mental faculties that suggest otherwise. At one point, the narrator 
states, “Buck possessed a quality that made for greatness—imagination” (36). The 
slippage that results between the narrator’s reservation of the word “reason” and the 
language used to describe Buck throughout the story reveals both an anxiety over how 
similar the mental experiences of dogs may be to humans and a desire to keep some sense 
of otherness––of alterity—to his descriptions of Buck even as the language available to 
him to describe the sled-dog threatens to make that impossible. 
 By the time he composed White Fang, published three years after The Call of the 
Wild, London had changed his strategy for dealing with the issue of reasoning. On its 
most immediate level, the later novel constructs a counter-narrative to Buck’s progress in 
The Call of the Wild. Where Buck moves from civilization to wilderness, White Fang is 
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born into a wilderness setting and moves through a series of environments that are 
presented as progressively more civilized over the course of the novel. White Fang ends 
his story in a place similar to where Buck’s began: a rural country estate in northern 
California. Where it addresses “reasoning,” the language of White Fang differs from that 
of The Call of the Wild. When describing how White Fang problem-solves, learns, and 
makes choices, the narrator of the later text repeatedly explains such experiences not by 
suggesting that White Fang does not reason but by suggesting he does not do so in the 
“man-fashion.” The first such qualification comes as the narrator conveys the young 
White Fang’s experience of fear. In this case, the narrator suggests “[h]e did not reason 
the question out in this man-fashion” (145), which at once invokes not only the alterity of 
White Fang but also calls into question the ability of London’s language to describe 
accurately the way in which White Fang would have “reasoned the question out.” The 
narrator’s modifier, “this man-fashion,” emphasizes the point, almost as if the narrator is 
telling the reader, “White Fang would not have thought it out like this, reader, this way in 
which I am communicating his story to you now.” The narrator makes similar comments 
when describing the thinking White Fang does: “[h]ad the cub thought in man-fashion,” 
“[b]ut the cub did not think in man-fashion” (158). This repetition of the word “fashion” 
to qualify the thoughts and behaviors of White Fang suggests a development in how 
London understood the mental experience of his dog character. While there are certainly 
many things White Fang responds to mechanically and many ideas he does not think 
about, the narrator’s concession that White Fang does not reason or think in the “man-
fashion” is different from the thesis that he does not do so at all.  
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London’s language in White Fang circulates a pervasive response to the problem 
of animality, one that Darwin first articulates with his claim that nonhuman 
consciousness is “different in degree” rather than kind: nonhuman mental experiences 
can resemble those of humans but only to an extent. London used fiction to explore the 
degree of that difference, but that fiction also demonstrates how an abstract principle, 
such as a “difference in degree,” begins to break down when illustrated experientially. 
London’s work reveals the complicated linguistic and conceptual dilemma within the 
problem of animality with respect to interiority. 
 In London’s 1911 defense of The Call of the Wild and White Fang, “The Other 
Animals,” he makes clear his stance on the question of reasoning:  
I have been guilty of writing two animal-stories—two books about dogs. 
The writing of these two stories, on my part, was in truth a protest against 
the ‘humanizing’ of animals, of which it seemed to me several ‘animal 
writers’ had been profoundly guilty. Time and again, and many times, in 
my narratives, I wrote, speaking of my dog-heroes: ‘He did not think these 
things; he merely did them,’ etc. And I did this repeatedly, to the clogging 
of my narrative and in violation of my artistic canons; and I did it in order 
to hammer into the average human understanding that these dog-heroes of 
mine were not directed by abstract reasoning, but by instinct, sensation, 
and emotion, and by simple reasoning. (109)    
London anticipated the objection that Burroughs eventually made even as he was 
composing his story, and he cites sensation, emotion, and “simple reasoning” as the 
factors motivating his “dog-heroes’” behaviors. These behavioral influences somewhat 
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anthropomorphize dogs in that they figure nonhuman mental experiences in terms similar 
to those that describe human mental states, but London also makes a number of 
qualifications meant to preserve the alterity of his dog-heroes; the word “simple” is doing 
a lot of rhetorical work for him. In this, London differentiates his position from that of 
Roosevelt and Burroughs who, in his view, “agreed that animals do not reason”: 
They assert that all animals below man are automatons and perform 
actions only of two sorts — mechanical and reflex — and that in such 
actions no reasoning enters at all. They believe that man is the only animal 
capable of reasoning and that ever does reason. This is a view that makes 
the twentieth-century scientist smile. It is not modern at all. It is distinctly 
mediaeval [sic]. President Roosevelt and John Burroughs, in advancing 
such a view, are homocentric in the same fashion that the scholastics of 
earlier and darker centuries were homocentric. 
London’s somewhat ad hominem attack on the claims of Burroughs and Roosevelt, 
hinging as it does on the concept of “simple reasoning,” attempts to stake a claim for a 
kind of third position in the anthropomorphism/alterity dualism. As London figures it, 
Burroughs and Roosevelt claim that because dogs and wolves do not reason like “us” (as 
if “we” all think in the same way to begin with), then they must not reason at all. 
According to that position, dogs and wolves must be entirely other, and the only possible 
form that otherness might take is reactive mechanism. Burroughs was unwilling to credit 
nonhumans with more than a fraction of what he considered thought; “If we were to 
subtract from the sum of intelligence of an animal that which it owes to nature or 
inherited knowledge,” he once wrote, “the amount left, representing its own power of 
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thought, would be very small” (“What Animals Know” 556). Later Burroughs adds, 
“many of the actions of the lower animals are as automatic as those of the tin rooster that 
serves as a weather-vane” (563). From that perspective, it is impossible to imagine other-
than-human forms of consciousness may exist. Intelligence becomes a zero-sum game: 
Animals either think as humans do, or they don’t think at all. In response, London 
attempts to map out a different kind of reasoning performed by canids, or another 
otherness, as it were. Such mental processes are ultimately described by London in ways 
that resemble human reasoning; however his disclaimers that his nonhuman characters 
did not reason as “men” do (or, in Buck’s case, do not reason at all) indicate his desire to 
somehow convey a sense of the differences of those characters. London’s position, that 
nonhumans do reason and are not only reflexive mechanisms but that their reasoning is 
“simple,” is an attempt to imagine nonhuman experience in a way that cannot be directly 
mapped onto a mutually exclusive dualism of anthropomorphism and alterity. 
 But it is only an attempt, and what makes London’s approach to the problem 
attractive to this project is how he both succeeds and fails in his uses of such ideas in 
fiction. In “The Other Animals” in particular, London’s writing resembles, almost exactly 
at times, the strategy of late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sciences of animal 
mind. Early practitioners in the fields of animal psychology, comparative psychology, 
and, later, ethology routinely used narrative to evidence their claims about animal 
reasoning, thinking, and consciousness.
12
 London’s rhetorical strategy in “The Other 
Animals” makes use of the same technique. Once the essay formally responds to the 
accusations of Burroughs and Roosevelt and opens the space for a different sort of 
response to the reasoning/mechanism binary (or the anthropomorphism/alterity one, to 
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figure it according to Brown’s schema), London goes on to prove his argument through 
two short vignettes about dogs with whom he had lived at various times: “Rollo” and 
“Glen.” As London tells these brief stories, his qualifier, “simple,” becomes strained 
(and, at some points, falls away entirely), and he describes their mental processes with 
comments such as “You and I, and even Mr. Burroughs, perform acts of reasoning 
precisely similar to [Glen’s] every day in our lives” and “Mr. Burroughs says that 
‘instinct suffices for the animals,’ that ‘they get along very well without reason.’ But I 
say what all the poor nature fakers will say, that Rollo reasoned” (114). London offers 
these brief, observational narratives to prove that these dogs reasoned, going even farther 
in this essay than he dared when composing The Call of the Wild five years earlier: where 
in 1903 he continually told his reader that Buck did not reason, by 1908 he had no 
reservations when asserting that the dogs he had known exercised reason.    
 London’s approach to the problem of animal intelligence complicates the 
anthropomorphism/alterity dualism, but it does not destroy it. The kind of otherness 
London imagines ultimately turns that dualism into more of a sliding scale, but one on 
which all animal life can be plotted in a more or less linear fashion. As London concludes 
his essay, he offers a defining metaphor that reveals that his argument is not so much 
about “The Other Animals” as it is that all animals, including humans, are basically the 
same when it comes to conscious experience. London’s metaphor of a “ladder of life” 
enables but also limits how he imagines nonhuman life. As are his attempts at proving his 
theory of animal mind by employing narrative, London’s teleological views of evolution 
are typical of his day, views that plotted not only species but also races along a 
hierarchical evolutionary continuum. Thus London finishes by extorting Burroughs: “No, 
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Mr. Burroughs, though you stand on the top of the ladder of life, you must not kick out 
that ladder from under your feet. You must not deny your relatives, the other animals” 
(120). The fundamental issue that arises as a result of London’s hierarchical paradigm is 
that the intelligence of others becomes less “other intelligence” and more “my own 
intelligence in a rudimentary form” (to borrow another qualifier London sometimes uses). 
 Still, despite the problems that develop from London’s somewhat narrow 
conception of otherness, his response to animality is valuable for its attempt to break 
down the dualism that motivated (and still sometimes motivates) the conversations 
surrounding it. His response is valuable to a greater extent because of the pressure his 
narratives put on the language featured in those conversations and because of how his 
literary expression shepherds the language and logic of the science of his period. As 
intentionally scientific writers such as Darwin and Romanes did, London drew on his 
close observations of animal behaviors as evidence for his speculations about their mental 
processes. In his Mind in Evolution (1901), for example, Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, 
uses the example of a cat he had “which learnt to ‘knock at the door’ by lifting the mat 
outside and letting it fall” as a way to answer the question of “whether there is any 
evidence that this [trial-and-error] stage of intelligence is attained by any animals other 
than man” (140). For his part, London cites two similar examples of dogs in “The Other 
Animals.” 
Although his view of intelligence is linear and hierarchical, London is also 
modest in his valuation of human intelligence; in the final paragraphs of “The Other 
Animals,” he argues, “Let us be very humble. We who are so very human are very 
animal. [. . .] You must not deny your relatives, the other animals. Their history is your 
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history, and if you kick them to the bottom of the abyss, to the bottom of the abyss you 
go yourself. By them you stand or fall” (120). In London’s framework, reasoning 
becomes a contested category. Rather than something that separates humans from 
animals, reason becomes an ability that existentially and experientially links (some) other 
animals to humans. That other animals have limbs or eyes or lungs or mouths is not 
enough to evidence an experiential kinship (one that opens a possibility for cross-species 
empathy); for London, and for Burroughs, the presence (or absence) of reasoning is 
critically significant. According to London’s descriptions of reasoning, the term is in 
many ways a stand-in for a cluster of mental properties—such as sentience, 
consciousness, and thought—that link the mental experiences of animals, specifically 
dogs, and human beings in a number of areas: “a dog exhibits choice, direction, control, 
and reason; [. . .] certain mental processes in that dog’s brain are precisely duplicated in 
the brain of man” (120).  Using these ideas, London incorporates animal life into his 
vision of human life and brings them into the ethical and social fabric of his imagination, 
even if the terms of that inclusion are sometimes contradictory and their ethical 
consequences hazy. 
The Language and Technique of Becoming Buck 
As I’ve discussed, the pressure of London’s descriptions of Buck repeatedly 
complicate his narrator’s overt claims that Buck does not reason at all. Indeed, one of the 
reasons that London felt he made such claims “repeatedly, to the clogging of [his] 
narrative and in violation of [his] artistic canons,” is because he was aware of how they 
seemed to be at-odds with the descriptive language of Buck’s character. The 
contradiction conveys a confusing message to his reader, something like, “Here’s a way 
  
108 
 
that Buck might have experienced this, but actually he didn’t experience it like this—and 
I can’t reliably put into words what that experience might have been.” Here, I want to 
give a fuller reading of the narrative methods by which London gestures toward 
nonhuman mental life in The Call of the Wild—methods that generated public 
controversy in his day and intersected with the broader discourses of evolution of the 
period. The intersection of evolutionary logic with fiction, in turn, provides compelling 
reasons for human readers to imagine the events of the story through the perspective of 
its nonhuman characters, and I will examine how London’s narrative techniques enable 
his reader to identify and empathize with nonhuman experience. 
The Call of the Wild explains its protagonist’s behavior via a number of 
influences. Heredity, response to environment, social factors (the actions of dogs and 
men), and learning all play important roles in determining Buck’s behavior at various 
points in the novel.
13
 There is a sense of synergy among these factors, and, each time the 
novel seems to privilege one, it tends to overturn that privileging by re-asserting the 
importance of the others, often explicitly. Very early, the book establishes that Buck’s 
heritage is important: “His father, Elmo a huge St. Bernard, had been the Judge’s 
inseparable companion, and Buck bid fair to follow in the way of his father. He was not 
so large—he weighed only one hundred and forty pounds—for his mother, Shep, had 
been a Scotch shepherd dog” (6).14 White Fang, which I will return to in greater detail 
below, places a similar emphasis on the lines of descent that precede White Fang. In both 
stories, London’s knowledge of the influence of breeding on both physical and behavioral 
traits play important roles in shaping the identity of his main characters. 
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 Buck’s physical attributes are not only a direct result of latent mechanistic or 
reactive expressions of heredity. Environmental factors play an important role in how his 
physical (or morphological) potential gets expressed. Before Buck is taken to the 
Klondike to work as a sled dog in the Alaskan Gold Rush, he “lived the life of a sated 
aristocrat” on the Miller estate in Northern California (5). During this time, Buck was 
able to “save” his body from the softness of this existence by “not becoming a mere 
pampered house dog” (6). The narrator makes clear that environmental factors and 
behavioral choices could greatly impact the way Buck’s heredity is expressed in his 
physical body. Buck lives something of the “strenuous life” Roosevelt advocated for 
American men early in the century.
15
 Participating in “outdoor delights” such as hunting 
influences the fitness of Buck’s physical body, a body that would undergo further 
changes once exposed to the harsh environment and social conditions of the Klondike. 
 Exposure to the harsh conditions of the north facilitates rapid changes in Buck’s 
physiology: 
His development (or retrogression) was rapid. His muscles became hard as 
iron, and he grew callous to all ordinary pain. He achieved an internal as 
well as external economy. He could eat anything, no matter how 
loathsome or indigestible; and, once eaten, the juices of his stomach 
extracted the last least particle of nutriment; and his blood carried it to the 
farthest reaches of his body, building it into the toughest and stoutest of 
tissues. Sight and scent became remarkably keen, while his hearing 
developed such acuteness that in his sleep he heard the faintest sound and 
knew whether it heralded peace or peril. (22) 
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In this passage, London casts Buck’s body as a complex process of interacting biological, 
emotional, and cognitive systems; it is a body that, while it maintains an underlying and 
inherited blueprint (something that would come to be known as genetics), is capable of 
undergoing rapid physiological changes and adaptions. The changes described occur in 
response to a new environment, but they are not the structural mutations of evolutionary 
change. The changes in Buck are physiological and mental changes that any individual 
(canine or human) is capable of achieving in response to significant changes in lifestyle. 
Buck’s fitness increases, certainly, but not in the evolutionary sense; rather, the intensity 
of his new environmental conditions makes his existing characteristics sharper.   
Buck’s body changes, but he does not explicitly “(d)evolve.” London’s word 
choice (or, more accurately, his refusal to choose a word) is critical. Buck may “develop” 
or “retrogress.” But the narrator refrains from using the language of evolution anywhere 
in the book, and the uncertainty between whether either development or retrogression are 
suitable metaphors for describing these changes signals something of a lack of 
willingness on London’s part to accurately describe such change with the directional 
language often used to describe teleological evolutionary progress. The word that 
tellingly does not appear in the passage, nor anywhere else in The Call of the Wild, is 
“evolution.” Nor does any variant of the word appear. London’s word choices on this 
matter are important—and they are choices that his readers continually overlook. I 
contend that critics routinely misread how The Call of the Wild treats evolution because 
they rely too much on comments about the book London made elsewhere. In a letter 
written to his publisher in 1905 (two years after the book’s first publication), London 
described his plans for White Fang by writing that “[i]nstead of the devolution or 
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decivilization of a dog, I’m going to give the evolution, the civilization of a dog” (Letters 
166). It is this description, penned by London long after he had completed The Call of the 
Wild, that guides most critical appraisals of it.
16
 The Call of the Wild develops a more 
nuanced understanding of evolutionary theory than even London’s own appraisal of it 
recognizes. Buck certainly is characterized by his heredity, and he changes in response to 
different physical and social environments; but nowhere in the book does the narrator 
suggest that Buck evolves, which would have amounted to a version of the Lamarckism 
that London rejected.  
According to the logic of Lamarckism, efforts or adaptations made by an 
individual in the course of his or her lifetime could be passed to offspring (Gould 177). 
Evolution took place within the lifetime of an individual. But the changes Buck 
undergoes, and the traits he passes on at the story’s conclusion, are the kind of genetically 
inherited traits indicative of the evolutionary logic of Darwinian natural selection. The 
text demonstrates an understanding of the difference between evolution in the 
Lamarckian sense (of an individual) and Darwinian sense (the selection of certain traits at 
the level of population); it is a difference that many of those who study London’s work, 
in their use of the term “evolution,” overlook. What is perhaps most interesting about the 
way this passage establishes individual morphological change as non-teleological and 
non-evolutionary is that London’s writing elsewhere, as revealed by some of his letters, 
seems unable to make the same kinds of distinctions. 
 Buck’s behavior, however, is not only determined by the interaction of instinct 
and environment. As discussed above, he also relies on his mind to process information 
and to make decisions. Learning is not only a critical element of Buck’s ability to meet 
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new challenges; it is more often his intelligence and cunning than it is his physical fitness 
that enables him to survive and, eventually, flourish. For example, the paragraph that 
describes the changes to his physiological systems continues by describing things Buck 
learned by applying reason and problem-solving skills:  
He learned to bite out ice with his teeth when it collected between his toes; 
and when he was thirsty and there was a thick scum of ice over the water 
hole, he would break it by rearing and striking it with stiff fore legs. His 
most conspicuous trait was an ability to scent the wind and forecast it a 
night in advance. (22) 
Buck has to learn—via the kind of “trial-and-error” reasoning Hobhouse describes when 
discussing his cat—how to manage certain aspects of his new environments. He develops 
strategies for looking after his feet and for accessing otherwise unavailable water. Buck 
has to put a familiar sense—smell—to a new, critical use. In addition to his physiological 
traits, Buck’s intelligence plays a critical role in how London’s narrator describes his 
acclimation to this new environment. 
 While his ability to withstand physiological stress and to learn quickly in new 
social environments inform significant aspects of Buck’s character, his evolutionary 
history plays a third role in shaping Buck’s behavior in ways that incorporate theories of 
descent. Vestigial and ancestral behavioral traits influence Buck’s consciousness and 
demonstrate that London’s thinking about the role of heredity was much more complex 
than a simple consideration of mechanical reactions acquired from parents. As Buck 
acclimatizes to the Yukon, his mind is shaped by both learned behavior and vestigial 
instinct: “And not only did he learn by experience, but instincts long dead became alive 
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again. The domesticated generations fell from him. In vague ways he remembered back 
to the youth of the breed, to that time when wild dogs ranged in packs through the 
primeval forest and killed their meat as they ran it down” (23). Over the course of the 
narrative Buck’s transition to a feral state parallels his transition from an individual to a 
pack animal. Buck develops from an individual into a member of a pack, though his 
unique status, which is also a direct result of his heredity, still plays an important role in 
how he is integrated into the society of wolves at the narrative’s conclusion.  
 London’s narrator variously interjects commentary that attempts to balance the 
influence that environment, heredity, and consciousness each play in Buck’s behavior. 
The text’s descriptions of Buck, however, consistently combine these influences to 
demonstrate that these inputs are not discrete. Thus, Buck figures as an effective fighter 
at once because of and in opposition to his instinct: “[h]e fought by instinct, but he could 
fight by head as well” (36). Indeed, the narrator presents instinct itself less as an 
unthinking physical reaction to a stimulus and more as a vague impulse that informs, but 
does not determine, conscious choice. Buck’s instincts urge him toward certain actions, 
but they do not always compel to react in pre-scripted ways. The narrator describes 
instinct as a kind of vector of memory: “[f]ar more potent were the memories of his 
heredity that gave things he had never seen before a seeming familiarity; the instincts 
(which were but the memories of his ancestors become habits) which had lapsed in later 
days, and still later, in him, quickened and become alive again” (41, my italics). Here the 
language of instinct becomes entwined with the language of memory and, in effect, the 
language of consciousness. Even instinct, then, which is often the novel’s framework for 
describing mechanistic behavior, becomes one of several factors that influences Buck’s 
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consciousness and decision-making. Buck’s instincts stir powerful impulses (“calls”) in 
him but not to the extent that they preclude his ability to depart from those instincts. 
Indeed, the closing chapters of the narrative explore Buck’s ability to exercise such 
discretion as he chooses to remain with John Thornton despite the increasingly strong call 
of the wild. 
 London’s descriptions of the factors that inform Buck’s experience are somewhat 
anthropomorphic insofar as they locate primary categories of environment, 
consciousness, and heredity that interact in varying ways to influence Buck’s experience 
of the world. By making Buck a thinking being whose interior mental experience is 
shaped by such factors, London explained Buck’s experience through concepts 
traditionally reserved for describing the mental experiences of human beings. The text’s 
anthropomorphism (or what London would likely have called its “homomorphism”) 
becomes strained, however, if we define the term as the application of exclusively human 
traits to nonhuman animals. By this definition, anthropomorphism signifies a fallacious 
way of describing nonhumans. If we define anthropomorphism, instead, as the 
recognition of human traits in nonhuman life (traits that may reside there), the term 
retains fewer of the logical problems often associated with it (in our day as well as 
London’s). Anthropomorphic descriptions of nonhuman animals need not be “false,” or 
artificial, in other words. London is continually navigating between the two senses of this 
term, attempting to validate anthropomorphism to a degree while preserving uniquely 
human aspects of experience by offering modified concepts of capacities humans share 
with other animals (in this case, the domain of complex reasoning). 
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 The Call of the Wild offers more than its narrator’s overtures about Buck’s lack of 
reasoning in its attempt to construct a nonhuman experience that partially resembles 
human experience. To this end, London occasionally employs defamiliarizing techniques 
that focalize the narrative through Buck’s perspective. These techniques, in turn, put his 
readers in a position to imagine the story’s events from Buck’s point-of-view. Such 
techniques advance the interspecies empathy that is part of London’s larger project of 
describing the experience of his dog characters in ways that approximate the experiences 
of his readers. In this way, the form (how the events of the story are conveyed) of The 
Call of the Wild comes to reinforce its content (its narrators overt claims about Buck’s 
experience). 
 London’s use of defamiliarizing technique to present nonhuman perspective bear 
some resemblance to the ethological methods that Jakob von Uexküll would develop in 
the 1930s.
17
 The overlap between London’s technique and early ethology suggests that 
London’s dog stories made significant contributions to animal theory and science through 
not only their allegorical mode but also through their realistic portraits of nonhuman 
animals. One of von Uexküll’s most significant contributions to ethology was his concept 
of the umwelten, or self-worlds, of animals. By attending closely to the perceptual organs 
of animals and insects, von Uexküll argued that different organisms construct self-worlds 
according to the critical components of their biological niches such as physiological 
processes, energy requirements, and/or flight triggers.
18
 These critical components von 
Uexküll called “functional tones.” All animals, humans included, use functional tones to 
filter their perceptions and give attention to the parts of their environments that convey 
information vital to their safety, comfort, and survival. In his theory, animals acquire 
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functional tones in relation to the relevant materials of their umwelten as a way of 
organizing a potentially endless flow of perceptual data. And, because different forms of 
life have different requirements for what is necessary to perceive or ignore, different 
organisms construct unique self-worlds. He figuratively refers to these self-worlds as 
“bubbles” and suggests that “[w]hen we ourselves then step into one of these bubbles, the 
familiar [. . .] is transformed. Many of its colorful features disappear, others no longer 
belong together but appear in new relationships. A new world comes into being” (5). Von 
Uexküll discusses the bubbles of butterflies, worms, and, most extensively, ticks, in each 
case orienting the attention of his reader to the perceptual processes of the nonhuman in 
question and encouraging the reader to imagine the world as it would be perceived 
accordingly.  
 What makes von Uexküll’s work provocative, however, is not the realization that 
different organisms inhabit the world in different ways but rather the attempt to imagine 
those differing ways of inhabiting and experiencing the world; in the case of the tick, for 
instance, he imagines a world in which visual organs are unnecessary, a world that is 
dominated by a search for the scent of butyric acid and a sensitivity to subtle changes in 
temperature. It is here, in the domain of imagination, that the scientific project of von 
Uexküll and the literary project of London intersect. While the goals of these projects 
differ, they share a fundamental interest in imagining and narrating nonhuman 
experience. Elements of von Uexküll’s methods can be seen in both The Call of the Wild 
and White Fang. London’s description of Buck’s first lesson in the “law of club and 
fang,” to which Buck is introduced early in the novel, demonstrates some of these 
similarities. After being roughly handled by a number of strangers as he has traveled 
  
117 
 
north, Buck confronts an un-named human character, referenced only as “the man in the 
red sweater.” Upon being released from his crate, in which he has been confined for days 
and which has come to serve as something like a torture chamber, 
[Buck] launched his one hundred and forty pounds of fury, surcharged 
with the pent up passion of two days and nights. In mid air, just as his jaws 
were about to close on the man, he received a shock that checked his body 
and brought his teeth together with an agonizing clip. He whirled over, 
fetching the ground on his back and side. He had never been struck by a 
club in his life, and did not understand. With a snarl that was part bark and 
more scream he was again on his feet and launched into the air. And again 
the shock came and he was brought crushingly to the ground. This time he 
was aware that it was the club, but his madness knew no caution. A dozen 
times he charged, and as often the club broke the charge and smashed him 
down[. . . .] 
 For the last time he rushed. The man struck the shrewd blow he 
had purposely withheld for so long, and Buck crumpled up and went 
down[. . . .]  
 He was beaten (he knew that); but he was not broken. He saw, 
once and for all, that he stood no chance against a man with a club. He had 
learned the lesson, and in all his life he never forgot it. That club was a 
revelation. (11-12) 
For a passage such as this to work within the context of the story, London must narrate 
the event in such a way that his human reader relates to the passage’s nonhuman 
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character more strongly than she does to its human one. To accomplish—or at least 
increase the probability of—cross-species identification in this passage, London uses 
three related narrative techniques. The first is that London’s word choice (to call such an 
experience a lesson in “the law of club and fang”) both naturalizes the concept of “laws” 
but also invokes the dual meanings of the word, as laws are at once human legal 
institutions but also descriptive metaphors for understanding natural processes. The 
second is that the passage features Buck encountering a new environment and learning as 
a result of that encounter. He (simply) reasons that it is best not to challenge a “man with 
a club.” The third is that the passage is focalized through Buck’s experience. To this 
point in his life, Buck has no experience with a human attempting to discipline him in 
this fashion. So when he first jumps at the man, London uses a passive construction to 
relay the event as Buck experiences it. When first struck, Buck simply “receives” the 
blow; the club is itself is invisible in that sentence. In the succeeding sentence, the 
narrator relates an objective description of the scene before once again re-focalizing 
through Buck’s perspective for the ensuing jump, which is again constructed passively. 
Once the narrator has related that Buck has become aware of the club, the club is at last 
figured to have some kind of agency. Buck, and to an extent the reader, now realize that it 
is the club that “breaks” Buck’s charges. London’s technique conveys the events of 
Buck’s first lesson in the “law of club and fang” through an experience by which Buck 
comes to assign an object (a club) something that resembles von Uexküll’s functional 
tone, or the parts of an organism’s umwelt to which it pays attention. Not only does Buck 
have functional tones for certain hereditary “memories,” such as the vague “calls” that 
inform his thinking at various moments, but he is characterized in a way that foregrounds 
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his ability to acquire new functional tones. As his physical and social environments gain 
functional importance, Buck learns to “see” an object that was, to this point, 
functionally—and grammatically—invisible.  
Passages such as the one involving the “man in the red sweater” combine early 
twentieth-century literary technique and scientific methods—particularly those of early 
ethology. Exemplified by von Uexküll’s work, the ethological impulse attempted to 
understand the self-worlds of animals by making observations of their physiology and 
behavior and then speculating about how they might consciously or experientially 
organize and order their perceptions. By creating animal stories, London had at his 
disposal a particularly provocative set of linguistic and descriptive tools for conducting a 
kindred project of speculative realism. Foremost among these was defamiliarization—a 
technique that became increasingly important to literary experimentation in the decades 
following London’s career. In the decade after The Call of the Wild was published, Victor 
Shklovsky formulated his theory of defamiliarization as a literary technique, which he 
describes as “mak[ing] the familiar seem strange by not naming the familiar object. [It] 
describes an object as if it were seen for the first time, an event as if it were happening for 
the first time” (721); he adds that an effective way to achieve this is to describe an event 
as it might be experienced by an animal—which London had realized as well.19 While 
London’s use of this technique in The Call of the Wild does not eschew the naming of 
objects for the description of their more impressionistic properties (which is something he 
does later in White Fang), his narrator does employ this technique to capture how Buck 
responds to and learns from new situations, such as when he learns not to attack a man 
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holding a club. London deploys defamiliarization not only for aesthetic purposes but also 
to enable his reader to empathize with the experience of a nonhuman character. 
 Even as London attempts to convey elements of Buck’s experience via techniques 
that seem to verify the realism of his story, he continues to offer disclaimers that call into 
question Buck’s ability to construct an authentic nonhuman experience. In Animals in 
American Literature, Mary Allen writes of The Call of the Wild that “[t]he tendency to 
enter the animal’s consciousness in a well-developed portrayal is almost unavoidable, and 
London achieves that point of view with varying degrees of success” (81). Yet, in the 
end, Allen maintains, “Buck’s point of view soon becomes acceptable, unobtrusive. He is 
forever a real dog, while most of his emotions . . . are convincingly drawn” (82). While 
London’s technique does provoke his reader to imagine the point of view of his 
nonhuman protagonist, Allen’s claim that Buck is “forever a real dog” is questionable. As 
many of the critics who read Buck’s allegorical potential attest, Buck’s potential as a 
“real” dog is limited. In her appraisal of the book, Allen employs a real/fake binary that 
leads her to argue for the authenticity of Buck in order to maintain his character’s literary 
significance as a dog character. While Allen’s attention to Buck as a dog, rather than an 
allegory, marks an important turning point in the history of London studies, her insistence 
that Buck is “real” unnecessarily burdens the text with a task that even London doubted it 
could achieve. But there is another way of reading Buck that takes him seriously as a 
nonhuman character without necessarily requiring that he meet the demands of being an 
authentically “real dog.” Where Buck may not be “real” in the sense that he is an 
ontologically accurate representation of a dog, the language that constructs him is an 
authentic response to the problem of animality where it manifests as a problem of 
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identifying with the thoughts and emotions of a nonhuman, and his story is an attempt to 
work out some of the particularities of this problem. In this reading, Buck makes possible 
a kind of “becoming-animal” in which the act of writing or reading his character enables 
the writer/reader to become occupied by (and to occupy) a series of nonhuman 
modalities: an umwelt. Within this reading, Buck’s character, the success of his story, and 
even the controversy surrounding London’s work mark a moment of intensifying interest 
in the thoughts, emotions, and subjective experiences—in a word the interiority—of 
nonhuman beings. 
 London does not so much create a “real dog,” then, as construct a fictional world 
whose prominent characteristics seem to align with the lived experience of a dog. 
London’s narrative emerged from his own observations of dogs throughout his life, 
including during the time he spent in the Alaskan Yukon (1897). The kind of writing that 
London was doing enlisted the observational skills of natural history alongside the 
imaginative skills of fiction writing, which was part of the reason it upset conventional 
natural historians such as Roosevelt; London used objective observations to speculate 
about non-observable experiences. His explorations of these experiences are imaginative 
thought-experiments in which the writer must “become animal.” London’s efforts to see 
through the eyes of dog, so to speak, is a kind of proto-ethology. Developing their term of 
“becoming-animal,” Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari suggest “von Uexküll, in defining 
animal worlds, looks for the active and passive affects of which the animal is capable in 
the individuated assemblage of which it is a part” (257). When describing the affects of a 
draft horse, for example, they list its “passive and active affects”: “having eyes blocked 
by blinders, having a bit and a bridle, being proud, having a big peepee-maker, pulling 
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heavy loads, being whipped, falling, making a din with its legs, biting, etc” (257). What 
Delueze and Guattari discuss as “affects” resemble the embodied conditions that act as 
functional tones within von Uexküll’s theory of umwelten. By exploring such affective 
states, The Call of the Wild constructs a fictional story through imaginative acts similar to 
the methods of both von Uexküll and Deleuze and Guattari. The third-person narrator 
fixates on these “affects.” By drawing attentions to objects, such harnesses, traces, whips, 
clubs, and teeth, that populate the conscious perceptual field of sled-dogs and by 
emphasizing the consequences of certain physical actions, such as the imminent death 
that accompanies a dog losing its feet in the company of other hungry dogs, the text 
foregrounds the effects that shape the self-worlds of its nonhuman characters. 
Buck asks his reader to step out of their human perspective and to imagine 
experiencing the Alaskan gold rush through the perspective of a dog—hundreds of 
thousands of whom were themselves commodified and put to work in order to support 
this frontier economy. He asks his reader to empathize with that experience. But Buck is 
not a real dog; he is a product of London’s scientific imagination that makes possible a 
cross-species identification. The intensity of Buck’s character makes him what Deleuze 
and Guattari term an “anomalous” or “an exceptional individual,” with whom “an 
alliance must be made in order to become-animal” (243). They suggest that such 
anomalies exist always at the borders of the human and nonhuman, and they find 
examples of such anomalous figures in Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick and D.H. 
Lawrence’s tortoises. The becoming-animal of Buck is particularly rich, I argue, because 
of his function as a main character and the countervailing emphasis that London puts on 
his marginality throughout the text. At the judge’s estate, Buck belongs neither to the 
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house nor to the kennel, yet he traverses both. Once in the Yukon, Buck is always aloof 
from the dog-team but also kept at a remove from human companionship. Even once he 
joins Thornton, the character with whom he develops the closest affinity, Buck dwells at 
the camp’s margins, increasingly navigating wild and domestic spaces, insofar as the 
camp is a kind of domestic space. In what is perhaps the most important margin of all, 
Buck exists in an imaginative space that is neither literal nor symbolic, a space where he 
retains meaning as a nonhuman character, even if his performance as a real dog remains 
suspect.  
The closing section of The Call of the Wild foregrounds the hybrid and marginal 
qualities of Buck, as Buck moves from an individual who looks after himself to the leader 
of a pack, what Deleuze and Guattari call the anomalous borderline of a multiplicity: 
“the, Anomalous, the Outsider, has several functions: not only does it border each 
multiplicity [. . .] but it also carries the transformations of becomings or crossings of 
multiplicities” (249).20 Buck’s singular identity becomes a pack identity. In the book’s 
final paragraphs, Buck faces a wolf pack, keeping their attacks at bay and eventually 
winning their acceptance. At this point, the text makes a section break before its 
concluding paragraphs begin: “[a]nd here may well end the story of Buck” (88). In this 
brief closing section, the narrator discusses a “Ghost Dog” sometimes observed by 
Yeehat hunters, who take care not to enter the valley in which Buck runs with the wolves, 
some of whom “were seen with splashes of brown on head and muzzle, and with a rift of 
white centring [sic] down the chest” (89). As the dog formerly known as Buck drops his 
name, a last remnant of his days as “the Oedipalized pet,” his trace is detected in the pack 
whose borders he has occupied and through which he has navigated the social spaces of 
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multiple species, emphasizing how they overlap and construct one another. Any 
reproductive rationale for Buck’s sublimation into the pack is silent and must be 
projected onto the text by the reader. Some of Buck’s affects, his “rift of white” and 
“splashes of brown,” have infected the pack as what Deleuze and Guattari would call a 
“contagion”: “animals are packs, and . . . and packs form, develop, and are transformed 
by contagion” (242). While Buck may not be a “real” dog, the response to the problem of 
animality that London develops through him certainly is; the affects that define his 
character together are as well, which explains partly why London responded so 
adamantly to the accusation of fakery. But the only response to that claim is not to insist 
with Allen that Buck is “forever a real dog.” The response that Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest Lawrence would make when confronted with the claim that his animals “aren’t 
real” fits London’s book equally well: “Possibly, but my becoming is, my becoming is 
real” (244). The significance of Buck as a character is not that he is real or fake but that 
he constitutes “a plan(e), a program, or rather a diagram, a problem, a question-machine” 
(258) that offers ways to understand and identify with nonhuman minds. 
The Evolution of Technique in White Fang 
Published three years after The Call of the Wild, White Fang revises many of its 
predecessor’s key themes and techniques. As his note to his publisher suggests, London 
saw the books as a complement to one another, and they are often published together as 
companion texts. London’s plan for White Fang was to narrate a reversal of Buck’s 
trajectory in The Call of the Wild, so it may seem that White Fang would demonstrate a 
kind of unbecoming-animal in the language of Deleuze and Guattari. On its surface the 
basic structure of the narrative supports this reading: White Fang moves from the 
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wilderness, through an indigenous society, into the companionship of white males, to the 
developed urban and suburban space of California, and he finally becomes a kind of 
family pet. As it does in The Call of the Wild, the narrator’s use of naming plays an 
important role in charting this progress. Only once his first human “master,” Gray 
Beaver, names the cub, declaring “[h]is fangs be white, and White Fang shall be his 
name” (163), does the narrator also begin to refer to White Fang in this way. If the 
shedding of a name at the conclusion of The Call of the Wild fully signals the becoming-
animal of Buck, is not the assumption of a name by White Fang a signal of the reversal of 
this process? 
As seemingly convincing as it may be to read White Fang as the undoing of the 
becoming London constructs in The Call of the Wild, I want to demonstrate how the latter 
text, too, constructs a becoming-animal and does so in a way that complicates some of 
what Deleuze and Guattari assume becoming-animal entails. As they develop their 
concept of “becoming-animal,” Deleuze and Guattari resist the idea that such a becoming 
is possible through human relations to domesticated animals, specifically “pet” animals 
such as cats and dogs. “These animals,” they argue, “invite us to regress, draw us into a 
narcissistic contemplation, and they are the only kind of animal psychoanalysis 
understands, the better to discover a daddy, a mommy, a little brother behind them . . . 
anyone who likes cats or dogs is a fool” (240, emphasis in original). By taking issue with 
the psychoanalytical method of understanding animals symbolically—that animals are 
interesting only because of what (or who) is “behind them”—Deleuze and Guattari’s 
argument parallels the one I am making about allegorical reading practices in London 
criticism and in literary study more broadly, where the importance of animals is so often 
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located in something they stand for rather than in the animal characters or figures 
themselves. 
 Deleuze and Guattari qualify their critique of companion animals when they 
suggest that such nonhumans may figure as the “demonic” or “affect” animals who 
produce a pack sensibility that enables the becoming-animal: “There is always the 
possibility that a given animal, a louse, a cheetah or an elephant, will be treated as a pet, 
my little beast. And at the other extreme, it is also possible for any animal to be treated in 
the mode of the pack or swarm. . . . Even the cat, even the dog” (241). Other than this 
slight qualification, Deleuze and Guattari generally disparage domesticated, co-dwelling 
animals, mainly discussing them as Oedipalized animals (in the terms of Freudian 
psychoanalysis). Though it is in many ways the reversal of Buck’s development (or 
retrogression), White Fang’s experience is not a negation of the becoming-animal Buck 
enables. Rather, White Fang’s story testifies to how “even a dog” who becomes involved 
in a caring, respectful relationship with humans can still engender such a becoming. 
White Fang demonstrates Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of becoming-animal, makes a 
version of that theory available to readers, and challenges their own valuation of the 
domestic sphere as it relates to the possibility of becoming-animal. 
London imagined White Fang as becoming enmeshed in the emotional matrix 
generally associated with domestic spaces. In the same letter in which he contrasted the 
“devolution” of Buck to (what would be) the “evolution” of White Fang, he also states 
that this new book project would tell the story of the “development of domesticity, 
faithfulness, love, morality, and all the amenities and virtues” (Letters 166). London takes 
up the language of the domestic family space to describe his vision for White Fang. In its 
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finished form, the book demonstrates how even a dog engaged in the social relations of 
the family need not necessarily become the Oedipalized pet of psychoanalysis. By putting 
pressure on what it means to “like” animals, White Fang shows that interspecies love, 
care, and affection do not categorically result in the “becoming-pet” (my phrase) of a 
nonhuman animal, nor does a sentimentalized narrative preclude a kind of becoming-
animal for its reader.
21 
Insofar as it puts it reader in a position to imagine and identify with an other-than-
human perspective, White Fang creates an imaginative space in which a becoming-
animal becomes possible for its reader.
22
 As an intentional companion to The Call of the 
Wild, White Fang draws on similar characterization methods. As they do Buck’s in the 
earlier text, hereditary behavior patterns shape White Fang’s consciousness. This is 
perhaps most clear upon White Fang’s first encounter with humans. Even though White 
Fang has not personally encountered humans before, his heredity affords some level of 
functionality when he encounters them for the first time. London constructs this scenario 
as a delicate interaction of conflicting instincts and experiences: 
Nor did the cub move. Every instinct of his nature would have impelled 
him to dash wildly away, had there not suddenly and for the first time 
arisen in him another and counter instinct. A great awe descended upon 
him[. . . .] 
 The cub had never seen man, yet the instinct concerning man was 
his. In dim ways he recognized in man the animal that had fought itself to 
primacy[. . . .] out of the eyes of all his ancestors was the cub now looking 
upon man[. . . .] The spell of the cub’s heritage was upon him. (160-1)  
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The passage bears similarity to those describing Buck’s inherited “memories,” and it 
evidences how evolutionary theory troubles blank-slate theories of mind, which proposes 
that individuals have no inherited or innate psychology tendencies. While the wolf-part of 
his instinctive heritage compels him to “dash wildly away” (“wildly,” no less, because 
that is the undomesticated part of his heredity), another part of White Fang’s genetic 
legacy gives him a sort of hard-wired functional tone, an innate meaning that he can 
ascribe to his perception of a human that tells him something other than “avoid.” A 
human means something within White Fang’s self-world. His first encounter with 
humans also activates his instinct for their companionship. London’s narrator emphasizes 
that the cub’s perception of humans also evokes his first experience of this instinct. By 
situating the instinct for human companionship as a result of his first perceptual 
experience of them—an experience made up of both visual and scent images—White 
Fang’s experiential consciousness is constructed as a function of inherited, instinctual, 
and perceptive inputs all operating at once. 
The role of inherited behaviors in both Buck’s and White Fang’s mind parallels 
Darwin’s anxiety about animal will and intentionality. According to Darwin, “Actions, 
which were at first voluntary, soon become habitual, and at last hereditary, and may then 
be performed even in opposition to the will. Although they often reveal the state of the 
mind, this result was not at first either intended or expected” (Expression 356). White 
Fang’s internal conflict reflects Darwin’s suggestion that, while relationships between 
will and intention and instinct and heredity can be fluid, outward actions are not always 
directly indicative of anyone’s “state of mind.” 
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The interior experience of White Fang’s mind plays an equally important role in 
White Fang as it does for Buck’s character in The Call of the Wild. To construct a sense 
of White Fang’s nonhuman mind, the later narrative operates through focalization 
strategies developed from those in the earlier. In White Fang, defamiliarization again 
constructs the nonhuman perspective that resembles von Uexküll’s theory of umwelten. 
In the earlier work, London employed defamiliarization by “describing an event as if it 
were happening for the first time” (Shklovsky 721); in White Fang he develops this 
method by also making efforts to “describ[e] an object as if it were seen for the first 
time” (721). To accomplish such an effect, Shklovsky proposes describing key objects 
according to their basic perceptual properties rather than by name. For example, London 
focalizes his description of the wolf den and of White Fang’s father entering and exiting 
the den through the cub’s frame of reference: 
 The fascination of the light for the gray cub increased from day to day. He 
was perpetually departing on yard-long adventures toward the cave’s 
entrance. . . . Only he did not know it for an entrance. He did not know 
anything about entrances—passages whereby one goes from one place to 
another place. He did not know any other place, much less of a way to get 
there. So for him the entrance of the cave was a wall—a wall of light[. . . .] 
 There was one strange thing about this wall of light. His father (he 
had already to come to recognize his father as the one other dweller in the 
world, a creature like his mother, who slept near the light and was a 
bringer of meat)—his father had a way of walking right into the white far 
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wall and disappearing. The gray cub could not understand this. (White 
Fang 141) 
The passage describes a kind of foreign object (an entrance/exit) and an unfamiliar event 
(the process of entering/exiting) that are alien to White Fang’s experience to this point.  
Here, London does not exactly withhold the name of an object; he first calls the opening 
by its proper name: an entrance. However, London then switches tactics: he explicitly 
informs the reader that White Fang does not know anything of entrances, so he replaces 
the word “entrance” with the phrase “wall of light.” In order to encourage his reader to 
think through the cub’s perspective, London uses this technique to frame how, for a wolf 
cub, the space of its den is an entire, complete, and enclosed world. What White Fang 
lacks is a functional tone for the white wall of light—a purpose for the one wall of his 
den that is different from the others. Later, he will develop such a functional tone when 
learns that the function of such “walls,” as it were, is to go “from one place to another 
place.” London continues to represent the den’s entrance via the cub’s experience by 
referring to the entrance as a “wall of light” repeatedly over the next few pages, and he 
does not again call it an “entrance” until White Fang has ventured out of the den and 
comes to realize the function of the “white wall.” London’s choice of the word “into” 
rather than “through” in the passage’s penultimate sentence further enhances the 
defamiliarizing technique of the section. A cub who sees an entrance as a wall would 
conceptualize it as something to be walked into rather than through. And the final 
sentence of the passage reinforces White Fang’s inability to associate a function with the 
image of the white light. 
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As London’s focalization techniques construct White Fang’s nonhuman 
perspective, his narrator emphasizes that White Fang’s intelligence and mental dexterity 
are key attributes of his fitness—another premise that White Fang shares with The Call of 
the Wild. In addition to his inherited physical prowess, White Fang’s abilities to learn and 
to reason (even if not in the “man-fashion”) play an important role in his response to 
different environments. “Body and brain,” London writes, “his was a more perfected 
mechanism. . . . Nature had been more generous to him than to the average animal, that 
was all [sic]” (209). Like Buck, White Fang’s mind is influenced but not determined in 
all cases by his instinctual responses to external stimuli. White Fang’s ability to 
deliberate and make choices—to respond rather than only react—makes possible his 
relationship to Weedon Scott, White Fang’s benevolent owner who obtains him from 
dog-fight-promoter Beauty Smith. For White Fang, developing a working relationship 
with a human, particularly after enduring Smith’s mistreatment through a career of dog-
fighting, “required nothing less than a revolution. He had to ignore the urges and 
promptings of instinct and reason, defy experience, give the lie to life itself” (248). In this 
passage, London represents White Fang as “defying reason,” which suggests that he is 
able to reason at a kind of second-order level: White Fang has an instinctual pull toward 
human companionship that experience he has taught him distrust, but he then calculates a 
step beyond this in learning to trust Scott. There is a resiliency in White Fang to respond 
to the rehabilitative ethics of care that Scott offers. White Fang shows the ability to resist 
actions that seem commonsensical or reasonable for the sake of a greater benefit.  
 White Fang must continue to defy reactive impulses when he travels with Scott to 
Northern California and confronts an environment that is different from anything he has 
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experienced previously. In order to adapt to the demands of this environment, White 
Fang must radically check his behavior through intelligence and self-awareness: 
Life was complex in the Santa Clara Valley after the simplicities of the 
Northland. And the chief thing demanded by these intricacies of 
civilization was control, restraint—a poise of self that was as delicate as 
the fluttering of gossamer wings and at the same time as rigid as steel. . . . 
Life flowed past him, deep and wide and varied, continually impinging 
upon his senses, demanding of him instant and endless adjustments and 
correspondences, and compelling him, almost always, to suppress his 
natural impulses. (276) 
Here London figures White Fang’s intelligence as an ability to suppress impulses. Such a 
suggestion built on ideas about nonhuman intelligence available through the logic of 
evolutionary theory, but it was also a suggestion sure to be contested by those seeking to 
isolate an exclusively human essence from the rest of the animal kingdom—a positioned 
exemplified by Burroughs’s claims that “in man alone does this universal intelligence or 
mind-stuff reach out beyond [. . .] primary needs and become aware of itself” (“What 
Animals Know” 557) and “we have no warrant for attributing to [animals] anything like 
our higher and more complex emotional natures” (562). As true as either Burroughs’s or 
London’s claims about nonhuman intelligence may or may not be—the questions related 
their argument are still yet to be convincingly settled—the kind of logic that structures 
the above passage closes some of the distance between human and canine consciousness, 
and London’s explorations of the relationship between biology, environment, and 
  
133 
 
psychology begin to take on implications that trouble essentialist conceptions of the 
human subject. 
  Like Buck, White Fang’s validity as a “real” animal is dubious. But, also like 
Buck, he need not be real in order to facilitate a becoming. Even if White Fang is, in a 
sense, too good to be true, even if some of his accomplishments strain credulity, what 
makes him important as a nonhuman character is not that he conveys something accurate 
about being a dog, but, as Cary Wolfe would say, he conveys something specific about 
the relationship between imagination and cross-species empathy. London’s description of 
White Fang as a “more perfected animal” marks him as another example of a kind of 
“anomalous” character—a character whose unmistakable, doggy intensity invites readers 
to imaginatively inhabit a nonhuman mode of being, to make sense of things from the 
perspective of another species. Both Buck and White Fang exist on the borders of a 
number of human, nonhuman, and interspecies collectives throughout each story, and 
they traffic between the molar and the molecular, the singular and the pack. This 
marginal status is registered biologically for both characters: it is their mixed heredity, 
their (un)classification as mutts, that gives them the mental and physical capacities that 
make them exceptional. Where Buck is the offspring of different breeds of domesticated 
dogs, White Fang is the off-spring of a wolf and a wolf-dog hybrid. The logic of 
hybridity underwrites the exceptionalism of both characters.
23 White Fang’s mixed 
heritage not only makes him a “more perfected animal” but also creates his need for 
reasoning capacities. Unable to unthinkingly follow either “wolf” or “dog” instincts, he 
must measure his surroundings and make choices about his actions. 
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Whether it is by suppressing an impulse to flee from Gray Beaver or by resisting 
the inclination to lash out at Weedon Scott, White Fang must use his cognitive abilities, 
variously referenced as his “head” or “brain,” to navigate a series of relationships with 
human characters and domesticated dogs. The forms of these relationships are multiple; 
White Fang dwells differently with Gray Beaver’s family than he does with Beauty 
Smith, which is different still from how he comes to relate to Scott and, later, Scott’s 
family in rural Santa Clara. Though his relationships with Gray Beaver and Beauty Smith 
are both productive for analyzing how London characterizes White Fang’s experience 
and agency in his interactions with humans, I want to close with an analysis of the 
relationship between White Fang and Weedon Scott, for it is this relationship that most 
closely resembles the “Oedipalized,” domestic relationship disparaged by Deleuze and 
Guattari. 
 Scott comes to care for White Fang by seizing him from Smith after White Fang 
has been badly beaten in a fight with a bull-terrier, in a scene characterized not only by 
the violent and asymmetrical power relations of the dog-fighting ring but also by the 
sense of strangeness with which the two dogs face each other. On the brink of death, 
White Fang is taken by Scott and slowly returns to health. Once recovered, White Fang, 
traumatized by months of harsh treatment, behaves violently toward Scott and his partner, 
Matt. White Fang stands “at the end of his stretched chain, bristling, snarling, ferocious, 
straining” (238). He is unapproachable at first, leading Scott to “confess” that his 
situation is “hopeless” and “it’s a wolf and there’s no taming it.” Matt, however, holds 
out some hope for White Fang, and refuses to adopt Scott’s objectifying language and 
impersonal pronouns; where Scott initially refers to White Fang as “it,” Matt uses 
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personal pronouns and argues that White Fang can be rehabilitated: “[w]olf or dog, it’s 
all the same—he’s ben tamed a’ready” (238). More experienced with dogs than Scott, 
Matt dismisses the notion that White Fang’s sub-species or breed categorically 
determines his character, and he reads a series of White Fang’s affects to attend to his 
personal history in order to make an evaluation of his prospect at rehabilitation: “[l]ook 
close there. D’ye see them marks across his chest. . . . He was a sled-dog before Beauty 
Smith got hold of him.” The trace of the harness give reason for Scott to hope that 
“there’s not much reason against his bein’ a sled-dog again” (238). 
 But Scott’s care does not lead to White Fang’s reintroduction to the labor-
relations of the sled team. Because he comes from what is portrayed as the softer, 
warmer, domestic territory of the continental U.S., Scott has a mode of interacting with 
White Fang that inducts him into a familial order. His response to White Fang’s situation 
is one of compassion, pity, and sympathy. “What he needs,” Scott “murmurs pityingly” at 
one point, “is some show of human kindness” (240). As a human character, Scott can 
only show “human” kindness, but it is a kindness that can be received and, eventually, 
reciprocated across species boundaries to another social animal. Scott’s ethics of caring 
lead him to refuse Matt’s suggestion that he “[b]etter have a club handy” (240) when 
approaching White Fang. Scott decides to approach White Fang without a weapon after 
paying attention to the way “White Fang watched the club after the manner of a caged 
lion watching the whip of its trainer” (239). After coming near White Fang “gently and 
soothingly,” Scott is able to finally touch him, an event which London focalizes through 
White Fang’s perspective: 
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The god’s hand had come out and was descending on his head. White 
Fang shrank together and grew tense as he crouched under it. Here was 
danger, some treachery or something. He knew the hands of the gods, their 
proved mastery, their cunning to hurt. . . . He snarled more menacingly, 
crouched still lower, and still the hand descended. He did not want to bite 
the hand, and he endured the peril of it until his instinct surged up in him, 
mastering him with its insatiable yearning for life. (241) 
In this first instance of caring touch, White Fang finally bites Scott, but the language of 
London’s description works to disassociate White Fang’s instinct from his will; he ends 
up biting Scott even though he does not want to—an example of the unexpected 
interaction between will and impulse that Darwin also discusses in Expression when he 
comments that his reflections on animal mind caused him to question his use of words 
such as consciousness, will, and intention as descriptors of both human and nonhuman 
behavior (357). To describe White Fang’s instinct as “mastering him” is to decouple 
mechanistic reaction from motivation and intention and to suggest that he has an ability 
to override impulse. 
 Scott and Matt come to figure this ability through the language of “intelligence.” 
After White Fang bites Scott, it is then Matt’s turn to give up hope for White Fang’s 
rehabilitation. When he retrieves a rifle with the intention to kill White Fang, it is once 
again the human characters’ attention to White Fang’s affect that allow them to 
understand his intelligence. As Scott “pleads” with Matt to “look at him” before firing, 
the human characters see that “White Fang, near the corner of the cabin and forty feet 
away, was snarling not at Scott but at the dog-musher [Matt]” (243). Observing this 
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condition leads Scott to conclude that White Fang “knows the meaning of firearms as 
well as you do. He’s got intelligence, we’ve got to give that intelligence a chance. Put up 
that gun.” To test Scott’s theory, Matt again “reached for the rifle, and at the same 
moment White Fang snarled. He stepped away from the rifle, and White Fang’s lips 
descended, covering his teeth.” It is through this communicative act that Matt comes to 
“agree with . . . Mr. Scott. That dog’s too intelligent to kill” (241). White Fang’s 
intelligence lies not only in his ability to “know meaning” but also in his ability to make 
that knowledge intelligible to others. Through this encounter, White Fang has maintained 
an element of independence; he is pushing Scott to come to him on his terms as much as 
Scott is pushing White Fang to conform to his expectations—a possibility made available 
by ethics that do not efface or attempt to subdue White Fang’s nonhuman otherness but 
respect and work with it. 
 As their relationship develops, the trust and emotional bond between Scott and 
White Fang grow. When the time arrives for Scott to return to California, White Fang 
again makes an affectual expression, this time “a low, anxious whine, like a sobbing 
under the breath that has just grown audible” (257), an utterance the narrator likens to a 
human voice. As Scott prepares to leave, White Fang “had already sensed it. He now 
reasoned it. [Scott] was preparing for another flight,” and he continues to use his “voice” 
to communicate his unwillingness to be left behind (258-59). Scott acquiesces to White 
Fang’s clear wishes, and takes White Fang with him to California, where he slowly but 
increasingly becomes incorporated into the domestic structure of the Scott farm. Here, 
White Fang must continually resist impulses, and he learns to tolerate the presence of 
other dogs, to whom his dog-fighting experience had taught him to respond only violently 
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and aggressively. White Fang’s story concludes with two sentimentalized sequences—
one in which he alerts Scott’s family members that Scott has fallen off a horse and broken 
his leg and another in which he attacks and kills Jim Hall, an ex-convict “human beast” 
(285) who breaks into the Scott home to kill Weedon Scott’s father, the judge who 
sentenced him to prison.
24
 In this process, though, White Fang retains agency even as he 
comes to care for and be cared for by Scott’s family. 
 White Fang’s unpredictable and wild tendencies remain explicit even through the 
novel’s conclusion, which shows how his character resists what Deleuze and Guattari 
would call the Oedipalization of companion animals. White Fang remains both wolf and 
dog.
25 
At one point, after White Fang has snarled and bared his teeth at two children, their 
mother worries, “‘I confess, he makes me nervous around the children. . . . I have a dread 
that he will turn upon them unexpectedly some day [sic]” (283). Judge Scott replies that 
“A wolf is a wolf. . . . There is no trusting one. . . . [Weedon] surmises that there is some 
strain of dog in White Fang; but as he will tell you himself, he knows nothing about it” 
(283). White Fang’s final acts of heroism motivate Judge Scott to reconsider his 
categorical thinking about wolves, and the family later comes to refer to White Fang as a 
“Blessed Wolf” (291). But even as he attains this “blessed” status, and even as he comes 
to occupy his place in a family structure when he mates with the collie Dolly, White Fang 
is not characterized as a kind of “little pet dog.” As he becomes entangled with the 
familial structure, White Fang’s aloofness also continues to characterize him: “nobody 
else ever romped with White Fang. He did not permit it. He stood on his dignity, and 
when they attempted it, his warning snarl and bristling mane were anything but playful. 
That he allowed [Scott] these liberties was no reason that he should be a common dog” 
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(281). White Fang accommodates the inhabitants of the domestic environment, but those 
inhabitants also accommodate him. To do so, his character pushes the Scott family into a 
kind of becoming-animal—one that takes place within what Deleuze and Guattari, 
reading White Fang’s domestication as a kind of becoming-pet, would likely see only as 
the psychoanalytic confines of the domestic sphere. 
  Like Buck, White Fang is not a “real dog.” There are many aspects of his 
character, such as his over-the-top heroics, that strain credulity even beyond the extent to 
which Buck’s character does. But, also like Buck, the potential of White Fang as a 
nonhuman character does not rely solely on his mimetic qualities. White Fang is another 
example of an “Anomalous” character who traffics between human and nonhuman 
communities, bridges individual and pack identities, and invites readers to become-
animal. Through White Fang, London brings this becoming into a domestic space, and 
his means of characterization can alert readers to the pack identities that pervade what 
may seem even the most Oedipalized, or molar social relations. Oedipalizing one’s pet is, 
after all, an act of reading, of a kind, in which one refuses to recognize the otherness or 
agency of the animal(s) with whom they dwell. If the characterization of White Fang 
makes him at all implausible, the significance of his character may be to suggest to 
readers the extent to which humans structure their own lives to accommodate the 
otherness of even the most diminutive and pet-like of companion species.   
   
This chapter began by distinguishing between Jeffers’s symbolic uses of animal 
imagery in poetic forms and London’s development of rounded nonhuman characters in 
fiction. Both methods of incorporating nonhuman animal referents into literary texts 
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represent important responses to the problem of animal interiority, or how nonhumans 
mentally experience their worlds. For Jeffers, animals more or less all experience the 
world in the same way. They are unconsciously immersed in and fully at-one with their 
environment. As such, animals became useful literary symbols for his poetry because he 
could use them to signify an unconscious oneness with the “wild God of the world” 
(“Hurt Hawks” 13)—an existence from which he understood human beings to be 
uniquely and fundamentally alienated by consciousness. For London, the interior 
experiences of nonhumans—particularly nonhumans (mammals) whose physiology and 
social behavior parallels that of humans—more closely resembles the interior experiences 
of humans. London’s nonhuman characters are conscious agents, often uncomfortable in 
their environments, who must learn, adapt, and problem-solve (reason) in order to 
succeed. Such characters recruit a reader’s empathy as that reader experiences narrative 
through a nonhuman perspective, even if the end result does not leave a reader able to 
accurately imagine or understand a nonhuman experience; perhaps all such an exercise 
leaves us with are questions and a sense of the problems associated with trying to 
imagine the life of another. But even if all they motivate are questions and problems, 
nonhuman characters expand the social and ethical space of community by pushing 
readers to understand animals as sentient agents with their own sets of interests, 
emotions, and thought processes. When approached as a problem of character, as London 
did, animals thus take on a kind of individuality that is difficult to achieve when 
approached symbolically.  
As fictional characters are typically human, to write nonhuman characters is to 
invite accusations of anthropomorphism such as those that were aimed at London’s dog 
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stories. London’s response to those accusations illustrates the interdisciplinary scope of 
the problem of animality where it involves questions of mind, and his rhetoric in “The 
Other Animals” demonstrates many of the techniques of early ethology, which attended 
to the physical and perceptual characteristics on nonhuman animals, or what Deleuze and 
Guattari would call their “affects,” in order to speculate on their interior experience. By 
drawing on such techniques to focalize his narratives, however, London’s nonhuman 
characters do not become “real,” though his naturalist fiction employs a kind of realism 
to construct its characters. Developing a method for reading London’s nonhuman 
characters through the paradigm of “becoming-animal,” I hope to provide a reading 
practice for complicating dualistic thinking that would suggest the only alternative to 
reading animals symbolically or allegorically would be to read them as necessarily “real.” 
By placing the intensity of Buck’s and White Fang’s characters alongside Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theory of the “Anomalous,” the chapter argues finally that these two 
nonhuman protagonists gesture toward the interspecies packs and multiplicities that 
pervade even the most seemingly settled domestic spaces and social relations. 
Notes 
 1. Born in 1876, London was 11 years (almost to the day) older than Jeffers. Both 
also spent much of their lives in California. 
 2. London was involved in a number of public debates during his career, one of 
which is discussed at length below. Another, though, that I do not have the space to treat 
more extensively here is the debate over naturalism in which he engaged with Julian 
Hawthorne. London’s resistance to Hawthorne’s effort to encourage him to produce 
romantic tales of adventure rather than philosophically oriented naturalist fictions reveals 
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how London imagined the role of fiction. For more on this debate, see Gary 
Scharnhorst’s “Skirmishes in the Naturalism War: Julian Hawthorne and Jack London.” 
 3. Lee Clark Mitchell notes that literary naturalism attained a particularly large 
audience in the United States; he maintains that it “attracted less interest abroad than it 
did in America, which has had the effect of making the debate on its literary status more 
pressing here than elsewhere” (viii). Mitchell locates in naturalism a radical undermining 
of traditional humanist (and realist) notions of agency, which he argues has contributed to 
naturalism’s turbulent reception among American audiences. 
4. Such a reading method, wherein London’s nonhuman characters are interpreted 
as screens for something else, typifies much London criticism. For her part, Shari 
Michelle Huhndorf reads Buck as exemplifying the notion that “[w]hile civilization 
softened and weakened modern men, the arctic cultivated toughness and cunning” (106, 
my italics). Christophe Den Tandt suggests that London “use[s] the elements of the 
natural world as allegorical signifiers of the metropolis” (10). And Auerbach suggests 
that London’s nonhuman characters serve primarily to publicize London’s own identity 
as a writer: “In the various guises of white man on trail, working dog, undercover social 
reformer, sociology professor, and effete bookworm turned sailor, London . . . vividly 
replayed his intense drive for popular validation as a man of letters” (8). While no doubt 
compelling, these appraisals of London’s work all emphasize that the importance of it 
inheres not in what it says about nonhumans or about interspecies social relations, but 
strictly in what it says about humanity, which I argue obscures how central the problem 
of animality was to the genesis of these works and to early twentieth-century American 
culture. 
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5. In “The Other Animals,” which I discuss further below, London simply replies 
to this objection from Roosevelt: “[i]t is merely a statement of a difference of opinion. 
President Roosevelt does not think a bull-dog can lick a wolf-dog. I think a bull-dog can 
lick a wolf-dog. And there we are” (110). 
6. The first English-language edition of Lorenz’s work was published in 1952. 
7. Lorenz’s discussion of human-dog relationships makes explicit a number of the 
ideas about nonhuman communication, learning, and individuality that are implicit in 
London’s stories. Where Burroughs, whose objections to London’s work were more 
developed and adamant than those of any of his other critics, maintained that the kind of 
individuality London’s stories imply was a form of anthropomorphism. In his writing, 
animals, even highly social animals, are interchangeable under similar conditions; he 
wrote that he was “convinced that the wild creatures behave just about the same in all 
parts of the country” (“Humanizing the Animals” 777). Recent ethology and wildlife 
biology appear to confirm the London-Lorenz view more than the Burroughs, as those 
studies seem to suggest that removing individuals from social groups can be highly 
disruptive to the group’s organization. For an example of such a study concerning canids, 
see “Biological, Conservation, and Ethical Implications of Exploiting and Controlling 
Wolves” by Gordon C. Haber in Conservation Biology 10.4 (Aug., 1996).   
8. See Bowler (79-81) for an explanation of how Lamarck’s theory of continuous 
progress does “not suppose all forms alive to have evolved from a common ancestry” 
(80). 
 9. For more on this point, see Gould’s The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, 
particularly 176-180. 
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10. Lawrence Berkove notes that “[a]mong the many intellectual influences on 
Jack London, none is so central and profound as that of Darwin. As early as high school, 
London read Darwin’s On the Origin of Species and Herbert Spencer’s Darwin-
influenced First Principles, strong reading for one of his age and destined to leave a 
lasting impression on his mind. A copy of the Origin of Species was one of the few books 
London had with him in the Yukon, and Darwin is mentioned a number of times in his 
letters—always favorable” (243). Where Berkove focuses on London’s relationship to the 
“red-in-tooth-and-claw” mechanism of natural selection and his inclusion of Huxley’s 
model of social fitness in his ideas about evolution, however, I focus in London’s interest 
in the continuities (as well as its lack) of mental experience across species. It is 
interesting to note the similarity of what Berkove calls London’s “trial-and-error growth” 
regarding the issue of ethics and evolution to the way I am describing the development of 
his treatment of the problem of animality: “Rather than expecting him to have from the 
first permanent views on every topic he broached in his literature, it is more realistic to 
acknowledge that his method of progressing toward final positions involved second 
thoughts. In later works, he often revisited and sometimes revised or reversed ideas that 
had been clearly advocated in earlier ones, one might even say had been stated 
forcefully” (247).  
 11. A theory of mind is one’s ability to attribute mental states, which include 
beliefs, thoughts, intentions, emotions, and desires, to others. A basic supposition of 
theory of mind is that a being must itself have mind before it can attribute mind to 
another because a theory of mind functions primarily by analogizing one’s own 
experience to another’s. Because minds cannot be directly observed, suggesting that 
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Buck possesses an awareness of the minds not only of other dogs but also of humans 
implicitly ascribes to him an ability to think in ways that come quite close to, if not 
qualify as, reasoning. 
12. The work of George Romanes provides perhaps the most notable example of 
this kind of narrative strategy. Take, for example, his description of his dog’s indignation 
at Romanes’s brother, which he provides as part of a larger discussion of canine 
intelligence: 
. . . at one time when all his friends were out of town, [my Sky terrier] was 
taken for a walk every day in the park by my brother, to whose care he had 
been entrusted. He enjoyed his walks very much, and was wholly 
dependent upon my brother for obtaining them. Nevertheless, one day 
while he was amusing himself with another dog in the park, my brother, in 
order to persuade him to follow, struck him with a glove. The terrier 
looked up at his face with an astonished and indignant gaze, deliberately 
turned round and trotted home. Next day he went out with my brother as 
before, but after he gone a short distance he looked up at his face 
significantly, and again trotted home with a dignified air. After thus 
making his protest in the strongest way he could, the dog afterwards 
refused to accompany him. (Animal Intelligence 439-40) 
Romanes strategy evoked criticism from some of his contemporaries, and provided the 
rationale for Conwy Lloyd Morgan’s formulation of what has since come to be called 
“Morgan’s Canon”: “In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise 
of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one 
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which stands lower in the psychological scale” (An Introduction to Comparative 
Psychology 53). Interestingly, Romanes originally positioned his own research as a 
response to the literary representations of animals in the late nineteenth century: 
“Hitherto the endeavor of assigning these levels has been almost exclusively in the hands 
of popular writers; and as these have, for the most part, merely strung together, with 
discrimination more or less inadequate, innumerable anecdotes of the display of animal 
intelligence, their books are valueless as works of reference” (v-vi). Morgan’s Canon is a 
refinement of Romanes methodology, and London’s work both bears the influence of and 
responds to the debates of this developing discourse. Perhaps his ultimate contribution 
was to put so much pressure on the language of reasoning through his narratives and 
descriptions of nonhuman characters that he demonstrated how, each in their way, 
Romanes and Morgan were both somewhat incorrect. 
 13. I choose the term “heredity” rather  than “genes” or “genetics” to describe 
Buck’s inherited traits and instincts because London was writing before the modern 
evolutionary synthesis, Bowler dates the modern evolutionary synthesis to the 1920s, 
though he recognizes there is historical debate over how exactly the theory “was put 
together” (289). The synthesis is the result of a combination of ideas that provided a 
conceptual framework (Mendelian genetics) for explaining how natural selection 
proceeds. As I’ve discussed above, prior to this, Darwin’s theory of natural selection 
lacked a clear explanatory mechanism, which had led to a decrease in the acceptance of 
his version of evolutionary theory by the early decades of the twentieth century. Because 
the evolutionary synthesis rejuvenated the theory of Darwinian natural selection, it is also 
sometime referred to as the neo-Darwinian synthesis.  
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 14. The “scotch shepherd dog” had virtually disappeared until a revival of the 
breed was initiated by breeders in the 1980s. The working breed that London discusses 
morphed into the “show collie” (of the “Lassie” variety) over the course of the century. 
The shepherd dog London discusses probably more closely resembled a large border 
collie, often regarded today as a highly intelligent breed. The breed form of the St. 
Bernard dog has remained less changed since London’s day. 
15. In his speech on “The Strenuous Life,” Roosevelt concludes that “our country 
calls not for the life of ease but for the life of strenuous endeavor. The twentieth century 
looms before us big with the fate of many nations. If we stand idly by, if we seek merely 
swollen, slothful ease and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the hard contests where men 
must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and 
stronger peoples will pass us by, and will win for themselves the domination of the 
world.” Buck’s character, particularly his marked difference from the “indoor” dogs, 
reflects something of these values. 
16. In her essay, “Jack London’s Evolutionary Hierarchies: Dogs, Wolves, and 
Men,” for example, Hopkins examines how London’s characterization of Buck and 
White Fang function in relation to his characterizations of human characters, but she 
leaves the assumption that Call is an example of an evolution-in-a-lifetime largely un-
queried, citing London’s description of the book and taking it face value (92). 
17. While I am not prepared to claim that von Uexküll, an Estonian, read 
London’s work, London’s influence on Lorenz does suggest there is a chance von 
Uexküll would also have been aware of some of London’s writing. London’s work 
circulated (and continues to circulate) to a wide international audience. Auerbach notes 
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that he “remains today the most widely read American author in the world” (1), a claim 
he traces to Hank Gutman’s (ed.) As Others Read Us: International Perspectives on 
American Literature. Auerbach’s Male Call was published in 1996. Whether or not 
London “remains” the most widely read American author, his work has historically found 
a significant international readership. 
18. Von Uexküll’s umwelten also resemble Wolfe’s claim “that the world is 
ongoing, differentiated construction and creation of a shared environment, sometimes 
converging in a consensual domain, sometimes not, by autopoietic entities that have their 
own temporalities, chronicities, perceptual modalities, and so on—in short, their own 
forms of embodiment” (xxiv), which I discuss in my chapter on the poetry of Elizabeth 
Bishop. That theory (and practice) is still attempting to understand the terms of this 
problem is still another reason I think it is important to construct a history of the problem 
of animality.  
19. Shklovsky discusses a short story by Tolstoy: “Tolstoy uses this technique of 
‘defamiliarization’ constantly. The narrator of ‘Kholstomer,’ for example, is a horse, and 
it is the horse’s point of view (rather than a person’s) that makes the content of the story 
seem unfamiliar” (721). 
20. Deleuze and Guattari discuss this movement from the molar to the molecular 
more thoroughly in the “plateau” called “1914: One or Several Wolves?” 
21. It is the problematic of “liking” animals as classes or groups that in my mind 
motivates Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of habitation with domestic animals. 
22. While Deleuze and Guattari suggest that “becomings-animal” are not 
“phantasies or subjective reveries: it is not a question of imitating a horse, ‘playing’ 
  
149 
 
horse, identifying with one, or even experiencing feelings of pity or sympathy” (258), 
they repeatedly cite works of literature as demonstrations of becoming. The reliance of 
their argument on the work of Faulkner, Woolf, Melville, and Lawrence (to name a few) 
suggest that even if becomings-animal are not only a function of the kind of identification 
with otherness that literary form makes available, the process can be certainly facilitated 
by such imaginative modes. 
23. In her discussion of the relationship between dogs, wolves, and eugenics in 
London’s fiction, Hopkins establishes a framework in which she compares the difference 
between dogs and wolves to that between chimpanzees and humans. She writes, “London 
constantly reminds us that there are always two modes of being available to dogs. 
Humans may, as we now know, share 98 percent of their genes with chimpanzees, but we 
do not form part of the same breeding group; speciation has definitively and irrevocably 
occurred” (90). Hopkins’s logic undermines the comparison she attempts to make; this 
error in turn undermines the ideological critique of eugenics at work in these stories and, 
I argue, somewhat flaws her reading of the texts. While genetic differences among human 
populations are not nearly as great as they are between wolf and dog populations (though 
it certainly depends on the breeds and populations being compared), genetic differences 
between wolves and dogs are not nearly as great as those between humans and chimps. If 
we keep in mind that many scientific and popular discourses at the turn of the century 
were circulating an ideology that sometimes conflated “race” with “species,” the critique 
of eugenics at work in these texts becomes even more apparent. We get a richer reading 
of these narratives if we historicize the categories of race and species than we get if we 
compare them to what “we now know,” as Hopkins seems inclined to do. 
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24. As Hopkins notes, “the human beings [in Call and White Fang] remain 
remarkably constant” (89). The flatness of Jim Hall’s character in these final sequences 
contributes to their sentimentalism, even as the narrator’s description of him as a “beast” 
could liken him to White Fang’s character and call attention to his history and experience 
in a way that would invite the reader to query the rehabilitative potential of San Quentin 
when contrasted with the ethics of care that Scott displays toward White Fang. Still, this 
character’s function in the closing scene is almost solely as a backdrop against which 
White Fang may prove his ultimate loyalty to the Scotts. Beauty Smith’s characterization 
earlier in the novel might productively contrasted with Hall’s as a way of analyzing how 
naturalism’s “beastly” implications might advance compassion for “bad guys” because it 
frames criminality as a function of environment and socialization rather than an essential 
quality of one humanity. 
25. The wolf and dog are animals that Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly use to 
contrast the demonic, molecular pack animal (wolf) from the Oedipalized, molar pet 
animal (“my little dog”).  
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CHAPTER IV 
KILLING, ETHICS, AND EMPATHY IN THE WRITING OF ERNEST 
HEMINGWAY IN THE 1930S  
Animals abound in the literature of Ernest Hemingway. So, too, do their deaths at 
the hands of the humans who hunt them. Hemingway’s writing about human-animal 
interactions engages directly with the asymmetrical power relationships that defined how 
a majority of Americans viewed animals throughout much of the twentieth century—and 
in many ways continue to shape the ways that animals are understood. Nonhuman 
animals, for Hemingway’s characters, are sometimes symbolically coded so that their 
deaths function as props for supporting the (usually masculine) egos of his human 
characters. Animals, such as the marlin of The Old Man and the Sea, are sometimes 
commodities in his stories. Occasionally, they become the subjects of experiences that 
portray them as kinds of persons or, at the very least, sentient beings. Hunted animals are 
frequently killed for food. They are sometimes phallic symbols. Often, animals in 
Hemingway’s work fulfill several of these roles at once. While Hemingway’s writing 
about animals is varied and complex, what is certain is that nonhumans play centrally 
important roles in a great number of his works, all of which seem invested in addressing, 
if not solving, the thick and complicated relationships that he had with nonhumans over 
the course of his career.  
Time and again, Ernest Hemingway turned to animals as a source of literary 
production. The animals in his literature, and the ethics that govern how his human 
characters relate to and treat his nonhumans, have commanded their own critical industry. 
In sum, Hemingway criticism can be grouped into several categories organized around, 
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respectively, his stylistics, his biography and public persona, his portrayal of gender 
identities, and his relationship to the natural world. It is with this last critical conversation 
that this chapter is most directly engaged. Most issues of The Hemingway Review feature 
at least one essay dealing with the ecological values (or lack of) shaping Hemingway’s 
work; essays specifically addressing the nonhumans in Hemingway’s work, while 
somewhat less frequent than the ecologically oriented analyses which involve partial 
attention to animals, are not uncommon to The Review. Critical disagreement about 
Hemingway’s ecological ethics is perhaps second only to discussion about his coding of 
gender in terms of generating theoretical debate.  
While the criticism concerning “Hemingway among the Animals” (to reference a 
chapter of Glen Love’s Practical Ecocriticism that deals with the topic) has brought 
attention to the importance of animals in the Hemingway canon, much of this criticism 
operates through the assumption that Hemingway’s writing from the 1950s demonstrates 
a radical departure from the way he wrote about animals earlier in his life, particularly in 
his “African writing” of the 30s. In this framework, even the most sympathetic 
Hemingway critics use the late work as a kind of apology for the early. This chapter 
queries the interpretive framework that shapes so much of this criticism, asking whether 
the work from 1930s is really as bereft of an ethical framework as much of the criticism 
would suggest and whether the work from the 1950s is as ecologically progressive as 
some of it argues. 
Why Ernest Hemingway? 
 I have selected each of the writers in this dissertation because they address the 
problem of animality differently. As I have discussed, Jeffers heavy symbolic use of 
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animals tends to idealize them and to maintain an ontological separation of human and 
animal life. London, by comparison, is invested in an attempt to use story to prove what 
he understood as a scientific law of biological and experiential continuity between 
humans and other animals, especially mammals. And, as chapter four will show, I 
examine a sampling of poems by Elizabeth Bishop because of how her poetry figures 
animals as radically strange and yet ethically demanding subjects. Hemingway’s work is 
notable because it indexes the conservation movement that developed throughout the 
United States in roughly the first fifty years of the twentieth century. Because of 
Hemingway’s popular hunting and fishing narratives, his work also contributed to the 
general conservation ethic of this era. 
 Hemingway’s work is also productive for discussing animals in twentieth-century 
American literature because it raises questions about what it means for humans to 
respond “ethically” to animals. The criticism surrounding Hemingway’s writing about 
animals largely conflates the interests of animals with abstract ecological ideals. 
According to these accounts, because Hemingway’s late-career work is more ecological, 
it is also fundamentally more ethical in its response to animals. In my readings at least, 
Hemingway’s response to animality is somewhat resistant to the progression of 
ecological ethics that several critics find in his work. Many of the animal studies-oriented 
reviews of Hemingway’s canon suggest that he developed an increasing concern with 
animals and/or ecology over the course of his career, particularly in the period between 
the mid-1930s and the 50s. While there is some evidence that Hemingway’s thinking 
about animals changed during this time, the emphasis that critics have put on what they 
read as an ecologically enlightened stage of Hemingway’s career (the 1950s) has led to a 
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general denigration of his work from early periods insofar as the subject of animality is 
concerned. What’s more, this progressive narrative of Hemingway’s ecological 
consciousness tends to idealize the personal nature of the changes in Hemingway’s 
thinking when, to my mind, any changes regarding animals present in his writing is less 
due to some profound development in his personal ethic and more due to the general 
cultural zeitgeist surrounding conservation that coalesced in the U.S. toward the mid-
century.  
The pervasive narrative been used to discuss Hemingway’s career as it pertains to 
his thinking about both ecology and animals is, in my view, a function of the critical 
methods of ecocriticism more generally. Where it pertains to animals specifically, 
however, Hemingway’s work potentially exposes a theoretical conflict within critical 
animal studies themselves. Literary animal studies that have emerged largely as a sub-
discipline of ecocriticism, examples of which are discussed below, have also taken many 
of their disciplinary and methodological cues from that relatively larger and better-
established theoretical school. These analyses of animals in Hemingway’s writing tend to 
find his work “ethical” when it demonstrates ecological concerns at a systemic level. 
Animal studies theorists who approach animals from a post-structuralist perspective, such 
as Cary Wolfe, on the other hand find Hemingway’s writing about animals provocative in 
moments where it problematizes normalized, humanist models of subjectivity and 
agency. Within literary animal studies, then, there is something of an inconsistency in the 
criteria that making certain representations of animals ethical. One view finds value in 
animals because of the role they perform within an ecosystem; the other emphasizes the 
otherness of nonhuman subjects. Besides Wolfe’s work, which analyzes Hemingway’s 
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work from a post-structural and posthumanist perspective, most critical appraisals of 
Hemingway’s writing about animals approach the topic from a more explicitly ecocritical 
angle. Taking cues from the structure of Lawrence Buell’s widely influential study of 
Henry David Thoreau in The Environmental Imagination, ecocritically trained 
Hemingway critics rely in a progress-narrative that, I argue, has led to something of a 
misreading of Hemingway’s writing about animals.1 
 The preference for Hemingway’s late work, much of which was not published 
while he lived, is a response to early ecocritical analyses of Hemingway’s work that 
condemned it as anti-ecological more or less outright. In his widely influential Practical 
Ecocriticism, for example, Love finds Hemingway’s “body count against the earth” as 
evidence of his “aggressive and isolated individualism which wars against the natural 
manifestations he claimed to love” (203). In her foundational ecofeminist reading of 
American literature, Louise H. Westling maintains that even if “he may have repented at 
the end of his life, as his protagonist’s attitude toward hunting in The Garden of Eden 
suggests [. . .] Hemingway’s heroes must be seen, beneath all the sentimental celebration 
of landscape and majestic animals of prey like lions and elephants and even big trout, as 
adversaries and conquerors [of the natural world]” (100). Some of the first ecocritical 
readings of Hemingway’s work, then, were generally dismissive of any ecologically 
valuable potential in his writing.  
Subsequent ecocritically oriented evaluations of Hemingway’s canon have tended 
to respond to these early readings by suggesting that, although some of Hemingway’s 
early work may well hold little ecocritical importance outside of exemplifying an 
ecologically destructive, masculine, and American attitude toward nature and nonhuman 
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animals, Hemingway developed a more complicated body of work later in his life, much 
of which he never published, that signaled a sort of sea change in his thinking. For his 
part, even Wolfe maintains a distinct preference for the later writing; he dismisses 
Hemingway’s work from the 30s as the basis for “the Hemingway of Papa’s code,” 
which, he continues, “is not representative of the entire career, or even of its most 
ambitious undertakings, but is instead anchored largely in the macho posturing—in both 
life and writing—of Hemingway in the 1930s, a self-commodifying and often desperate 
chest thumping on Hemingway’s part” (Animal Rites 123). Wolfe goes on to read the 
posthumously published The Garden of Eden against the “Papa’s code” writing of the 30s 
in an effort to argue for a more complicated, complete picture of Hemingway’s 
posthumanism than, he maintains, is available in the earlier work. In an essay on 
“Hemingway’s Late Life Relationship with Birds,” Robin Gajdusek discusses 
Hemingway’s description of sea birds in the 1956 essay “A Situation Report” and suggest 
that the “later Hemingway is a writer who not only sees where the driven birds hide but 
who emphatically, feelingly understands their dilemma” (176). Kevin Maier’s review of 
Under Kilimanjaro takes a similar approach to Hemingway’s career.2 Suggesting that the 
importance of Under Kilimanjaro can be found mainly in the way it differs from Green 
Hills of Africa, Maier writes, 
Instead of the representations of men ‘exploit[ing] the natural world for its 
self aggrandizing properties’ that critics such as Glen A. Love have seen 
in Green Hills of Africa (203), Under Kilimanjaro features hunting by 
what we might call a concern for an ecological order. Unlike the 
competition for trophies that drives the narrative of Hemingway’s first 
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safari, the hunting in Under Kilimanjaro is justified by the sportsman’s 
code and, in particular, the sportsman’s conservation platform. (119) 
Such discussion of the earlier work implies that Green Hills registers no “concern for an 
ecological order” and that the hunting depicted can be neither “conservative” nor 
“justified.” In her review of Under Kilimanjaro, Ann Putnam admits that she could never 
bear to read the later African book because she feared “an irresistible return to the trophy 
hunting and blood hunts of Green Hills of Africa” (132). In their own way, these 
appraisals of Hemingway’s writing about animals betray a tendency to read 
Hemingway’s late-career as a departure from, a change of, or a shift away from his 
thinking about animals in the 1930s. 
Though his perspective on Hemingway’s work from the 1930s is somewhat more 
measured, Cary Voeller is similarly dissatisfied with Hemingway’s early work; likewise 
citing a change in Hemingway’s “attitude toward trophy-hunting,” Voeller writes that in 
True at First Light (an earlier version of the manuscript that would become Under 
Kilimanjaro) “[a] serious, utilitarian, dutiful Hemingway persona replaces the 
swashbuckling, bragging figure of Green Hills of Africa” (72). For his part, though, 
Voeller does recognize something of a throughput from Green Hills to True at First 
Light, writing that “[t]wenty years later, the more reflective, wiser persona that 
Hemingway constructs for himself at the end of Green Hills of Africa seems to have 
become a reality” (75).2 In their efforts to recover some ethical and ecological value in 
the Hemingway canon, these frameworks tend to idealize Hemingway’s late work at the 
denigration of the earlier primarily by suggesting that the popular Hemingway of the 30s, 
40s, and early 50s was in some sense not the “true” Hemingway and that there was a 
  
158 
 
body of more or less hidden work, mostly unpublished in his lifetime and thus made 
available posthumously without his editorial oversight, in which we might locate 
redeeming accounts of his ecological sensibility as well as changes in his thinking about 
ethical issues such as gender, race, and animals. As Maureen Dowd argued in observance 
of the 50
th
 anniversary of Hemingway’s suicide-by-shotgun, “it is time to give that most 
self-consciously masculine writer another look.” Where Dowd suggests Hemingway’s 
writing about women and gender identity are due for review, this chapter performs a 
similar query into Hemingway’s writing about animals, seeking to find what, if anything, 
Hemingway’s lifetime of hunting, fishing, and writing can reveal—about potentially 
ethical views on killing, certainly, but also about the epistemological possibilities of 
writing about animals and how those possibilities circulate in a world where the actual 
lives of animals are at stake. By focusing on how Hemingway uses literary expression to 
imagine and understand his relationship to nonhuman animals, this chapter will attempt 
to recover a sense of the ethics that are present in his writing from the 1930s and to show 
that any ecological ethic Hemingway may have achieved later in his life developed as a 
function of, rather than in spite of, the way he wrote about animals in this period of his 
career.  
 This chapter does not argue that there were no changes in Hemingway’s attitude 
toward hunting and killing over the course of his career. But one of its main goals is to 
demonstrate that, even while he wrote about trophy hunting through the 30s, there were 
ethical and ecological sensibilities—registered as a concern for nonhuman animals—to 
even his early writing. As part of this argument, I want to suggest that Hemingway’s 
thinking in this period reflected more widely held American attitudes toward hunting in 
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the 1930s—attitudes that changed as decades passed. In some way, then, this is to make 
Hemingway’s personal ethical development less “personal,” but it is also to illustrate how 
even trophy-hunting is a more complex ethical endeavor than many readers of 
Hemingway have tended to realize and to examine the ways in which his masculinity 
involved empathizing with nonhuman others even in his headiest, most “macho” works. 
The centrality of literary work to my reading will organize the chapter’s final section—
and also provides one of the most compelling answers to the question of “why 
Hemingway?” as the chapter also analyzes the importance that the process of creative, 
literary expression had in Hemingway’s ethical thinking about his relationships to 
nonhuman animals. 
Ecology and Ethics from the 1930s to the 1950s 
 Part of the reason critics tend to find greater ethical common ground with 
Hemingway’s late work is that ecological and environmental thought—both of which to a 
significant degree inform one’s thoughts about human-nonhuman relations—developed 
significantly over the decades of Hemingway’s career. The 1950s, and the years 
immediately preceding and following, were a decade that saw the circulation of some of 
the twentieth century’s important environmental thinking. Hemingway’s attitudes toward 
nature index of some of the attitudes of that era. First published in 1949, Aldo Leopold’s 
defining work, A Sand County Almanac, is perhaps one of the most well-known 
environmental works of this era. In his “Conservation Esthetic,” Leopold critiques both 
the recreational and trophy-hunting traditions—the latter of which several critics note 
Hemingway also turned from in his later writings. Calling outdoor recreation “a self-
destructive process of seeking but never quite finding” (178), Leopold argues that “the 
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trophy-hunter is the caveman reborn. Trophy-hunting is the prerogative of youth [. . .] 
and nothing to apologize for” (188). Leopold envisions trophy-hunting as part of a 
continual process of ethical development. In most analyses of his hunting ethics, 
Hemingway’s writing seems to mirror quite closely the maturation process Leopold 
sketches. In this sense, Hemingway’s ethics in the 50s might be seen as much less a 
“departure” or “shift away” from (to use language common to the criticism) those he 
demonstrates in the 30s and more as of a maturation of them. The only problem Leopold 
has with the trophy-hunting “stage” of ecological consciousness is when hunters never 
grow out of it; he goes on to write that “[t]he disquieting thing in the modern picture is 
the trophy-hunter who never grows up” (294). While my point here is not to argue for the 
actual ethical value of this paradigm, it is to suggest that understanding the ethics of the 
particular historical context in which Hemingway wrote might allow insight into the 
ethical systems at work in his early writing that have been somewhat ignored in many 
ecocritical and animal-studies oriented interpretations of his work. 
Hemingway’s late-life work on animals emerged from the same cultural moment 
that produced Leopold’s, though Hemingway’s use of fiction changes the polemical 
consequences of his writing. The 1930s, 40s, and 50s were a time of rapid changes in 
wildlife management policy in the United States. For his part, Hemingway had a lifelong 
interest in wildlife biology. As early as the late 30s Hemingway had a copy of Leopold’s 
Game Management in his personal library. Though it is A Sand County Almanac that 
garners popular attention for Leopold’s ethics, within professional wildlife management 
circles it is Game Management that is often considered his most important. The 
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philosophies first explored in Game Management directly gave rise to those of the 
Almanac.  
 Hemingway’s library contains works by a number of other important 
environmental thinkers as well. Perhaps most notably, his library at the Finca Vigía 
contained a copy of Rachel Carson’s The Sea Around Us (Brasch and Sigman 66), which 
was published in 1950 as Hemingway was working on The Old Man and the Sea. 
Hemingway’s library included a number of other works that attest to his concern with 
important environmental issues of the mid-century, including a 1947 report prepared by a 
committee of the United States Department of the Interior entitled Fading Trails: The 
Story of Endangered American Wildlife (Brasch and Sigman 117), which states in its 
opening paragraph that “[t]he greatest scourge against American wildlife was the 
commercial market hunter” (11). Hemingway possessed, and presumably read, this book 
and others like it, including Peter Matthiessen’s Wildlife in America and Sally Carrighar’s 
One Day at Teton Marsh (245, 65). Hemingway’s writing about animals in the 1950s 
reflects a tone of environmental concern that is common to all of these publications. Both 
his fiction and his creative non-fiction register aesthetic responses to a growing cultural 
awareness in the United States of limited environmental resources, which included game 
animals particularly, and of a sense of the connected nature of life on a local and global 
scale. If London’s thinking about animals at the century’s onset put him in a minority, 
albeit a highly vocal one, Hemingway’s work in the 50s catalogs ecological concerns that 
were becoming increasingly mainstream.  
If an awareness of the environmental thinking that was gaining momentum by 
mid-century is relevant to understanding what might seem to be a “departure” from his 
  
162 
 
earlier attitudes toward animals, it is equally relevant, I think, to read the earlier work 
within its historical context. Hemingway’s ideas about animals in the 1930s may look 
ethically problematic when judged by the ecological ethics of succeeding decades, but 
when read in the context of earlier hunting and conservation ethics the complex of ideas 
(and ideologies) that informed Hemingway’s early work on animals yields a better 
picture of how that writing demonstrates an important, even an ethical, response to the 
problem of animality. In his analysis of how Green Hills interfaces with the broader 
canon of colonial African safari narratives, Lawrence H. Martin argues that Hemingway 
intended the book as a corrective to the mistakes he felt characterized the genre: 
The rhetorical intention of the book [is] to tell the truth about Africa and 
the hunt while avoiding the mistakes and melodrama of other books of the 
type, and thus to be the best, the most original, the most truthful of the 
genre, communicating personal experience in such a way to make the 
armchair sportsman feel the country and the chase. (88) 
For Hemingway, this meant “try[ing] to write something about the country and the 
animals and what it’s like to some one [sic] who knows nothing about it” (Green Hills 
194). Part of conveying this within the context of his personal experience meant dealing 
with the feelings of guilt and sorrow that resulted from his empathetic identification with 
some, but not all, of the animals he injured or killed. In the two works that emerged from 
Hemingway’s trip to Africa in the 1930s, Green Hills and “The Short Happy Life of 
Francis Macomber,” this empathy functions through imaginative, literary expression. The 
imaginative and literary aspects of Hemingway’s “truth-telling” structure his relationship 
to the genre that shaped his experience as a hunter in and a consumer of Africa—a genre 
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that he also sought to depart from in significant ways. To some degree, Hemingway saw 
and experienced hunting through the eyes of fiction, which involves no small degree of 
empathetic imagination in order to understand and write character. Before delving into a 
more thorough reading of how this empathy informs Hemingway’s writing from the 30s, 
I first want to expand on the importance that the act of writing appears to have had in the 
way he conceptualized and understood himself in relation to nonhumans. 
Writing about Writing about Animals: “An African Story” in The Garden of Eden 
 To introduce my discussion of the problem of animality in Hemingway’s writing, 
I need to start at the end. Published posthumously in 1986, The Garden of Eden continues 
to provide some of the most compelling evidence for revisionist arguments about the 
ethics, politics, and identity of Ernest Hemingway. The material has provided important 
insight into Hemingway’s thinking about gender and, indeed, perhaps even his own 
masculinity, if we assume that the protagonist, David Bourne, manifests parts of 
Hemingway’s own identity. But my primary interest in The Garden of Eden is in its 
“story within a story” narrative frame, for within the text’s main narrative is a sub-
narrative about David’s composition of a story based on his experience as a child hunting 
elephants in Africa with his father.
3
 In it, the protagonist, David Bourne, spends hours 
working to get “right” in prose an experience he had as a young boy helping his father 
hunt an elephant on an Africa safari. Bourne’s narrative leads to a conflict between him 
and his father, one which leads him finally to declare, “Fuck elephant hunting” (181). 
David’s comment leads to a kind of breakdown in his relationship with his father because 
of how his interspecies ethics signifies a refusal to participate in his father’s symbolic 
economy. It is a choice David makes even though he knows his father “will never trust 
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[him] again” because of it. Indeed later in the text the elephant replaces David’s father in 
David’s organization of the family’s symbolic structure: “[t]he elephant was his hero now 
as his father had been for a long time” (201). That David continues to recollect the event 
in this way into his adult life, that he has not since written off its significance to some 
kind of immature sentimentalism, establishes the power of the story’s interspecies 
politics, whereby two more or less politically powerless subjects identify with one 
another across species lines.   
The Garden of Eden does more than recount this experience from David’s youth; 
it also emphasizes that the process of writing reconstitutes the experience for him. The 
account of David’s working process positions fiction writing as the method through 
which David comes to understand his relationships with his father and with the elephant. 
The narrator describes David’s writing process as representative of his encounter with the 
elephant, in a way, but also as constitutive of that experience. And the effort of writing 
facilitates David’s knowledge of his relationship with the elephant:  
He knew he did not have it right yet[. . . .] But his change of feeling 
toward Juma [his father’s hunting guide] and toward his father and toward 
the elephant was complicated by the exhaustion that had bred it. Tiredness 
brought the beginning of understanding. The understanding was beginning 
and he was realizing it as he wrote. (182, my italics)  
The act of writing, then, is described as making available knowledge and understanding 
that otherwise may be left unavailable—it is actually producing the realization of how his 
experience with the elephant permanently changed how he felt about his father. 
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Through writing, David recalls and re-creates the moment in which he identifies 
with the elephant in Africa. He describes this identification as a function of recognizing a 
shared capacity for suffering with and of returning the gaze of a nonhuman animal: 
He had tried to make the elephant alive beneath the tree anchored in his 
final anguish and drowning in the blood that had flowed so many times 
before but always staunched and now was rising in him so he could not 
breathe, the great heart pumping it to drown him as he watched the man 
who came to finish him. David had been so proud the elephant had scented 
Juma and charged him instantly. (200-01) 
The language of this passage emphasizes the elephant’s embodiment, describing 
physiological traits David shares with the elephant that are also the sources experiences 
David and the elephant could have in common; anguish, drowning, and heartbeat are all 
sensations that can plausibly bridge human and nonhuman experience. The passage 
suggests this use of language amounts to an attempt to “make the elephant alive” in such 
a way that the trauma of the experience becomes available to him again, and by extension 
to his reader. 
 The trauma of David’s experience is partly registered through his recognition of 
the elephant’s suffering, but it also becomes registered through their reciprocal gaze. 
Describing the moment the elephant first meets David’s gaze, after he has been wounded 
in the shoulder, the narrator says that “his eye was alive and looked at David. He had 
very long lashes and his eye was the most alive thing David had ever seen” (199).4 “But 
he didn’t look at me as though he wanted to kill me,” David recalls later, “He only looked 
sad the same way I felt” (201). In these places where Hemingway describes David’s eye 
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contact with the elephant, he relies on ambiguous descriptive language that both 
identifies David with the elephant but also retains a sense of the elephant’s otherness and 
difference. This ambiguity is one of the important aspects literary language can bring to 
what Wolfe discusses as the “semantic overburdening” of the problem of animality (117). 
Because it retains difference through identification, my reading of the ethics of this 
episode, then, is significantly different from Voeller’s, whose revisionist interpretation of 
Hemingway’s writing argues that “Hemingway, however subtly, reminds us that humans 
and animals are one and the same” (68, my italics) and that his “protagonists, in various 
ways, become one with an animal” (75, my italics). Such a reading is, to my mind, 
symptomatic of overly idealized accounts of Hemingway’s work that seek to collapse all 
differences between and within species into a vague “oneness.” In contrast to critics who 
see Hemingway as advocating a oneness with animals, I find interspecies ethics in 
Hemingway’s writing that result from partial identification between human characters or 
narrators and nonhuman characters. These moments emphasize similarity but not 
sameness, which also leaves space for alterity and difference. The ethics I locate in 
Hemingway’s writing about animals are not explicitly ethics of animal welfare or ethics 
on ecosystemic scale. They are an ethics on a smaller (though no less profound I think) 
personal level. The intimate quality of these ethical moments bridges my discussion of 
Hemingway to my reading of Bishop in the next chapter. 
 Understanding the identification between David and the elephant as their 
becoming “one and the same” risks de-emphasizing, if not entirely effacing, the actual 
significance of the interspecies politics that David advances through his sense of loyalty 
to and ethical responsibility toward a nonhuman. In the scene that this identification 
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occurs, David again recalls physical characteristics that humans and elephants share, in 
this case orienting his attention around the elephant’s eye and long eye lashes. However, 
Hemingway concludes this process of identification with the comment that the elephant 
“only looked sad the way [David] felt,” which again enrolls discursive ambivalence to 
describe David’s experience in a way that casts suspicion over the extent to which the 
emotions of the two beings mirror each other. Here, Hemingway’s famous “iceberg” style 
does significant work, and the ambivalence of his language screens David’s partial 
identification to the elephant. To say that “he only looked sad the same way I felt” is 
indeed to suggest that the “only” emotion the elephant was experiencing was the same 
sadness David felt. But the “only looked” phrasing also introduces the possibility that 
David is aware the elephant did not actually feel this sadness at all and that he in fact 
“only looked” as though he did; in this latter case, any sadness David detects is the 
function of his projection of his own emotional state onto the elephant. It is the 
ambiguous nature of this un-knowability, rather than a move to make David and the 
elephant, “one and the same” that, I argue, motivates the problem of animality and 
becomes a central aspect of its aesthetic appeal within the broader narrative of The 
Garden of Eden; as such language can be provocatively arranged around the problem in 
order to gesture toward interspecies affinities that are at once similar and different. The 
strategy Hemingway uses to work out the partial identification between David and the 
elephant connects The Garden of Eden’s interspecies ethics to the narrative’s response to 
issues of gender and sexuality as well. In its approaches to both the problem of animality 
and the problem of gender, the text employs a pattern of indirection and vague language 
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that allows for characters to identify partially with one another across identity categories 
that typically promote separation.  
 Through the character of David, Hemingway makes clear that while aesthetic 
language may gesture toward the central paradox of the problem of animality it will fail 
to accomplish the goal of either tracing accurately the objective similarities and 
differences between discrete beings or of fully presenting the life of a nonhuman animal: 
In the story he had tried to make the elephant come alive again as he and 
Kibo had seen him in the night when the moon had risen. Maybe I can, 
David thought, maybe I can. But as he locked up the day’s work and went 
out of the room and shut the door he told himself, No you can’t do it. . . . 
There is nothing you can do except try to write it the way that it was. So 
you must write each day better than you possibly can and use the sorrow 
that you have now to make you know how the early sorrow came. And 
you must always remember the things you believed because if you know 
them they will be there in the writing and you won’t betray them. The 
writing is the only progress you make. (166) 
Reflecting on his writing process, David becomes aware of the limitations of what he will 
accomplish with his story. Admitting an inability to “make the elephant come alive again 
as he [. . .] had seen him,” David resolves to “write it the way that it was,” which comes 
to mean “write it the way” he remembers experiencing it, in an effort to better understand 
the terms of his interaction with the elephant (to “use the sorrow that [he has] now to 
make [him] know how the early sorrow came”). Another of Hemingway’s characteristic 
techniques, his move from the third- to second-person narrative voice, involves the reader 
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in this process. By addressing “you” toward the end of the passage, David suggests that 
his process also implicates his reader in any progress he makes toward re-presenting his 
encounter with the elephant. 
 The Garden of Eden enacts this reader-involvement through the character of 
Catherine, David’s partner, who identifies with David’s dog, Kibo, when she manages to 
read his story without his knowledge. When Catherine tells David that she is “worried 
about his dog,” David responds, somewhat confused, by asking “My dog?” Catherine 
informs him, 
‘Yes your dog in Africa in the story. I went in the room to see if you 
needed anything and I read the story. . . . 
 ‘It’s wonderful,’ she said. ‘But it frightens me. The elephant was 
so strange and your father too. I never liked him but I like the dog better 
than anyone except you David, and I’m so worried about him.’ (163) 
Because she is a reader of David’s story, Catherine’s response provides an example of the 
ability for narrative to motivate empathy across species lines. (At the point where 
Catherine reads the story, David has not yet written through the elephant’s death; 
otherwise one might suspect she may have a similar reaction to that episode.) Her 
experience of David’s story reveals another example of how literary language, and 
narrative in particular, can create a sense of interspecies community. For Catherine, this 
sense of community means both an allegiance to David and a concern for the well-being 
of his nonhuman companion. Her sense of the elephant as “so strange” supports the 
interpretation that David’s writing maintains that he and the elephant are not “one and the 
same” and instead demonstrates cross-species identification can take place even if 
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animals remain radically strange. Catherine likens the strangeness of the elephant to the 
strangeness of David’s father, which reinforces that no two beings in his story are 
ultimately the same. What the characters have common is, paradoxically, strangeness and 
difference. Each character is different, and the ethics of David’s “Africa story” reveal the 
possibility that principles other than species- or even family-membership might organize 
empathy, allegiance, respect, and sorrow. This “similar and different” logic that 
characterizes the elephant hunting story works through the novel’s other relationships as 
well so that, within the broader networks of Garden, the interspecies social system comes 
to frame and participate in the novel’s approach to human political and gender relations; 
when seen from this perspective, this seemingly odd sub-narrative of this novel comes to 
fit quite while with the text’s broader themes. 
Through its focus on David’s compositional process, The Garden of Eden 
emphasizes the kinds of ethical and aesthetic responses to the problem of animality that 
literary expression makes available to both writers and readers. David’s challenge to 
himself, which mirrors Hemingway’s own craft, is to recreate this memory “truly” so that 
he might communicate to others the trauma of a life-changing experience. David’s 
response to his father and Juma’s killing of the elephant is to call them the “god damned 
friend killers,” which references not only another elephant they had previously hunted but 
also the kind of interspecies affinity David comes to feel for the elephant. The elephant’s 
compromised situation, his vulnerability, and his embodied response to his situation 
move David toward empathizing with him in a way that changes forever his relationship 
to his father. Through all of this, David uses narrative to understand himself in relation to 
a community of human and nonhuman others. With this emphasis on the writing process 
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as a means to understand interspecies relations—on the process of writing as a process of 
realization—I will now attend to his earlier work involving animals with a goal less 
oriented around finding an idealized ecological vision there and more oriented around 
how his narrators and characters understand themselves within an interspecies 
community. 
 Imagination, Empathy, and Identification in Green Hills of Africa 
 Part of what grounds Westling’s argument that Hemingway’s characters “must be 
seen [. . .] as adversaries and conquerors” (100) is that, where it concerns nonhuman 
animals, his writing almost always ends in death. Ernest Hemingway is known for killing 
animals. He killed them by the tens, the hundreds, the thousands even. He killed trout. He 
killed lions. He killed deer. He killed cheetah. Hemingway’s hunting endeavors are a 
fundamental part of his popular “Papa” image, forged through that very “body count” 
Love discusses. The iconography of the Papa brand, which no doubt Hemingway helped 
to create and circulate, still conditions public and, to a certain extent, critical responses to 
his work.  
 As I have discussed, these responses are often framed as progressive narratives of 
an awakened ecological consciousness that emerged late in Hemingway’s life. As Voeller 
does when he suggests that the “wiser persona” that appears in the closing pages of 
Green Hills becomes a “reality” in the 1950s, these narratives sometimes locate a nascent 
ecological sensibility in the writing from 1930s. Rather than coming to Hemingway’s 
work from this period with an external metric (late-century animal rights, for example) 
for measuring its ecological sensibility, I want to examine Green Hills and “The Short 
Happy Life of Francis Macomber” with a focus on how their specifically literary qualities 
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enable an empathetic response to nonhumans. In this way, I hope to suggest that 
Hemingway’s literary imagination was at the center of any ethically or ecologically 
progressive thinking he developed through the course of his life. I aim to show that the 
empathetic imagination present in his work played a key role in the changes in his 
thinking that other critics note. By contextualizing what are often regarded as fairly 
radical changes in Hemingway’s thinking as a function of an imagination that was 
occupied by the problem of animality from a very early moment, I hope to show that the 
“ecological Hemingway” of the 1950s marks less of a sea-change in his literary project 
and more of a logical consequence of his early work, both of which also reflect a broader 
change in American attitudes concerning nature and animals from the 1930s to the 1950s. 
 Hemingway’s writing about animals in the 30s was fundamentally influenced by 
his immersion in the methods of natural history writing as a child. Through the early 
decades of the twentieth century, natural history dominated how most Americans 
understood nature. Hemingway’s childhood participation in the Oak Park, Illinois, 
chapter of the Agassiz Club indicates the extent to which he was trained in the object-
oriented methods of natural history in the early century. For Hemingway, the practice of 
natural history was also bound to his understanding of one the heroes of his childhood, 
Theodore Roosevelt. In her analysis of Roosevelt’s influence on Hemingway, Suzanne 
Clark discusses Hemingway’s relationship to these traditions as an adult, after his 
experience in World War I significantly changed his perspective on Roosevelt’s system 
of values. In ways that other critical comparisons of Roosevelt’s influence on 
Hemingway often ignore, Clark attends to the divided allegiance Hemingway’s work 
shows with respect to Roosevelt (his “disillusionment with [the myth of] Roosevelt” 
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(60)). Clark agrees with Hemingway biographer Michael Reynolds that “the moral values 
of ‘courage, love, honor, self-reliance, work and duty’ continue[d] to ground 
Hemingway’s version of the strenuous life” (60) into the 1920s and 30s, but she also 
notes that “Hemingway diverges from Roosevelt’s association of manliness and the 
victorious nation” and that “Hemingway’s work represents both a continuation of certain 
principles and a significant questioning of the national project” (60). This view of 
Hemingway’s relationship to the strenuous life tradition allows Clark to see how 
Hemingway’s understanding of the “true sentence” resists to the positivist assumptions of 
natural history writing—because, as is shown through David’s experience in Garden, 
“truth” for Hemingway is experiential, not objective or ontological. In Clark’s view, 
Hemingway’s work amounts to “an unmaking of positivism” (64). For as much as it 
states positively, Hemingway’s sparse style also works negatively—one of the aims of 
the iceberg language is to gesture toward meaning that lies beneath the words on the 
page. In contrast to natural history writing, which aimed to observe, classify, define, and 
name things, Hemingway’s sparse style is suggestive but vague, and I am not using the 
term “vague” pejoratively. Hemingway’s writing thus utilizes certain descriptive 
techniques adopted from natural history, but it also changes the aim and function of the 
techniques. The goal for Hemingway’s language is not to produce a one-to-one 
correspondence between word and world. 
 Where it addresses the problem of animality, this kind of language calls attention 
to similarities between human and nonhuman characters without necessarily fully 
articulating the details or significance of those correspondences. Writing in a mode that 
required him to imagine his way into the experience of another in order to write effective 
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character, Hemingway explores the ways in which human and nonhuman experiences 
resemble one another without having to show that they are “one and the same” precisely 
because so much can be left beneath the surface of what he actually writes. In Green 
Hills, physical description leads, both conceptually and grammatically, into empathetic 
identification, enabling the Hemingway narrator’s empathy toward the animals he hunts: 
I could remember [. . .] one time in a hospital with my right arm broken 
off short between the elbow and the shoulder, the back of the hand having 
hung down against my back, the points of the bone having cut up the flesh 
of the biceps until it finally rotted, swelled, burst, and sloughed off in pus. 
Alone with the pain in the night in the fifth week of not sleeping I thought 
suddenly how a bull elk must feel if you break a shoulder and he gets 
away and in that night I lay and felt it all, the whole thing as it would 
happen from the shock of the bullet to the end of the business and, being a 
little out of my head, thought perhaps what I was going through was a 
punishment for all hunters. (148) 
Here, the narrator’s memory of his own injury creates an awareness of his embodiment 
and of the vulnerabilities of that embodiment, and that awareness underwrites his ability 
to imagine his way into the experience of an animal wounded by a hunter’s bullet. The 
narrator locates the basis for this empathetic identification in a kind of dream-state, which 
is also a mode of consciousness that eludes the positivism of documentary technique. 
This intuitive empathy may not make for a sound natural history, which the narrator 
seemingly admits to when revealing that he was “a little out of [his] head]” when struck 
by this sudden thought. To say that he was out of his head is also, however, to relocate 
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the grounds on which this kind of thinking occurs. While getting out of one’s own head 
(and into the head of another) may not make good natural history as Hemingway had 
learned it, it did provide him a framework for understanding himself in relation to 
nonhuman life.     
 It is the dream-logic of this memory that provides the basis for Hemingway’s 
hunting ethics, such as they are in Green Hills. Hemingway goes on to explain that 
because of his injury and suffering “at least I knew what I was doing [when I hunted]. I 
did nothing that had not been done to me. I had been shot and I had been crippled and 
gotten away.” Feeling that he fully understood the potential suffering he could inflict on 
game, Hemingway “resolved that I would only shoot as long as I could kill cleanly and as 
soon as I lost that ability I would stop” (149). The basis of Hemingway’s famous “clean 
kill” hunting ethic, then, can be located in his empathetic imagination. 
 The hunting ethic Hemingway advanced in Green Hills is quite different than the 
one Maier locates in Under Kilimanjaro. The conservation ethic in the later text, Maier 
argues, is based on Hemingway’s concern for population-based game management. The 
ethic of Green Hills, on the other hand, is grounded in the Hemingway narrator’s 
empathetic identification with nonhumans, and it includes a recognition of the 
asymmetrical power dynamic that defines the terms of his relationship to animals. This 
ethic also frames the narrator’s ultimate failure in Green Hills. While many readers see 
this early African text as a blustering, macho self-promotion, Green Hills’s plot organizes 
around Hemingway’s failure to live up to his “clean kill” ethic. The final hunting episode 
of the narrative undermines, rather than enhances, the image of Hemingway as expert 
hunter, and the humility of his failure explains his “ecological move” toward the book’s 
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conclusion—a move that readers who are inattentive to the narrator’s empathy sometimes 
have difficulty explaining.  
 As a result of the hunt that concludes Green Hills, Hemingway imagines what 
will happen to the sable he wounded but was unable to track and kill cleanly, and, again, 
it is this imagination of the consequences of his actions that facilitate his sorrow, 
humility, and guilt:  
I was thinking about the bull and wishing to God I had never hit him. Now 
I had wounded him and lost him. I believe he kept right on travelling and 
went out of that country. He never showed any tendency to circle back. 
Tonight he would die and the hyenas would eat him, or, worse, they would 
get him before he died, hamstringing him and pulling his guts out while he 
was alive. The first one that hit that blood spoor would stay with it until he 
found him. Then he would call up the others. I felt a son of a bitch to have 
hit him and not killed him. I did not mind killing anything, any animal, if I 
killed it cleanly, they all had to die and my interference with the nightly 
and the seasonal killing that went on all the time was very minute and I 
had no guilty feeling at all. We ate the meat and kept the hides and horns. 
But I felt rotten sick over this sable bull. (271-72) 
Hemingway’s remorse punctuates his failure, which is a function of his empathetically 
imagining what will happen to the sable. The passage develops through doubling 
comparisons between human and nonhumans. The hyena will track the sable as the 
human hunters had done throughout the day, but they will ultimately be more successful 
than anyone in Hemingway’s party. The sickness of the sable is mirrored, in a way, by 
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the “rotten sick” feeling to which the narrator confesses. While his situation is nowhere 
near as dire as the sable’s, this mirroring language does register a connection between 
hunter and hunted as the Hemingway figure faces the consequences of not living up to his 
own ethical code. He reasons that killing is acceptable particularly when animal meat is 
consumed as food, and, according to his logic, not to keep trophies from the kill is 
imagined as a kind of waste. The value that governs the slaughter of animals is that of the 
“clean kill,” which would attempt to eliminate needless suffering. The ethics in this 
passage function through empathy, not necessarily ecology. Whether it’s valid or not, the 
language here assumes ecologically sound situation within which the hunting occurs. The 
ecological picture of this passage reflects an attitude that assumes hunting practices to be 
“minute” within the broader economy of “nightly” and “seasonal” killing. Hemingway 
thus naturalizes his hunting practices in terms of how they impact animal populations. So, 
even where his primary concern may not be the conservation of populations, it is worth 
noting that Hemingway does have some kind of ecological consciousness—even if he 
seems largely unaware of the problems that those practices might cause when enacted on 
a large scale. 
 Hemingway’s inability to conform to his own ethical standard continues to 
trouble him. Later, after his hunting party has left the area where he wounded the sable, 
he continues to reflect on his failure. In one of the more introspective moments of Green 
Hills, Hemingway digresses into an interior dialogue, trying to work out an excuse for 
himself and ease the guilt the episode has caused: “But that damned sable bull. I should 
have killed him; but it was a running shot. [. . .] Hell everybody is off sometime. You’ve 
got no bloody business to be off. Who the hell are you? My conscience? Listen, I’m all 
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right with my conscience. I know just the kind of son of a bitch I am and I know what I 
can do well” (282). Hemingway’s misgivings concerning his hunting of the sable evoke 
his sense of conscience, and he turns the pull of that conscience into a resolve to one day 
return to Africa to “see the buffalo feeding where they lived, and when the elephants 
came through the hills we would see them and watch them breaking branches and not 
have to shoot” (282). The guilt and shame of this failure is at the root of his return some 
20 years later. The conscience of Green Hills paves the way for the ecological concern of 
Under Kilimanjaro. 
Hemingway’s sense of the capacity of the African ecosystem to accommodate 
commercial hunting is only momentary. Even within his own sense of the “minute” 
impacts of his hunting, however, Hemingway registers a sense of the ecological 
consequences of colonial imperialism and the hunting-based safari economy it promotes. 
A few paragraphs after his meditation on the guilt he experiences after wounding the 
sable, Hemingway develops the argument that a “continent ages quickly once we come” 
(284). While Voeller, Westling, and others have located in this paragraph a tragic 
ecological wisdom, I also want to suggest there is another ethical logic at work 
throughout much of Green Hills, one that does not base itself in the notion of population 
management or biodiversity but instead functions through empathy and respect for 
nonhuman life, even when it means killing and eating animals. As problematic as 
Hemingway’s ethical vision may seem in Green Hills to readers versed in the logic of 
ecology and ecocriticism, an ethical construct does frame how Hemingway writes about 
hunting in much of the book and ultimately troubles any ego-inflating expertise 
Hemingway ascribes to himself. 
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Thinking with Animals in “The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber” 
 As a piece of creative non-fiction, Green Hills uses motifs of recollection and 
reflection to establish the Hemingway narrator’s empathy with nonhumans, particularly 
with suffering ones. In the fiction that emerged from the same trip to Africa Hemingway 
took in 1930s, however, he uses different literary techniques to advance a sense of cross-
species empathy and ethical responsibility. In “The Short Happy Life of Francis 
Macomber” (1936), Hemingway employs defamiliarizing techniques somewhat similar to 
those of Jack London discussed in the previous chapter. Hemingway’s use of the 
technique is, however, more extreme in its stripping of language down to basic 
descriptors, which Shklovsky discusses as a primary technique of defamiliarization. As is 
the case in London’s fiction, Hemingway’s use of a nonhuman narrative focalizer 
establishes a sense of the lion’s perspective and positions the lion as an important 
character. This character status, in turn, presents the lion as a nonhuman person—it 
makes clear his interests, his responses, and his consciousness—all basic criteria for the 
sentience of what Gary L. Francione would call an animal’s “interest in continuing to 
live” (18).  
“Macomber” tells the story of an American couple on a commercial hunting tour 
in Africa, a basic premise that is similar to Green Hills. Unlike Green Hills, however, the 
story is clearly fiction. The plot involves the emasculation of the title character when he 
fails to kill a lion he’s gut-shot and who lays waiting for him in a cluster of tall savannah 
grass. When the lion rushes, Macomber loses his nerve and flees, and the couple’s 
hunting guide, Robert Wilson, steps in to shoot the lion. The logic of the story implies 
that Macomber’s wife, Margot, then sleeps with Wilson because she is impressed with 
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his courage but also because she is embarrassed by Macomber and, perhaps, wishes to 
compound his humiliation. The infidelity brings to the surface the couple’s domestic 
problems, and the terms of their relationship are revealed through their argument over 
Margot’s indiscretion. Often read as the stereotypical “Hemingway bitch,” Margot seems 
intent on the symbolic emasculation of her husband. Anne Greco’s “Margot Macomber: 
‘Bitch Goddess’ Exonerated,” for example, argues that her character exemplifies an 
“American woman’s hardness [that] has been brought about as a result of her husband’s 
weakness” (274). Through hunting, however, Macomber eventually recovers some sense 
of his own power, which leads to the story’s famously ambiguous resolution: Margot kills 
her husband at the story’s end, but the motive for the act is unclear. It is plausible that 
Margot shoots her husband because of her jealousy of his newly realized masculine 
empowerment, but it is also plausible that she hit him mistakenly because he was also 
being charged at that moment by a kudu, and she was trying to protect him. Margot’s 
action can be read as either unbelievably spiteful or tragically heroic. Perhaps it’s both. 
Another classic example of Hemingway’s iceberg theory, the text itself gives readers 
very little evidence for definitively interpreting Margot’s actions.   
What is often lost in the din of this action is the role of animal sacrifice in the 
drama of human power relations, a situation that Hemingway attempts to emphasize by 
writing through the perspective of the lion at various moments in the story. As Nina 
Baym observes about her experience teaching Ernest Hemingway’s “The Short Happy 
Life of Francis Macomber,” most critical readings of this story dwell on questions 
concerning its gender (and identity) politics.
5 
While these politics do indeed simmer 
throughout the narrative and boil over at its close, “Macomber” frames its human 
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conflicts within a broader interspecies context. The story’s formal conditions incorporate 
nonhumans, specifically the lion killed by Wilson, into its social relations. Hemingway 
uses defamiliarizing formal techniques to focalize parts of the narrative through this 
lion’s perspective. The result of this narration is a zoomorphism that both expands the 
ethical space of the story to nonhuman animals and creates a sub-narrative that 
problematizes the “great white hunter” ethos commonly read into “Macomber.” 
 In several places, Hemingway’s narrative technique evokes the perspective of the 
lion that Macomber and his guide, Robert Wilson, hunt. Lorraine Daston and Gregg 
Mitman write that zoomorphic thinking stems from “the yearning to understand what it 
would be like to be, say, an elephant or a cheetah [or, of course, a gut-shot lion]” (8). The 
construction of the lion’s perspective in “Macomber” conveys this zoomorphism because 
the method of narration positions readers to think through the experience of a nonhuman 
being. The story’s first account of the lion introduces an extra-human perspective: 
The lion still stood looking majestically and coolly toward this object that 
his eyes only showed in silhouette, bulking like some super-rhino. There 
was no man smell carried toward him and he watched the object, moving 
his great head from side to side. Then watching the object, not afraid, but 
hesitating before going down the bank to drink with such a thing opposite 
him, he saw a man figure detach itself from it and he turned his heavy 
head and swung away from the cover of the trees as he heard a cracking 
crash [. . .] (13) 
In such moments, Hemingway refracts the story of the lion hunt through the lion’s 
consciousness. First, he changes the perceptual modality of the story, expanding the 
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perceptual field from vision to include smell, which is not a mode of perception that 
factors into the human characters’ observations of one another—especially from a 
distance. Second, he uses words and phrases that describe familiar objects in unfamiliar 
ways. Hemingway repeatedly chooses the word “object” instead of truck or car to 
reference the party’s hunting vehicle, and he writes that it is “bulking like some super-
rhino,” which triangulates the visual description of the vehicle with an image more 
familiar to the lion’s experience. Even referencing the “man figure” as “itself” rather than 
the more familiar “himself” carries an element of this zoomorphism. This zoomorphic 
focalization technique integrates the lion into the story’s social fabric. Even as some of 
the other characters primarily value the lion for what he represents symbolically, the 
formal technique of “Macomber” presents him as more than that: he becomes a character.  
 To achieve the sense of perspective that advances the lion’s role as a character, 
Hemingway writes in a way that “makes the familiar seem strange by not naming the 
familiar object. [He] describes an object as if it were seen for the first time, an event as if 
it were happening for the first time” (Shklovsky 721). In the case of “Macomber,” the 
zoomorphic thinking this defamiliarization makes possible enlists the reader to think 
through—or empathize with—a nonhuman’s perspective in a way that is similar to how 
the Hemingway narrator imagines nonhuman experience in Green Hills. As the hunting 
sequence continues, Hemingway uses the technique to underscore the lion’s unfamiliarity 
with the hunters’ guns. Rather than describing the reports of the guns as “gunshots,” he 
writes that the lion hears a “cracking crash” when the guns are fired: 
. . .[H]e heard a cracking crash and felt the slam of a .30-06 220-grain 
solid bullet that bit his flank and ripped in sudden hot scalding nausea 
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through his stomach. . . .[T]he crash came again to go past him ripping the 
air. Then it crashed again and he felt the blow as it hit his lower ribs and 
ripped on through . . . and he galloped toward the high grass where he 
could crouch and not be seen and make them bring the crashing thing 
close enough so he could make a rush and get the man that held it. (13) 
The scene makes the gunshot—an utterly familiar sound to the human hunters—strange, 
defamiliarizing it and the attendant sequence of events. The separate registering of sound 
and pain when the lion is struck by the bullet, for example, decouples the experience of 
hearing the gunfire from feeling the pain of the bullet. As the lion becomes the narrative 
focalizer, he eclipses the privileged perspective of the hunters and generates, in turn, a 
distinct and powerful nonhuman presence in the story. As a whole, the passage gathers a 
number of perceptions that position its read to imagine the scene, its sights, smells, and 
sounds, through the lion’s perspective. These sensations culminate with the narrator 
conveying what the lion felt: the alert hesitation, the slam of the bullet, the sudden 
nausea, the ripping flesh. The story leads the reader from seeing through the lion’s to 
feeling the strike of the bullet. The defamiliarization advances the empathetic 
imagination. 
Hemingway uses his training as a naturalist along with this aesthetic technique to 
construct the wounded lion’s perspective of this hunt. His knowledge of the anatomical 
structure of the lion’s eye translates to how he represents the lion’s sight in the passage. 
Twenty years later, Hemingway reflected on his theory about the eyesight of lion’s that 
he provided the basis for his imagination of the lion’s experience: 
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Many years ago I had discovered, or believed I had, that lions have no 
depth of vision and see only in silhouette. I had experimented with this, 
and later gambled on it, in photographing wild lions at close range in the 
old days [. . .] and I was convinced it was true. In those days I did not have 
the respect for lions that I should” (182) 
Regardless of the veracity of Hemingway’s discovery, it demonstrates his attempt to 
think through the experience of a lion; the move to preserve the “silhouette vision” in the 
Macomber story suggests that a kind of zoomorphism, rather than anthropomorphism, is 
at work in the passage—or at least scrambles the distinction between the two techniques 
of representing nonhuman experience. Hemingway’s move from “discovery” to literary 
narrative addresses Wolfe’s point about “transdisciplinarity” in animal studies and the 
relationship between what is “accurate” and what is “specific” (What Is Posthumanism? 
115-16). On its most immediate level, Wolfe’s concept of transdisciplinarity asks “what 
[literary and cultural studies] can contribute, specifically, that could not be handled just 
as well or better by other fields such as history or sociology or biology” (103). One of the 
most significant—and specific—contributions literary study can make to animals studies 
is to call attention to the language we use to represent or understand the experiences of 
animals. Unless they are writing in a literary mode (and some do), no historian, 
sociologist, or biologist will attempt to narrate anything through the perspective of a 
nonhuman. When read in conjunction with this “fact” that Hemingway believed he had 
discovered about the vision of lions, “Macomber” can demonstrate the difference 
between knowledge and understanding. There is a big difference between knowing about 
the physiological structure of a lion’s eye—that, example, they have a horizontal streak 
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of nerve cells for picking out moving prey on a horizon—and understanding (or at least 
attempting to understand) what it is like to see through those eyes. Narrative is a place 
where one uses what one “knows” about a subject to imagine the lived experience of that 
subject. Narrative attempts to turn knowledge into understanding. Where it pertains to the 
problem of nonhuman lived experience, that knowledge may not be “accurate,” but it is 
“specific” in one of the original senses of the term: having the quality of a species.6 
Hemingway’s use of the “silhouette vision” of lion’s is specific even though it is not 
accurate. Zoomorphic technique is thus an attempt to understand how a member of 
another species situates itself in and brings forth its world.  
 The zoomorphism at work in these paragraphs allows “Macomber” to remain 
recognizable to human readers (hence Hemingway follows one description of the 
“cracking crash” with the image of “a .30-06 220-grain solid bullet”), yet it opens up the 
possibility for imagining the specific perspective of the lion. The story’s zoomorphism 
expands its ethical framework. Indeed, the sentence following Hemingway’s description 
of the lion’s experience states, “Macomber had not thought how the lion felt” (13). The 
story’s narrative style, however, does exactly that by presenting the lion’s perceptions 
and responses as he becomes entangled in the action of hunting and in the wider culture 
of masculinity that the hunt invokes. The lion thus becomes an actor in the narrative’s 
larger interspecies society. In “Macomber” the violent encounter between hunters and 
lion provides an opportunity for the reader to think through the experience of a hunted 
animal. 
 Figuring an animal other into “Macomber” as a character amounts to recognizing 
that nonhuman beings possess subjectivity and a perspective. It amounts to a recognition 
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that they (or some of them at least) might experience the world in a way that can be 
rendered in narrative. Jacques Derrida contends that the history of philosophical and 
theoretical discourses have been marked by a denial of the seeing animal. He traces a 
philosophical lineage from Descartes to Levinas whose “texts are signed by people who 
have no doubt seen, observed, analyzed, reflected on the animal, but who have never 
been seen seen by the animal” (13). Part of what marks a development in Hemingway’s 
ethical regard for animals is his ability to situate nonhumans in a way that Derrida asserts 
philosophy fails to do. The violent encounter—and the way he was able to explore such 
encounters through his writing—offered Hemingway a unique opportunity to account for 
seeing animals (animals who see), and in “Macomber” the narrator delves into the lion’s 
experience to offer a depiction of the hunting party being seen by the lion. If the hunting 
party is read as based loosely on Hemingway and his circle (which is how many critics 
read the story), then the short story offered Hemingway the chance to show his likeness 
as “seen seen” by an animal. His move here places Hemingway in a class of thinkers 
Derrida maintains is made up of poets and prophets, thinkers “who admit to taking upon 
themselves the address that an animal addresses to them” (14). Nonhuman characters are 
not only a recognition that animals see but an attempt to render what they see. 
 Both Green Hills and “Macomber” advance methods for empathetically 
identifying with nonhumans. Both texts, through differing narrative techniques, 
foreground the act of thinking about how animals feel. If the ethics of these writings may 
not reflect the more mature ecological vision that characterize some of Hemingway’s 
later work, I maintain that there is an ethical system at work in these texts, and it is one 
that operates through a recognition of the interests and experiences of nonhuman animals. 
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Even as they “record ‘truly’ [. . .] that the contact zone between twentieth-century 
individualism’s narcissistic economy and a wider ecology resonates with violence and 
death” (Clark 64), these texts attempt to provide a means for understanding hunting and 
killing, however superfluous it may seem to us in hindsight, within an empathetic 
conceptualization of nonhuman life. Hemingway’s writing about animals in this period is 
certainly not without its problems, but it is also not entirely empty of ethical 
responsibility. In the push to identify those problems, readers are often too quick to 
overlook those ethics and, as a result, fail to see the logic of the violence depicted and the 
significance of Hemingway’s literary projects as methods for coping with the 
consequences of—and to some extent excusing—that violence. 
An Ecological Hemingway? Game Laws and Animals as Food in Under Kilimanjaro 
 In contrast to the problems many critics find in Hemingway’s writing from the 
1930s, the posthumously published Under Kilimanjaro (2005) has been the primary 
source of revisionist appraisals of his work that argue he developed an ecological 
consciousness late in his career. The recurring emphasis on killing animals for food in 
Under Kilimanjaro leads many readers to see an increased justification for hunting in the 
later text that does not exist in Green Hills. Maier writes that one signal that 
Hemingway’s hunting ethic has “changed significantly” since the 1930s is the “nearly 
two dozen hunting trips justified solely as efforts to acquire meat for camp” (121). And 
Ryan Hediger locates his argument that “Under Kilimanjaro corroborates this view of a 
hunting ethic increasingly attentive to particular, concrete, local contexts and actual 
animals” in Hemingway’s statement that on his second African tour “the time of shooting 
beasts for trophies was long past with me [. . .] I was shooting for the meat we needed to 
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eat [. . .] and against beasts that had been outlawed for cause” (116-17). Such frameworks 
suggests that the trophy hunting performed in Green Hills somehow precludes or negates 
also using slaughtered animals for meat. But, even in the earlier text, Hemingway more 
often than not notes that the animals killed by the hunting party are eaten. 
Certainly, in Green Hills both Hemingway and Karl keep trophy heads, and 
trophy licenses were a significant part of the hunting industry and culture in the 1930s. 
But Hemingway also makes a point in that text that the hunting party eats what they kill. 
Hemingway notes that the party is “free to shoot for the meat we needed” (52) and 
refrains from killing a waterbuck at one point precisely because he “knew it was 
worthless meat” (53). Later, when he’s sighted a buffalo, Pop tells Hemingway “[h]e’s 
not a big one . . . I wouldn’t take him unless you want him for meat” (100). Hemingway 
replies that he has “got three more on the license,” and Pop ultimately authorizes the kill 
by conceding “It’s awfully good meat . . . Go ahead then.” Upon flushing and killing 
ducks, Hemingway notes that “we hunted [their bodies] carefully and found them all . . . 
remembering how marvellous [sic] they were to eat” (130). Hemingway rationalizes his 
killing of an oryx in a similar way, killing it because “we wanted meat badly” (156). As 
this also occasions an opportunity for Hemingway to show off some shooting skill, the 
killing of the oryx is both a chance to demonstrate mastery and to get meat for camp. In a 
way more honest than some of the passages about meat hunting in Under Kilimanjaro, 
this example reveals that hunting for meat and hunting for status are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive endeavors.  
Just as Hemingway frequently discusses eating the meat of hunted animals in his 
early “Africa book,” he also demonstrates some respect for game laws of that period. At 
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one point, Hemingway describe a situation in which Karl’s hunting group, hoping to 
shoot a leopard, “had found not a leopard but a marvellous [sic] lion, a huge, black-
maned lion that did not want to leave, on the rhino carcass when they had gone the next 
morning and could not shoot him because he was in some sort of reserve” (126). Even as 
Maier’s comparison suggests that Green Hills is marked by “serious disdain for game 
laws” (119), the Hemingway character repeatedly refrains from shooting at female 
animals, particularly when they are accompanied by young ones. When he does shoot at a 
cow late in the story, it is because of a mistake and another source of guilt for him. While 
there are moments in Green Hills that the Hemingway character disregards game laws, 
there are a number of places he acts out of deference for them. Again, my point is not to 
say that many readers of Green Hills are wrong in pointing to what we might call 
ethically suspect moments in the early book, but it is to demonstrate that Green Hills is 
more complicated and thoughtful than it is generally given credit for. 
Attention to the ethical system of Green Hills has another important consequence: 
it helps to problematize idealizations of the writing about animals in Hemingway’s later 
African book. As the binary comparison of the two texts begins to breakdown, the ideas 
that traffic between them come into focus. Hemingway’s status as an “acting Game 
Ranger” on his second visit to Africa does increase the legal authority of many of his 
hunting actions. But, as Rose Marie Burwell points out, the legal pretext for much of this 
“endless killing” is that “many [are] conveniently classified as vermin by game 
regulations code” of the day (22). More telling than his ascription to game laws is the 
descriptive style used to narrate certain hunting sequences. Part of Maier’s issue with 
Green Hills is the “indiscriminate kill[ing of] non-game animals like hyenas” (121). And, 
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indeed, the tenor of the passage where Hemingway describes the hyena slaughter can 
seem chilling: 
Mirth provoking was the hyena that stopped out of range by an alkali lake 
to look back and, hit in the chest, went over on his back, his four feet and 
his full belly in the air. Nothing could be more jolly than the hyena 
coming suddenly wedge-headed and stinking out of high grass by a donga, 
hit at ten yards, who raced his tail in three narrowing, scampering circles 
until he died. 
   . . . the pinnacle of hyenic humour, was the hyena, the classic hyena, that 
hit too far back while running, would circle madly, snapping and tearing at 
himself until he pulled his intestines out, and then stood there, jerking and 
eating them with relish. (Green Hills 37-38) 
There is a tone of abjection in Hemingway’s description of the hyenas; he later calls them 
“fisi, the hyena, hermaphroditic, self-eating devourer of the dead, trailer of calving cows, 
ham-stringer . . . stinking, foul” (38). The tone is quite different than the note of empathy 
with which he describes wounding a bull elk and, later, the sable, and it reveals the 
specificity with which he imagines animals. He does not empathetically identify with 
animals as a single, monolithic group—individuality and difference matters. Wolfe finds 
this kind of differentiation in Hemingway’s thinking to be a “systematic parsing of the 
animal other into quite different and discrete ontological and ethical categories” and 
determines that it “evince[s] the obsessive hierarchization and classification of the other 
so central to the Enlightenment project” (“Fathers” 251-52). But for his part, Hediger 
finds a “necessarily tenuous, circumstantial quality of ethics” in some of Hemingway’s 
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work, which explains why his writing in places uses descriptions of suffering or death as 
springboards to empathy and in other places uses similar descriptions as sources of 
humor. 
 Revealed to a greater degree through Hemingway’s narrative through than by the 
legal technicalities of his hunting, such ethical “tenuousness” is present in Under 
Kilimanjaro as well as Green Hills. In the later text, his descriptions of killing baboons 
take on an element of the mirth he says that he feels toward hyenas in the earlier. In the 
case of the baboons, Hemingway establishes that he and his camp “were supposed to 
keep the population of baboons down to protect the shambas [farms]” (156). Beyond the 
legality of it, however, there is a rhetorical similarity between the hyena episode of Green 
Hills and what is described as an almost genocidal mass slaughter of baboons in Under 
Kilimanjaro: 
The baboons came out of the bush quietly and started to cross the stream 
like a raiding party. There were three very big old-man baboons at the 
head, one bigger than the others. . . . the females and the young ones still 
coming out of the bush. 
   Still lying down I held on the shoulder of the biggest old dog baboon 
and squeezed very gently. . . . I hit the third and then the second as he 
jumped over him. I looked back at the first baboon and he was lying face 
down in the water. The last one I had shot was screaming and I shot and 
finished him. (173-4) 
Hemingway goes on to describe what he calls their “disgusting corpses” (157), replete 
with “obscene bellies, and really bad faces being pulled out of the water and up the bank” 
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(174). The abjection of the baboon slaughter echoes that of the hyena hunt of Green 
Hills. Hemingway’s description of the episode is characterized by militant language; 
Hemingway was always interested in and moved by war and, in some cases, war games, 
and the language here reveals some pleasure in confronting what he imagines as a kind of 
enemy “raiding party,” and his words demonstrate little remorse, sorrow, or guilt over his 
actions. Also missing from his discussion of the baboons is any kind of empathetic 
identification with the wounded, “screaming” baboon of the final sentence. 
 The purpose of my analysis of Green Hills, “The Short Happy Life of Francis 
Macomber,” and Under Kilimanjaro is not to suggest that Hemingway’s thinking about 
animals remained unchanged over the course of his career. Many of his readers before me 
have explored these changes in enriching ways. Indeed, another of Hemingway’s late 
works, The Old Man and the Sea, is centrally structured around the problem of animality. 
In this novella, Hemingway uses the character of Santiago to voice many of the troubling 
ethical questions that characterize much of his writing about animals. The narrative is 
built around a central metaphor—a fishing line that both literally and figuratively 
“connects” Santiago and the marlin he catches and kills. As the marlin pushes Santiago to 
his physical and ethical limits, Hemingway voices concerns through him that address 
some of the animality problem’s central issues. “[W]e are joined together” (50), thinks 
Santiago at one point. And later he “beg[ins] to pity the great fish that he had hooked” 
and thinks “[h]e is wonderful and strange and who knows how old he is” (48). Finally, 
after much reflection, Santiago becomes overwhelmed by the prospect of killing the 
marlin: “you loved him [the marlin] when he was alive and you loved him after. If you 
love him, is it not a sin to kill him. Or is it more?” (105) His only response to such 
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questions ultimately lead him to tell himself, “don’t think, old man.” Even more than 
Under Kilimanjaro, The Old Man and the Sea demonstrates both the extent to which the 
problem of animality continued to trouble Hemingway late into his life as well as his 
inability to ever satisfactorily think through an adequate ethical response it. Lacking such 
a complete ethical response, he was left with an aesthetic one. 
 But if my point in this chapter is not to suggest Hemingway’s thinking about his 
relationships to nonhumans underwent no changes throughout his career, it is to argue 
that those changes are best seen as a continuation of, rather than a departure or shift away 
from, his early writing. The tendency to dismiss or demonize Hemingway’s writing about 
animals from the 30s, particularly Green Hills, in the process of idealizing his late-life 
work is, to my mind, hasty and, ultimately, unnecessary, and it can result in 
misrepresentations of the importance of empathy and ethics (and, in places, the lack of 
them) in the writing from both eras. Hemingway’s writing about animals, tinged as it is 
with both the pleasure and the guilt of exercising power over them, demonstrates how 
aesthetic and imaginative expression can mobilize feelings of empathy across species 
lines. 
Notes 
 
 1. Buell’s groundbreaking and highly influential work tracks Walden “in light of 
antecedent drafts and journal materials [. . .] to see Thoreau undergoing a partly planned, 
partly fortuitous, always somewhat conflicted odyssey of reorientation” (23). This 
paradigm for understanding a kind of progressive development of ecological ethics, 
effective as it is for discussing Thoreau’s developing environmental consciousness, 
dominates much ecocriticism and, in my view, has led Hemingway critics to map a 
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similar structure onto Hemingway’s work. This way of understanding Hemingway’s 
development as a writer has real critical value, but it has become so widely entrenched in 
Hemingway criticism that there is now a real risk of missing important responses to 
animality that exist in his earlier writing.  
2. Published in 2005, Under Kilimanjaro records Hemingway’s African safari 
during the winter of 1954-55. Originally edited by Patrick Hemingway and published as 
True at First Light in 1999, the manuscript was re-visited and re-published several years 
later by Robert Fleming and Robert Lewis, who argued that this later version represents 
“as complete and faithful a publication as possible without editorial distortion, 
speculation, or textually unsupported attempts at improvement” (vi). 
 2. Voeller’s language here is revealing of the rhetorical move that other 
ecocritically oriented readers of Hemingway’s work also make. Note that the Hemingway 
of Green Hills is called a “persona” while the Hemingway of True at First Light is 
described as a “reality.” 
 3. Titled “An African Story,” this short story has also been published in The 
Complete Short Stories of Ernest Hemingway. The short story version, however, lacks 
what I think is one of the critical components of this narrative: the framing device 
whereby David reflects on the compositional process and the kind of experience that 
literary expression, specifically, allows him to recover and recreate. 
 4. In other example of how Hemingway’s writing from the 50s demonstrates 
values similar to Leopold’s, David’s experience, and his presentation of the eye as a site 
of identification with a dying nonhuman, mirrors Leopold’s description of his observation 
of the death of a wolf: “[w]e reached the old wolf in time to watch a fierce green fire 
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dying in her eyes. I realized then, and have known ever since, that there was something 
new to me in those eyes—something known only to her” (140).   
5. In “Actually, I Felt Sorry for the Lion,” Baym discusses how one of her 
students (surprisingly to Baym) finishes “Macomber” with a greater sense of sympathy 
for the lion than for any of the story’s other characters. Her student’s response leads 
Baym to argue that the lion haunts “Macomber” even after he is killed. 
7. One of the original sources of the word “specific” is John Bulwer’s 
Anthropomethamorphosis (1650), which uses “specific” to denote characteristics of what 
were, for Bulwer, different “species” of humans. There are thus two senses in which we 
might consider Wolfe’s claim that distinct disciplinary perspectives bring something 
“specific” to animal studies.   
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CHAPTER V 
THE STRANGEST PEOPLE WE DON’T KNOW: 
ANIMALS IN THE POETRY OF ELIZABETH BISHOP 
 In a letter to Anne Stevenson in 1964, Elizabeth Bishop reported that, prior to 
their divorce, Pauline Hemingway gave a copy of Bishop’s North & South to her 
husband, Ernest. According to the letter, Hemingway liked the book and was particularly 
drawn to Bishop’s poem “The Fish.” Ernest, Pauline reported to Bishop, commented 
upon reading it that he “wish[ed he] knew as much about it as [Bishop] does.” It was a 
praise that Bishop tells Stevenson was more meaningful to her “than any praise in the 
quarterlies” (Millier 156). While moving from Hemingway to Bishop might at first 
glance seem like an abrupt shift in both style and sentiment, their shared interest in the 
uses of animals—as well as their personal, intimate responses to the problem of 
animality—links Hemingway and Bishop and transitions my focus from animal 
characters in fiction once again to animal figures in poetry. 
Perhaps Elizabeth Bishop’s most anthologized poem “The Fish” has occasioned 
critical commentary from almost every major appraiser of her work. Randall Jarrell, one 
of Bishop’s earliest critics, cited the poem as evidence that Bishop’s work is “morally so 
attractive” because of its emphasis on how “morality, for the individual, is usually a 
small, personal, statistical, but heartbreaking or heartwarming affair of omissions and 
commissions the greatest of which will seem infinitesimal” (235).1 What Jarrell finds 
striking in Bishop—what he refers to as her morality’s “small,” “statistical,” even 
“infinitesimal” properties—is her attention to the specific conditions of her speaker’s 
experience. Many of Bishop’s poems share this method. Because of their focus on 
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specificity, Bishop’s poems tend to resist abstract ethical claims or moral maxims. 
Instead her poems, especially where they feature a speaker’s encounter with a nonhuman 
animal, often stick to the detailed description of that experience. Thus, as Jarrell further 
notes, many of her poems also carry a vividly personal quality. Bishop’s biographer Brett 
Millier makes a similar observation of “The Fish” when she emphasizes that Bishop 
attends to the singularity of the poem’s situation; in doing so, Millier finds “The Fish” 
“most representative among the early poems of Bishop’s voice.” Millier suggests that the 
speaker’s actions—which culminate in her release of the fish in the poem’s final 
moment—contradict Bishop’s usual fishing practice of keeping her catch (154-5).2 Key 
to both Jarrell’s and Millier’s reading of “The Fish” is Bishop’s ethical concern with and 
response to nonhuman life. Bearing the unmistakable influence of her mentor Marianne 
Moore, “The Fish” is an early iteration of a theme that Bishop would make her own and 
return to throughout her career: how personal observation of and intimate interaction with 
nonhuman others influence the way that her poetic speakers understand other animals.
3
 
 Narrating a fishing excursion that climaxes with the catch and concludes with the 
release of an impressive, intriguing (“tremendous,” in the speaker’s words) animal, “The 
Fish” introduces several of Bishop’s strategies for figuring human-animal interactions. 
The first of these is that the fish’s physical presence—and the speaker’s attention to that 
presence—compels the speaker to be mindful of the specificity of the encounter 
described. To sharpen this specificity, Bishop couples basic description (“his brown skin 
hung in strips”) with defamiliarizing simile (“like ancient wallpaper”) to introduce an 
element of strangeness to the commonplace (10-11). The poem also features observations 
that allow the speaker to identify with the fish while simultaneously differentiating him 
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from the speaker: “While his gills were breathing in / the terrible oxygen / —the 
frightening gills, / fresh and crisp with blood” (22-25). Like the speaker, the fish breathes 
and is made of blood and flesh; unlike the speaker, the fish breathes through gills and 
cannot use the gaseous air above water to oxygenate his blood. This move to 
simultaneously identify with and differentiate from a nonhuman animal is perhaps 
Bishop’s most provocative response to the complicated problems concerning the way that 
humans imagine themselves in relation to other forms of animal life.
4
 
 Further characteristic of Bishop’s figurations of animals is the moment when 
communication is gestured toward but also imperfectly achieved. In “The Fish,” this 
comes when the speaker, continuing to partially identify with the body of the fish, 
“looked into his eyes / which were far larger than [hers] / but shallower, and yellowed” 
(34-36). As the speaker seeks some kind of visual communication with her catch, the 
fish’s eyes “shifted a little, but not / to return [her] stare. / —It was more like the tipping / 
of an object toward the light” (41-44).5 The setting of “The Fish” introduces a fourth 
element that pervades almost all of Bishop’s poems concerning animals: the poem takes 
place in an environment that is neither pristine nor uncorrupted by human presence. “The 
Fish” makes clear that the home of its nonhuman figure is not separate from the 
environment of the human speaker. The poem even gives this shared environment 
something of a celebratory tone, framing the oil-slicked water surrounding the engine as 
“a rainbow” (69). Bishop’s human-animal interactions almost always occur in places that 
emphasize how animals and humans share the environments in which we dwell. Finally, 
“The Fish” concludes with an ethical figuration that results from the epiphany of the 
poem. In this case, that ethic is registered in the speaker’s action of releasing the fish. The 
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attention to this fish’s individuality, the close observation, the frustrated communication, 
and the recognition of shared environment give rise to an epiphanic moment where 
“everything / was rainbow, rainbow, rainbow! / And [she] let[s] the fish go” (74-76). The 
excitement of the speaker’s epiphany, capped by Bishop’s rare use of an exclamation 
point, resolves into the simple, declarative action of the poem’s final sentence. 
 Bishop’s poems often feature oblique personal epiphanies that result from her 
careful description of objects, experiences, or memories. Her descriptive poetic has 
received a lot of attention. It has been the source of what some have pejoratively termed 
her “reticence.” For others, such as Jarrell and more recent readers such as Zachariah 
Pickard or Bonnie Costello, Bishop’s focus on detail and specificity is a source of 
empowerment and a critique of normalized modes of perception and meaning-making. 
And in his appraisal of a sampling of her poems, Lloyd Schwartz locates the “profound 
vision” of Bishop’s work in her “interest in small things, in ‘details’” (45). While many 
readers have responded to early criticism of her work by embracing, rather than 
dismissing, her method of careful description, what has been generally overlooked in the 
study of her poetry is the particular perspective Bishop’s method brings to bear on what 
has come to be called, for better or worse, “the question of the animal.” In many studies 
of her poetics, animals become just more objects or things for Bishop to describe. In 
these views, an armadillo is not much different from a map or a lighthouse. But Bishop’s 
method has distinct consequences where it concerns nonhuman animals because it works 
to figure animals as recognized members of broad interspecies social networks—what 
might also be called a community of the living. Because of her focus on description and 
her attention to the specificity of experience, most of Bishop’s poems emphasize the 
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materiality and individuality of animals.
6
  The insistently singular yet also highly social 
qualities of these animal figures invests them with kinds of personhoods that remain 
significantly—sometimes radically—strange, even as they ground intimate and personal 
identification with nonhuman others. A number of Bishop’s poems develop modes of 
nonhuman personhood that complicate and multiply the category of “person” rather 
assimilate animal others to a singular, fixed conception of the term (a conception that 
conflates “person” with “human”). 
 The method by which Bishop presents the experience of “The Fish,” though 
nascent at this point in her career, typifies her use of observation to maintain the 
strangeness of her animal figures while also clearing the way for an ethical identification 
with them. In his analysis of Elizabeth Bishop’s Poetics of Description, Pickard reads her 
general poetic method of close description through the lens of what has come to be called 
Bishop’s “Darwin Letter” (DL). Written to Bishop’s friend Anne Stevenson in 1964, the 
letter expresses the poet’s admiration for what she saw as Darwin’s process for coupling 
observation with reflection: 
[R]eading Darwin, one admires the beautiful solid case being built up out 
of his endless heroic observations, almost unconscious or automatic—and 
then comes a sudden relaxation, a forgetful phrase, and one feels the 
strangeness of his undertaking, sees the lonely young man . . . sinking or 
sliding giddily off into the unknown. (qtd. in Pickard 5) 
Bishop further compares Darwin’s rhetorical process to the creative act of art, stating, 
“the same thing is necessary for its creation, a self-forgetful, perfectly useless 
concentration.” Where Pickard uses Bishop’s ideas from this letter as a way of 
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understanding her poetic treatment of “imagery, psychology, epiphany, knowledge, 
morality, narrative, travel, and, finally, description itself” (5-6), this chapter uses the 
insight provided by the Darwin Letter (as well as some of the conclusions Pickard draws 
from it) to understand how she figures animals into several of her poems. Because of its 
coupling of observation and unknowability, Bishop’s poetry enlists the practice of 
observation in order to attend to the limits of her human poetic speakers’ ability to 
understand nonhuman experience. 
 Although these poems figure animals as ultimately unknowable, even in acts of 
close observation, they do not rehearse the long intellectual tradition of imagining 
nonhuman animals as essentially different from human ones. Rather, the unknowability, 
or strangeness, of animal others at which Bishop’s speakers arrive in these poems 
occasion moments of generosity by presenting opportunities for Bishop to figure 
nonhumans as social actors in the poems. The release of her catch in “The Fish” is one 
such moment, but different poems register these ethical gestures in different ways. Thus, 
Bishop’s animals become entangled in her poems’ social relationships, which grant them 
a sort of personhood.
7
 Bishop partly unfixes the certainty of what constitutes a person by 
foregrounding the ways that her poems’ human figures are also unknowable. Schwartz 
reads this strategy for imagining human others into “In the Waiting Room,” where he 
describes the epiphanic moment when the speaker (again, presumably Bishop) realizes 
that “[h]aving an individual identity not only separates her from the others, it also does 
not separate her from others, who also have identities” (33).8 But this feeling of both 
kinship with and alienation from other living bodies is something Bishop further locates 
in experiences with nonhumans in many of her poems. In these social configurations, 
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nonhumans become actors who, like humans, are never entirely knowable but whose 
insistent presences give rise to the opportunity for observation and interaction. (Indeed, in 
these poems observation and interaction are inseparable.) The practice of observation in 
these poems, then, pulls in two directions: Bishop’s animal poems identify speakers with 
nonhuman animals while also highlighting the limits of that identification. 
Socializing with Strangers 
 Bishop’s poem “Manners” develops a notion of an interspecies society and 
provides an example of how close observation can lead to an ethical, even “mannerly,” 
relation to nonhuman others. “Manners” is the first poem in the “Elsewhere” section of 
Questions of Travel (1965). If her letter to Stevenson is an indication of her thinking 
during this period, the publication year of the poem suggests a link between her work on 
it and her thinking about Darwin’s methods of natural history and animal observation. 
The poem recounts a drive Bishop took in her grandfather’s horse-drawn carriage. As 
they drive, they encounter and offer a ride to a young boy named Willy and his 
nonhuman companion—a crow who maintains a kind of conversation with them as they 
drive. The poem reveals interspecies society as a concern for Bishop and builds its ethic 
directly from Bishop’s reserved technique, which results in the speaker’s learning to 
behave ethically toward nonhumans despite a lack of certainty over what those animals 
“know.”9 In other words, rather than beginning with the assumption that the only ethical 
responsibility humans have regarding nonhumans arises in cases where certain emotions 
or cognitive abilities can be proven, “Manners” establishes ethical responsibility toward 
animals as its default mode. By placing its nonhuman actors within—rather than outside 
of—its social matrix, the poem imagines forms of nonhuman personhood; its animal 
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figures are positioned as kinds of people, though their forms of personhood remain 
strange. And that is an important qualification because it is through this strangeness that 
the animal persons of “Manners” remain both nonhuman and nonhumanist. 
 The speaker of “Manners” is presumably Bishop herself, since the poem initiates 
a series of recollections based on her own childhood experiences. In these poems, Bishop 
approaches a kind of confessional poetics, but she does so via her own signature 
method.
10
 True to her descriptive mode, she reveals experience by focusing on outward 
physical details (through description and observation) rather than the inner emotional 
experiences of the speaker. Especially in the first several poems of the “Elsewhere” 
section, Bishop attempts to present recollected emotions by offering descriptions of 
remembered events. Animals play key roles in a number of the poems. Leading the 
sequence, “Manners” establishes how Bishop imagines herself as, in part, a product of 
her interactions with nonhuman animals.  
 The epigraph, “For a child of 1918,” alerts readers to its speaker’s developing 
sense of manners––manners that emerge as a function of her engagement in an 
interspecies social reality. Another way of putting this point would be to say that the 
speaker’s sense of manners is coproduced.11 The manners that the speaker’s grandfather 
presses his two young travelling companions to adopt and practice at the poem’s close are 
observed despite the speaker’s anxiety over what Willy’s crow “knows.” “Manners” is 
structured around this question, which is central to the poem both thematically and 
formally; the line in which this question is asked is self-contained, and it is the sixteenth 
of thirty-two total lines. After the boy’s crow flies off when he climbs into the carriage, 
the speaker worries, “How would he [the crow] know where to go?” The speaker’s 
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anxiety over this question is put to ease in two ways. First, the crow follows the journey 
of the carriage, flying only “a little way at a time” (7). Second, the crow maintains what 
the speaker frames as a kind of conversation: “when Willy whistled he answered” (19). 
The speaker’s grandfather also recognizes this exchange as a kind of conversation, 
commenting that the crow “answers / nicely when he’s spoken to” and that “Man or 
beast, that’s good manners / Be sure that you both always do” (21-24). Rather than 
framing them as a mechanism for purifying the poem’s humans from its nonhumans, the 
grandfather’s comments figure the crow’s calls as a conversation, which frames him as a 
participant in the poem’s social relations (its culture) and locates manners in the 
relationships between the humans and other animals. Indeed, by co-opting the rhetoric of 
“man” and “beast,” the grandfather’s language conflicts with the notion that mannered 
society purifies the human from its bestial nature. On the contrary, the recognition of 
cross-species society does not bestialize the poem’s human actors; rather it compels them 
to act with respect and politeness toward its nonhuman people. 
 In the poem’s closing lines, the grandfather demonstrates how he too obeys the 
strictures of interspecies social propriety that he imparts to the children throughout: 
When we came to Hustler Hill, 
he said that the mare was tired, 
so we all got down and walked, 
as our good manners required. (29-32) 
The complete sentence of the final quatrain (aside from the opening one, it is the only 
stanza in the poem that Bishop does internally break up with some kind of end-stop 
punctuation) creates a grammatical holism to the stanza that reinforces the social holism 
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it depicts. In this scene, the grandfather, who to this point has been the poem’s only 
speaker (beside the crow), is also silenced—while the speaker relays to the reader what 
he said, his words get no direct voice. This is a shift from the direct quotations in all of 
the other stanzas. Speech is replaced by mannerly action, and any anxiety over the mare’s 
interiority disappears, replaced instead by a simple reading of her body and a recognition 
of the shared experience of fatigue. Their good manners “require” that they behave both 
politely and generously toward the mare, and the poem thus locates manners as a function 
of an interspecies society. Moreover, because the poem focuses on the remembered 
experience of childhood, “Manners” emphasizes how social codes can be understood as 
coproduced by both human and nonhuman actors. 
 Bishop’s habit of including nonhumans within the social framework of her poems 
enables an ethics based on generosity even while it remains aware of difference. The 
mannerly society I am suggesting arises from Bishop’s poetry is not one where moose, 
seal, and fish become prim, anthropomorphized guests at a tea party. Each animal figure, 
for Bishop, interfaces with and occupies a broader social network in its own way—based 
on species, certainly, but also based on the particularities of his or her experience 
(Willy’s crow is not every crow). Indeed, as suggested by the tipping eye of the fish, it is 
often difficult for Bishop’s speakers to achieve a thorough or reliable understanding of 
the animals they encounter. But these human-nonhuman relations retain their social 
framework despite such difference and strangeness, such unknowability, which results in 
an expansion and diversification of how her readers might understand what constitutes 
society. As her speakers come to imagine their interactions with nonhumans as social, 
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they both recognize animals as subjects and assume an ethical responsibility toward 
them.   
 “Manners” centralizes its speaker’s anxiety over her inability to know with 
certainty the interior experience of the poem’s nonhuman animals. She does not, 
however, let this lack of certainty deter her mannerly, ethical behavior. Instead, she 
focuses on the signs conveyed by the animals’ physical presences, as registered both by 
the “speaking” of Willy’s crow and the fatigue of the mare. However, a thorough 
knowledge of what those animals are thinking or feeling is never available to the poem’s 
speaker or reader. As the poem develops its interspecies social framing, then, the animals 
in it retain ethical relevance even as they are allowed to remain what Timothy Morton 
terms “strange strangers,” the category he substitutes for nonhuman animals in The 
Ecological Thought. Morton develops his notion of the strange stranger from Derrida’s 
work on “Hospitality”12: 
Instead of ‘animal,’ I use strange stranger. This stranger isn’t just strange. 
She, he, it—can we tell? how?—is strangely strange. Their strangeness is 
itself strange. We can never absolutely figure them out. . . . They are 
intrinsically strange. Do we know for sure whether they are sentient or 
not? Do we know whether they are alive or not? Their strangeness is part 
of who they are. After all, they might be us. And what could be stranger 
than what is familiar? As anyone who has a long-term partner can attest, 
the strangest person is the one you wake up with every morning. (41) 
Morton’s description can provide some insight for reading the animal figures in Bishop’s 
poetry. He offers this “strange stranger” to provide some footing for the difficult, 
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confusing conceptual terrain that has come to characterize the way humans imagine 
themselves as and in relation to other animals. “Saying ‘Humans are animals,’” Morton 
writes, “could get you in trouble. So could saying ‘Humans are not animals,’ for different 
reasons.” In response to this quandry, Morton lists a series of questions—questions that 
often plague arguments concerning ethics and animals. For Morton, the answer to these 
questions, or at least part of it, relies on his remaining attentive to the strangeness of 
nonhumans others, a form of attention that I argue also results from the diverse 
menagerie of animals in Bishop’s body of work . Whether fish, moose, heron, mare, crab, 
or snail, the animals that appear in her poems range from the everyday to the rare, and 
Bishop’s speakers frequently attend to animals so familiar that we risk forgetting their 
strangeness.
13
 All such organisms occupy nodes within an interspecies social matrix, so, 
while Morton begins developing the urgency of the “strange stranger” concept in 
response to the “humans are animals” problem, he eventually connects this strangeness to 
what he calls “long-term partners.” By offering the strange stranger as a response to the 
semantic challenges animals present and then using the concept to characterize intensely 
personal relationships, Morton positions strangeness as a function of intimacy. Such 
moments of mutual intimacy tend to characterize Bishop’s poetic descriptions of human-
animal encounters. Indeed, the “long-term partners” Morton discusses need not be 
human. Morton thus uses the “strange stranger” to imagine nonhuman animals as 
participants in a network of organisms that are all relating to one another through varying 
degrees of similarity and difference—a network that of course includes an array of 
human beings as well. For Morton, and I would argue for Bishop as well, one result of 
including nonhumans in these kinds of networks (social networks, if you will) is that it 
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can also safeguard against becoming overly familiar with other humans. This includes 
even the human we come to imagine as “the self.” 
 The ideas Morton advances through his concept of the “strange stranger” 
highlight the kind of strangeness and difference that I am arguing characterize the animal 
figures in many of Bishop’s poems. And while Bishop’s animals remain both strange and 
singular, her poems also figure them as social actors, or agents. In her work on animals in 
fiction, Susan McHugh argues that “the success of the novel form follows from its . . . 
support [of] models centered on agency rather than subjectivity” (1).14 McHugh’s focus 
on agency rather than subjectivity can elucidate further how animals function in Bishop’s 
poetry. Perhaps best exemplified by the poem “Pink Dog,” where an insistent and 
“depilated” stray dog threatens to undermine the poem’s lighthearted Carnival 
atmosphere and troubles a heavily ironic conclusion, Bishop’s method of emphasizing 
animals as agents is also at work in poems such as “The Fish,” “The Moose,” and 
“Manners” (as well as many others). In these poems, Bishop’s speakers do not focalize 
events through the experience of her nonhuman figures. In doing so, Bishop resists 
colonizing the consciousnesses of animals. In other words, she is not so rude as to 
presume to know them in such a way that would allow her to speak for them.
15 
Bishop 
instead relies on observation to describe unique forms of animal agency. As a result of 
this agency, animals often address Bishop in personal, intimate ways. 
 Taken together, the responses to the problem of human-animal relations 
developed by Morton and McHugh respectively can shed light on Bishop’s poetic 
approach to animals. Bishop, however, also centralizes the social aspects of those 
relations in ways that escape both Morton’s and McHugh’s formulations. So, even as the 
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strange stranger and agent models extrapolate some of what Bishop does with her animal 
figures, they do not exhaust it. For this reason, I am using this chapter to rehabilitate the 
concept of “nonhuman persons” as best suited for discussing Bishop’s animal figures 
because of her emphasis on the social aspects of human and animal lives.
16
 The risk of 
this phrase is that, by operating through an assumption that would conflate “person” to 
“human,” it undermines the very strangeness that, as Morton points out, can be such a 
useful imaginative mechanism. But, if we can keep Morton’s and McHugh’s cautions in 
mind while also attending to the social framing of Bishop’s approach to animals, 
nonhuman persons becomes a viable articulation of her animal figures—not least because 
of the mannered ways of relating to them that arise from her poetics. Bishop’s speakers 
recognize nonhuman personhoods, but they do not extend to or impose upon other 
animals a prefabricated concept of what it means to be a person. As a result of her focus 
on strangeness, agency, and sociality, Bishop’s speakers avoid the ethical paralysis that 
comes with the inability to know completely the terms of another animal’s life. 
 It is this sense of propriety, which requires one to resist the urge to be overly 
familiar with another, that Bishop’s speakers bring to their interactions with animals and 
that allows them to recognize strangeness. Indeed, propriety and manners begin with the 
refusal to be overly familiar. The social picture of “Manners” links the mannerly actions 
of Bishop’s childhood memory with respect and dignity, which Sarah Buss argues fuses 
the moral to the mannerly: “the ‘respect’ and ‘dignity’ of such importance in moral 
philosophy are the very same ‘respect and ‘dignity’ of such importance in manners. 
Systems of manners play an essential role in our moral life. What’s more, playing this 
role is the essential function of good manners” (795). If respect and dignity result from 
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good manners, Bishop signals her respect and dignity for the strangeness of nonhuman 
animals by including them in the social setting of this poem. 
 “Manners” concludes with a description of the speaker, her grandfather, and her 
friend dismounting their carriage out of consideration for the mare’s fatigue. Such a move 
is motivated by a fundamental identification with the strange stranger, an identification 
that resists “absolutely figuring out” the mare’s state-of-mind but still offers courtesy 
toward this nonhuman other who has become a participant in the poem’s social fabric. By 
recalling that it was consideration of the mare’s fatigue that moved the three passengers 
to disembark and walk, the poem’s speaker grounds interspecies “manners” in a 
recognition of the physical limits and the capacity for suffering shared by humans and 
nonhumans. Jeremy Bentham first framed the capacity for suffering as the basis for cross-
species sympathy in the eighteenth century, and his position has provided the foundation 
for some of the most important inquiries into this issue in recent years. Bentham’s central 
formulation is to ask not “Can [animals] reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they 
suffer?” In “Manners,” an awareness of nonhuman suffering proves central to how 
Bishop remembers learning about social propriety. Bishop’s approach to animality 
functions through what Derrida (working from Bentham) calls “the finitude that we share 
with animals.” For him, mortality is “the most radical means of thinking the finitude we 
share with animals, the mortality that belongs to very finitude of life, to the experience of 
compassion” (The Animal That Therefore I Am 28). By recognizing the mare’s fatigue, 
“Manners” makes this capacity for suffering a part of its interspecies society, which is in 
turn underscored by the mortality shared by all living entities.   
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But, where “Manners” acknowledges the possible suffering of a nonhuman being, 
it is a poem that follows “Manners,” “First Death in Nova Scotia,” that more thoroughly 
thinks through this “finitude that we share with animals” by blurring the distinction 
between human and nonhuman death. Also from Questions of Travel’s “Elsewhere” 
section, “First Death in Nova Scotia” situates questions about human-animal relations 
squarely in the memory of childhood experience. “First Death” recalls the funeral 
viewing of Bishop’s cousin Arthur. The poem opens with a description of the room in 
which the child’s dead body lays, and the speaker’s eye lingers upon a stuffed loon: “on 
the table / stood a stuffed loon / shot and stuffed by Uncle / Arthur, Arthur’s father.” The 
speaker then momentarily conflates the loon with her cousin through the use of the vague 
pronouns “he” and “him”: “Since Uncle Arthur fired / a bullet into him, /  he hadn’t said 
a word.” The use of pronouns here confronts the reader with a crucial interpretive choice: 
the reader either believes that Uncle Arthur shot his son or must recognize the dead loon 
as another person in the room by accepting the use of personal pronouns to describe him. 
The phrase “he hadn’t said a word” further confuses the dichotomy of human/nonhuman 
in the poem when it comes to the question of mortality; again, the reader can either 
understand that the Uncle killed his son or go along with the idea that the loon might, at 
some point in his life, have been able to speak. The structure of the poem’s second stanza 
thus asks its reader to recognize the “finitude we share with animals.” 
 Ann K. Hoff reads the conflation of Arthur’s and the loon’s deaths in this poem as 
re-creation of “childhood confusion” not unlike the one that she also sees in “Manners” 
(587). But to dismiss the child’s perspective (which is, I argue, at least entertained by 
Bishop as an adult as well since it is as an adult that she re-constructs the experience in a 
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poem that formally and thematically emphasizes death as shared) as confusion is to 
misunderstand the ethical investments of the poem. Likening the death of her cousin to 
the loon should not trivialize Arthur’s death, but it should call into question the practice 
of trivializing the deaths of nonhuman animals. While the poem’s speaker is perhaps 
confused by and unable to comprehend “death’s inertia and finality” (Hoff 587), she is 
clear-thinking in apprehending Arthur’s death through her understanding of the death of 
the loon, as death is the one inescapable fact that unites the entire community of the 
living. The poem’s title further conflates the death of Arthur and the death of the loon. 
The “First Death in Nova Scotia” is actually the loon’s, who was shot and stuffed long 
before Arthur’s passing. Indeed, it is the speaker’s status as a child that gives her access 
to this reality, of which the adults in the room are presumably less cognizant, as well as 
her ability to realize that the corpses of both the loon and her cousin are on a sort of 
display. But it is a reality of which the adult Bishop, as composer of the poem through the 
experience of the child, remains acutely aware. 
 Finally blurring any essential distinction between human and nonhuman death in 
“First Death” is the stark fact that “little Arthur” is a child. Arthur’s status as a child, and 
how that status would inflect his relationship to death, seriously troubles any 
metaphysical logic that would distinguish human from nonhuman death in an essential 
way. Any confusion on the part of the child Bishop only underscores this point. One of 
the claims to which Derrida’s comments respond is the idea that animal death is of less 
ethical importance because animals do not have some kind of abstract knowledge of 
death. Specifically, Derrida is responding to the claims of Martin Heidegger, whose 
position on nonhuman death Matthew Calarco summarizes in this way: “animals (as 
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instances of the kind of beings that merely have life but have no relation to finitude) 
never properly die or demise; they can only perish. Demise and dying are modalities of 
finitude to which animals simply do not have access on Heidegger’s account” (17). For 
Derrida, on the other hand, all life is characterized by some kind of relation to finitude, 
which is one of the profound arguments of “First Death” as well. In this poem, the child 
speaker does not participate in the symbolic economy that essentializes human and (or 
versus) nonhuman death. That is the body of human child laid out next to that of a loon 
emphasizes the point. What this poem says about death is not that humans and 
nonhumans all experience death in the same way, nor that we ought to place the same 
degree of importance on all death. (Though I do argue the poem urges its reader to take 
nonhuman death and killing more seriously than the adults at the margins of the poem 
seem to take it.)  On the contrary, what “First Death” suggests is that all beings relate to 
and experience death differently, and, what’s more, will relate to and experience death 
differently even within the course of an individual lifetime.    
 “Manners” and “First Death in Nova Scotia” are only two examples of a number 
of poems where Bishop figures animals as kinds of persons by focusing on their sociality, 
individuality, and materiality. Each of her volumes contains at least one poem that 
features a speaker encountering a nonhuman animal and acknowledging its strangeness 
through a partial but intimate identification with it. And each of these poems is inflected 
somewhat by the particular style of the volume in which it appears. That this theme 
continued to appear even as Bishop’s work took on different formal characteristics at 
different points in her career demonstrates the important connection between form and 
content in her work. Each new formal opportunity is also an occasion to investigate these 
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problems in a different way. Thus “The Fish” uses a restrained, mature voice to query 
human and nonhuman suffering and retains something of what Adrienne Rich calls “the 
poem-about-an-artifact” strategy, which Rich traces to the techniques of Bishop’s friend 
and mentor Marianne Moore. In the first section of Questions of Travel, the artifactual 
method of North & South gives way to an emphasis on framing formative interactions 
between humans and animals as social and featuring those interactions in local, specific 
environments. “Manners” and “First Death” thus demonstrate the role of interspecies 
society in the remembered experiences of the poet’s youth. 
Picking Up the Scent and (Re)Perceiving “The Moose”  
 Because it is a poem that was under development for many years, “The Moose” is 
harder to classify as an example of a certain stage of Bishop’s career and is somewhat 
resistant to the kind of historical narrative sketched in the first two parts of this chapter. 
Finally published as part of Geography III (1976), “The Moose” is a poem that was years 
in the making. Millier locates the basis of the poem in a trip Bishop took in 1946, and the 
journey the poem records also figures in “Cape Breton,” published as part of A Cold 
Spring in 1955. (Indeed, “The Moose” does share a lyrical voice with other poems, such 
as “At the Fishhouses” and “Cape Breton,” whose genesis is located in the same period of 
Bishop’s life.) “The Moose” is one of Bishop’s longest poems, and much of its length is 
devoted to establishing the overwhelming closure of the human-centered goings-on inside 
the bus. Indeed, the poem’s title figure does not appear until its final stanzas. The early 
stanzas of the poem deal with establishing the “narrow provinces” (1) of an 
anthropocentrism that the moose eventually de-centers, as the language of the opening 
line both references a geographical description of the Nova Scotia coast and gestures 
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toward human provincialism. Both the form and the content of the poem reinforce the 
monotonous, almost boring, anthropocentrism of the bus:  
The passengers lie back. 
 Snores. Some long sighs .   
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
In the creakings and noises, 
an old conversation  
 —not concerning us, 
but recognizable, somewhere,  
back in the bus: 
Grandparents’ voices  
 
uninterruptedly  
talking, in Eternity: 
names being mentioned, 
things cleared up finally; 
what he said, what she said, 
who got pensioned; (85-102)  
These lines are characteristic of the first two-thirds of “The Moose.” In her reading of the 
poem, Bonnie Costello argues that lines such as these result in a “sense of fragmentation” 
that sets up the “affective power of the moose [which] is due in part to her full 
representational presence, after a long sequence of glimpses, gestures, premonitions, and 
dreams” (166). Throughout these first movements of the poem, long, meandering 
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sentences and subordinate clauses scaffold mundane descriptions that do not concern 
“us” in two senses: the conversations among the passengers are not about us, nor do we 
take an interest in them.  
 The poem’s lyrical voice, along with the sublime intrusion of the moose in the 
poem’s closing stanzas, has led some readers to see the poem as a re-working of 
Romantic poetics. Helen Vendler finds the moose to be a kind of avatar for the “hairy, 
scratchy, splintery,” and “inscrutable” woods; in her reading, the moose is symbolic of 
animal life as “pure presence, with its own grandeur” (28). She writes, “Bishop’s moose 
is at once maternal, inscrutable, and mild. If the occupants of the bus are bound, in their 
human vehicle, to the world of village catastrophe and pained acknowledgment, they feel 
a release of joy in glimpsing some large, grand solidity, even a vaguely grotesque one, 
which exists outside their tales and sighs, which is entirely ‘otherworldly.’” Readings of 
“The Moose” such as Vendler’s focus on Bishop’s choice of “otherworldly” to interpret 
the moose as a symbol for a feminized Nature typical of Romantic poets. In these 
readings, the moose becomes an avatar for a sense of Nature that Morton characterizes as 
“‘over yonder,’ . . . . a reified thing in the distance, under the sidewalk, on the other side 
where the grass is always greener, preferably in the mountains, in the wild” (3). In 
accounts like Vendler’s, the moose symbolizes this vision of nature, precluding her 
individuality and closing off the possibility that she might also exist “in here” with us as 
much or more than she does “out there” with Nature. In this reading, the speaker’s asking 
“Why, why do we feel / (we all feel) this sweet / sensation of joy?” (154-56) captures the 
thrill of coming so close to, while remaining ever so far from, nature in all its 
transcendent glory.  
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 But I want to suggest that Bishop’s choice to describe the moose as 
“otherworldly” and yet also “awful plain” (149) is actually consistent with her figurations 
of animals more generally and ultimately serves to register the moose as an individual––
an actual moose. The moose, like all animals, is otherworldly in the sense that it is a 
strange stranger. The moose makes and participates in a world that only momentarily 
overlaps with that of the speaker. But this otherworldliness of the moose can be read as 
something that connects it to, rather than separates it from, the human figures of the 
poem. Indeed, the momentum of the poem up to the point where the moose appears on 
the scene establishes that the poetic speaker herself occupies a world that is somewhat 
estranged from those of the other passengers on the bus—an alienation that is evident 
from her lack of concern with and participation in the fragmented conversations she 
overhears. The driver’s comment, “Curious creatures,” can be read as a description of 
both the moose and the bus’s passengers, and the speaker’s note that when he speaks the 
driver is “rolling his r’s” (159) adds an element of otherness to the driver as well. The 
point here is not to suggest that the passengers on the bus are as strange to one another as 
they are to the moose, but it is to point out how the poem presents a range of “worlds,” all 
of which overlap at some points and diverge at others. The otherworldliness of the moose 
only frames the otherworldliness of each passenger on the bus. Paradoxically, then, the 
otherworldliness of the moose unites her with the passengers on the bus. There is no 
reliable, fully shared world from which “we” can contemplate the world of the moose. 
Even as the speaker seems to assume that all the passengers on the bus feel the same 
sweet sensation of joy in the presence of the moose, her parenthetical attempt to assure us 
that we all feel this only reveals that most readers probably do not. Indeed, one version of 
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the driver’s response to the moose, which comes in the very next line, is to label moose 
“curious creatures,” which does not articulate the same sweet sensation of joy that the 
speaker suggests. Where the “sweet sensation of joy” the speaker feels suggests a feeling 
of intimacy and emotion when encountering the moose, other passengers respond with 
idle curiosity or with surprise at how “awful plain” the moose is. 
 The conclusion integrates the moose into the world of the bus, even though she 
remains strange and “otherworldly” in a sense. “The Moose” closes with “a dim / smell 
of moose / an acrid smell of gasoline” (166-68) and reinforces the sense in which the 
worlds of bus and moose converge and overlap. This social framing is highlighted by the 
speaker’s movement from impersonal to personal pronouns to reference the moose, who 
begins as an “it” (137) but later becomes a “she” (150, 152). By re-locating the sensual 
register through which the moose is perceived, the speaker effectively locates the moose 
inside the space of the bus. Bishop accomplishes through a method that resembles the 
conclusion of “The Fish.” Just as the fish lives and breathes in the world of rusted 
engines and oil-slicked water, the moose inhabits the world of pavement and exhaust. 
Bishop describes a complex, non-pristine (polluted, even) environment to conclude “The 
Moose” with a sensory image that integrates human and nonhuman actors in a 
community in which all beings are more or less “otherworldly.”  
Bishop, Animal Studies, and That Other Elizabeth 
 My reading of animals in Bishop’s poetry has some limitations. In addition to 
pieces such as “Rainy Season; Sub-tropics,” where she narrates directly through 
nonhuman speakers, Bishop occasionally uses animals in explicitly symbolic ways. The 
symbolism of a poem such as “Roosters” largely effaces the nonhuman personhoods that 
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I am suggesting come through in so many other examples of Bishop’s work. Nor is the 
method that I argue Bishop employs, which functions by identifying with animals 
(human animals as well) by attending to their very strangeness, without its own 
limitations when it comes to responding to the question of the animal. On some level, the 
categorical distinctions that Bishop’s poems query and disrupt are necessary in order to 
make practical sense of a world characterized by infinite differences great and small. 
Still, giving serious attention to how Bishop addresses animals through her poetry reveals 
animality as an important generative site for her and demonstrates an important 
contribution that poetic and literary expression can make to questions about human-
animal relations more generally—questions that became increasingly vexed in the United 
States throughout the twentieth century  and today motivate an emerging theoretical field. 
I want to conclude by briefly sketching what part of this contribution might be by 
discussing Bishop’s work in the context of the ideas of another writer who, though a 
fictional creation, directly argues for and defends what she terms a “poetry of the 
animals.”  
 Published in 1999, well after Bishop lived and wrote, J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of 
Animals has become something of a touchstone for scientists, philosophers, and writers 
concerned with animality.
17
 The piece testifies to the thick, complicated scientific and 
ethical questions that intersected in the discourse of animal studies at the close of the 
twentieth century. Coetzee’s narrative centers on the character of Elizabeth Costello, a 
writer who has been invited to accept an award from and give a talk at Appleton College. 
As the subject of her talk, Costello chooses to address animal-rights issues and discuss 
the potential of poetic explorations of the lives of animals. Throughout the work, Costello 
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explores questions about ethics and animals from a range of historical, literary, and 
philosophical perspectives. Her arguments capture and, to a certain extent, satirize 
familiar animals-rights positions. Costello’s urgent arguments against factory farming, 
meat eating, and speciesism are serious, but they also isolate her from the narrative’s 
other characters. Ironically, then, what motivates Costello’s deep concern for the lives of 
animals is also what precludes her from identifying with other humans. Costello’s intense 
desire to imagine her way into other modalities of being, and her belief that as a writer 
she is eminently positioned to do so, actually ends up alienating her. As Costello 
discusses and debates these positions with other characters, Coetzee’s work casts an 
ironic tone over academic discourse in general.
18
 As Coetzee’s characters talk over and at 
(but rarely with) one another, each grounds his or her argument in a different disciplinary 
bias. Part of what the exchanges that take place in The Lives of Animals exemplify, then, 
is an unwillingness, or inability, of the other characters to recognize that poetic 
figurations of animals can make contributions to questions about how humans imagine 
and relate to other animals, as this is ultimately what Costello argues for in her lecture 
concerning “The Poets and the Animals.” Costello’s thinking on poetry and animals has 
two parts: that a poetry of the animals “asks us to imagine our way into [an animal’s] way 
of moving, to inhabit that body” and it “does not try to find an idea in the animal . . . but 
is instead a record of an engagement with him” (96). 
 Often products of only this second of Costello’s criteria, Bishop’s poems do 
indeed offer records of engagement with animals. But, by resisting the urge to “inhabit 
that body” her poems offer a means for imagining animals that is at once imperfect and 
more serious than that of Costello. In Costello’s framework, such poetry is 
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simultaneously this record of engagement and an invitation to speak for animals. 
Bishop’s approach to animals in her poetry is distinct from the one Costello articulates 
because she generally resists “imagining her way into” a nonhuman’s experience, instead 
recognizing that the conditions of that experience remain profoundly strange.
19
 But 
Bishop’s method of figuring animals in her poems functions as a result of physical and 
cognitive engagements with them, and—by decoupling such engagement from the 
imagination (or appropriation) of nonhuman experience—her work suggests that 
encounters with animal others can lead to a recognition of their strangeness that is 
respectful, dignified, and ethical. 
 Through poems like “The Moose,” “First Death in Nova Scotia,” and “Manners,” 
Bishop develops ways of understanding animals that personify them without 
anthropomorphizing them. In other words, she develops strategies for poetically figuring 
animals that cast them as persons insofar as they are social actors, but they do so through 
recognizing difference and strangeness rather than assimilating nonhuman animals to a 
restricted form or personhood qua human. The unknowability and strangeness that so 
often characterize Bishop’s animals are an important response to problems that animals 
pose, and in this way literary responses such as hers can contribute to what Wolfe calls 
the “semantic overburdening” of the topic of nonhuman animals (117). Bishop’s animals 
retain strangeness even as her poetic speakers find ways to identify with them, however 
tenuously. For Bishop, animals are the subjects of experiences that can be gestured 
toward and partially identified with but never known with any certainty or completeness. 
In Bishop’s work, animals encounter and address us as subjects of individuated 
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experiences, as kinds of nonhuman persons, even if they are indeed the strangest people 
we’ll ever (not) know.  
Notes 
 
 1. Jarrell differentiates Bishop’s work from those of other poets of her era who he 
felt had turned their backs on the possibility of moral action altogether and instead fixated 
on the cruelty and chaos of a world almost too big and violent for their comprehension. 
For more on Jarrell’s assessment of the state of poetry in the mid-twentieth century, see 
his book Poetry and the Age, and particularly the chapter “Poets” for more of his 
discussion of Bishop. 
 2. Writes Millier: “She judges this case independently, finding in her imperfect 
communication with the fish a reason to let him go” (155). Though she gives only 
passing attention to their significance in the context of her larger work on Bishop’s life, 
Millier mentions two ideas here that inform my explication of Bishop’s poetic figurations 
of animals: 1) “she judges the case independently,” meaning that Bishop’s speaker 
attends to the specificity of the particular encounter of the poem; and 2) her decision to 
let the fish go results from an “imperfect communication” with it. 
 3. In her review of North and South, Adrienne Rich, for example, points out that 
the “overall strategy of many poems—the poem-about-an-artifact—owes too much to 
Miss Moore.” In its close observation of its subject’s physical features, “The Fish” 
adheres to this method. 
 4. In The Ecological Thought, Timothy Morton aptly summarizes the paradoxical 
way in which human-animal relations are imagined. “Saying ‘Humans are animals,’” 
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Morton writes, “could get you in trouble. So could saying ‘Humans are not animals,’ for 
different reasons” (41). 
 5. This lack of “a gaze” is another of Bishop’s intriguing strategies for figuring 
animals, as most reflections on the ethical calls that animals make to humans arise out of 
situations where a nonhuman looks or “looks back” at a human. Derrida’s work in The 
Animal that Therefore I Am is motivated by his consideration of a look from his cat. And 
John Berger’s argument in About Looking is grounded in the claim that “That look 
between animal and man, which may have played a crucial role in the development of 
human society, and with which, in any case, all men had always lived until less than a 
century ago, has been extinguished” (26). Contrary to arguments about human-animal 
relationships that generate from the act of looking, the speaker’s ethical actions in “The 
Fish” result from an interaction in which a cross-species look is not only explicitly 
avoided but also nullified as a real possibility because of differences in perceptual 
faculties and ocular physiology. 
 6. Indeed, I would argue that this is the most common, though not the exclusive, 
effect of Bishop’s animal figures. Certain poems, such as “Roosters,” use heavy animal 
symbols in ways that distract from, though do not efface, their individuality and sociality. 
In my view of the body of her work, however, these poems are the exceptions that prove 
the rule.   
 7. While the case can be made that the term “persons” is best kept synonymous 
with “humans,” I have chosen to discuss Bishop’s animal figures as sorts of persons 
because of the social emphasis her speakers place upon their relationships to other 
animals.  Additionally, because of her focus on the particularity of singular encounters 
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with animals, Bishop’s poetry is, in my reading, resistant to abstraction. So, while a 
particular seal might become a nonhuman person because of how he responds to the 
speaker of “At the Fishhouses,” the other seals at the periphery of the poem do not 
necessarily take on the same social status. Bishop’s animals are individualized and not 
necessarily interchangeable, which is one of the ways her imagination of them is different 
than understandings of animals that treat one member of a species as more or less 
interchangeable with another.   
 8. Schwartz draws a line in this process of recognizing herself in others, however, 
when it comes to animals. When he reads “The Moose” a few pages later, the moose 
becomes a symbol of “the past,” “natural innocence,” and “the timeless” rather than a 
being who might participate in this society of partial identifications with and alienations 
from other living bodies. 
 9. Pickard deals at length with Bishop’s “reticence” and his argument about 
Bishop’s method of description amounts to an intervention into the critical conversation 
surrounding Bishop’s work. He positions his project as a response to the derogatory way 
in which the term “description” has been used to discuss her work. According to Pickard, 
the negative view of Bishop’s reticence, or her insistence on careful observation and 
description, “implies a limiting obsession with brute reality, a lack of imagination that 
prevents Bishop from seeing beyond the here and now” (Poetics of Description 3). But 
such a willingness to acknowledge what is unknown, and unknowable, (or at least 
bracketing knowledge as incomplete and tentative) is one particularly provocative way of 
understanding ethical relations between humans and nonhumans, as I hope to show 
throughout this essay. 
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  Ann K. Hoff also reads “Manners” as a function of Bishop’s “reticence,” finding 
it a re-enactment of Bishop’s childhood experience in which she was kept outside 
knowledge by her grandparents, where she was often spoken to, but rarely spoke herself. 
In “Manners,” Hoff sees a reclamation by Bishop over her memory and an empowerment 
of herself by claiming the terms of her silences. Hoff asserts that “[a]dult Bishop 
empowers herself by restraining [her readers]” (580). In this exercise of the power of 
restraint, Hoff ultimately finds that “[i]t is not that Bishop is too timid to share her 
memories, nor that she fears societal reproof, but that Bishop finds something valuable in 
the indeterminate” (579). Although it falls into the anthropocentric tradition of Bishop 
criticism, Hoff’s reading, in her identification of Bishop’s empowered restraint and her 
valuation of the indeterminate, still offers two key concepts that can inform how we 
understand the interspecies social world that the poem sketches. Where readings such as 
Hoff’s emphasize how the human interactions in the poem reveal Bishop’s foundational 
concerns, I want to point out the more-than-human concern at work in the poem—an 
element that has largely been ignored by critics in favor of a focus on other psychological 
or biographical elements of the poem. 
 10. Bishop scholars have often noted her distaste for the blatantly confessional 
style. Jonathan Ellis writes that “[f]rom the outset, Bishop cast a cold eye on what she 
would later dismiss as ‘Romantic and self-pitying’ poetry” (63). And Joseph Epstein 
takes the position that, despite her efforts to veil confession in her poetry, Bishop’s 
poems nonetheless “represent the ruins shored up from a hard and often horrifying life” 
(42). In 1948 Bishop herself wrote to Robert Lowell: “Sometimes I wish I could have a 
more sensible conversation about this suffering business, anyway. . . . I think that it’s so 
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inevitable there’s no use talking about it, and that in itself it has no value, anyway” (One 
Art 170). And in a 1967 issue of Time she commented on the work of confessional poets, 
saying that “[y]ou just wish they’d keep some of these things to themselves” (“Poets: The 
Second Chance” 68). 
 11. “Manners” is one example of what Donna Haraway discusses as 
“coproduction” (When Species Meet). In my reading, the poem constructs a kind of 
“natureculture” where the cultural practices of humans emerge through relation with, 
rather than separation from, other animals. There are other iterations of “coproduction” 
(molecular and technological, for example) Haraway uses that are less applicable here. 
But her point that human culture is a product of our interactions with rather than our 
transcendence from animal life is consistent with the conception of interspecies society 
advanced in “Manners.” Through the framework of becoming, Haraway examines and 
emphasizes the ways that “we are in a knot of species coshaping one another in layers of 
reciprocating complexity all the way down” (42) Haraway’s emphasis on coproduction and 
coshaping result in an understanding of “figures” that is key to how I use the term 
throughout this paper. Haraway writes, “Figures collect people the people through their 
invitation to inhabit the corporeal story told in their lineaments. Figures are not 
representations of didactic illustrations, but rather material-semiotic nodes or knots in 
which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another. For [Haraway], figures have 
always been where the biological and literary or artistic come together with all of the 
force of lived reality” (4). 
 12. From Acts of Religion. While Derrida’s notion of the arrivant is provocative 
and connects hospitality to the notion of manners I see at work in Bishop’s poems, 
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Morton’s permutation of this concept is more fitting because he connects this concept 
specifically to animal persons in the context of what he calls “the ecological thought.” 
 13. Indeed, it is often those animals most familiar to us that awaken us to the 
strangeness of animals in general. Jacques Derrida locates the reasoning for his now 
famous claim for the multiplicity of animal life in an encounter with his cat; much of 
Darwin’s own thinking about natural selection and heredity arose from his experience 
breeding pigeons; and Donna Haraway repeatedly credits her dog with motivating her 
thinking on posthumanism.  
 14. This paradigm of agency and animals-as-agents, literary and otherwise, is 
extensively explored in the recently published collection Animals and Agency, edited by 
Sarah McFarland and Ryan Hediger.  
 15. In “Rainy Season; Sub-tropics,” however, Bishop does just this, telling a brief 
story in three parts, each narrated by a different animal. What is interesting about this 
piece, however, is that Bishop breaks sharply with her normal formal techniques; “Rainy 
Season” is a kind of prose poem or flash fiction.  
 16. I am largely taking this idea of nonhuman persons from Mary Midgley’s 1985 
essay “Persons and Non-persons,” in which she uses a legal ruling to inquire into the 
complex of meanings and assumptions that coalesce in the notion of personhood. 
Midgely examines a ruling whose logic found dolphins incapable of functioning as 
“another” within the legal framework. The judge in this case ruled “that ‘another’ would 
have to be another person,” which, as Midgley points out, for him meant another human 
being. Working from this ruling, however, Midgley argues that the conflation of “person” 
with “human being” “is a very natural view but not actually a true one” (53). Midgley 
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goes onto to argue that personhood can be grounded in the recognition that some animals 
are “highly sensitive social beings” (61).  While Midgley’s argument mainly points to 
society in higher mammals (who do of course have important and highly recognizable 
modes of social being), what is provocative about this location of personhood in sociality 
in the context of Bishop’s poetry is the array of life-forms in whom Bishop recognizes 
different kinds of social relations.   
 17. Available in book form, The Lives of Animals was first presented by Coetzee 
in lecture form in 1997 as part of Princeton University’s “Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values.” The published version contains  an introduction from  political theorist Amy 
Gutmann and “reflections” from philosopher Peter Singer, primatologist Barbara Smuts, 
literary and environmental critic Marjorie Garber, and religious-studies scholar Wendy 
Doniger. “The Lives of Animals” is also contained in Elizabeth Costello, a larger work 
on the life of its main character published in 2003.  
 18. Here I am indebted to Allison Carruth’s “Compassion, Commodification, and 
The Lives of Animals.” Carruth comments extensively on both the double-edged function 
of Costello’s sympathetic imagination and the satire of academic discourse. About the 
former, Carruth notes that “[a]s her son John repeatedly suggests, [Costello’s] ‘powers’ to 
feel for and think her way into ‘other existences,’ which define her novelistic practice, 
also threaten to rupture her filial ties” (203). About the latter, Carruth also notes that 
Peter Singer’s own narrative response to Coetzee’s work “initially implies that The Lives 
of Animals is less a ‘serious problem’ for animal ethicists than a ‘postmodern’ spoof of 
academic discourse” (207). In response to this position, Carruth’s insistence on the 
embodiment of nonhumans, however, is somewhat mirrored by my own argument for 
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how Bishop’s work might be seen as a response to Costello’s ideas. Because of her 
descriptive and observational practices, Bishop’s focus is on this embodied status rather 
than the experience of that body. Thus, Bishop resists what I elsewhere call “colonizing 
the consciousness” of nonhumans, which Costello expressly argues a poetry of the 
animals should do. 
 19. Bishop does experiment with nonhuman narrators in the sequence “Rainy 
Season; Sub-Tropics,” a series of prose poems that are each narrated by a different 
animal (a giant toad, a crab, and a snail). Taken in the context of Bishop’s other animal 
figures, “Rainy Season” demonstrates some of the problems with anthropomorphized 
first-person narrators.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: 
THE AESTHETICS OF ANIMALITY IN AND AFTER THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
From the earliest historical records, it is clear that animals have regularly played 
important roles in human art, religion, economics, and science. Cave paintings, creation 
narratives, bestiaries, animal poems, wildlife photography, game reserves, ranches, and 
zoos are just some of the many places human and nonhuman lives mingle and shape one 
another. As Linda Kalouf shows in Looking at Animals in Human History, 
representations of animals may indeed be some of the first aesthetic artifacts ever 
produced by human beings.
1
 As seemingly omnipresent as animals have been throughout 
human cultural history, however, I have focused on animals in twentieth-century 
American culture because during this period what had widely been a fascination with 
animals became more distinctly what I have discussed as the problem of animality, even 
as, over the same period, animal lives in North America came under human control on an 
unprecedented scale. Both aesthetically and technologically, then, the twentieth century 
was a period in the United States where animals themselves, both real and imagined, 
increasingly became cultural productions. 
As evolutionary theories circulated a plausible, even authoritative, argument for 
biological continuity between human and animal life, corollary theories emerged arguing 
a similar kind of continuity between the mental experiences of humans and other animals. 
After centuries of understanding animals as un-thinking, if complex, machines the 
argument over nonhuman mind was on in Euro-American culture. Certainly there are 
cultural traditions that understand human relationships to animals according to different 
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narratives and logics, but within the history of Euro-American modernity, there was no 
system of thought as well equipped as evolutionary theory for questioning the basic 
assumption that human life could be separated from animal life singularly and essentially. 
The problem of animality arose as a function of the conflict between two basic 
paradigms: one that defined the human against the animal; the other that defined the 
human as a variety of animal. As “the twentieth-century scientist,” as London would say, 
increasingly sanctioned the latter method of understanding human life, Americans 
developed an interest in, as well as an anxiety about, the similarities and differences 
between humans and other animals—an interest that manifested in a range of cultural 
practices. How Americans understood animals throughout the period was to a significant 
degree a function of the problem of animality as it was addressed through the interrelated, 
sometimes competing, practices of science and art. To this end, I have offered analyses in 
the work of four writers who each, in varying degrees, addressed the problem of 
animality in their work both by engaging scientific approaches to the problem but also by 
addressing the problem on ethical and philosophical grounds beyond the purview of 
scientific inquiry. Each writer’s literary project develops a distinct response to animality, 
and their responses have corollaries that persist even today. 
Jeffers, London, Hemingway, and Bishop each brought their own assumptions, 
philosophies, and literary techniques to bear on how they used literary expression to 
understand and respond to the problem of animality. Through his poems, Jeffers sought 
to demonstrate his philosophy of Inhumanism, which inverted the hierarchy of life that 
distinguished humans from animals along a singular, essential line, valorized traits 
thought to be exclusively human, and disavowed that which was associated with the 
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animal. Thus, even as Jeffers radically overturned what had become a culturally 
entrenched habit of valuing human in relation to animal life, he left largely unquestioned 
the basic assumption that humans differed from animals in a singular, uniform, and 
essential way. In Jeffers’s poetics, animal imagery, through symbol and allegory, was put 
to use in a new, anti-Romantic, and largely anti-religious way. What was not new in 
Jeffers’s method, however, was that those symbols and allegories still relied upon the 
premise that animals experienced the world fundamentally differently than humans. In 
contrast to Jeffers’s habits of poetically figuring animals, the poetry of Elizabeth Bishop 
exhibits a significantly different method for addressing the problem of animality. 
Bishop’s work, partly because of her later historical moment and her identity as a female 
poet, leaves the question of animal interiority—which is the basis for many arguments for 
the ethical treatment of animals—largely unanswered. That she does so, however, does 
not preclude her speakers from responding to animals ethically, even politely. The sheer 
fact of their presence in many of Bishop’s poems is adequate for her speakers to frame 
animals as social beings and to respond to them on those grounds. My reading of 
Bishop’s work is grounded in her personal reflections on the observational techniques of 
Charles Darwin, but I argue that she interpreted Darwinism in a vitally different way than 
some of her predecessors—an interpretation that led her to emphasize variety and alterity 
rather than fitness and competition. For Bishop, natural history also becomes social 
history. 
By working in fiction, London and Hemingway used narrative and nonhuman 
characters to develop their responses to the problem of animality. For London, this meant 
composing several works that featured dogs as their protagonists and relied on the logic 
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of evolutionary theory to explain their thoughts, emotions, and reasoning capacities, such 
as they are in each respective text. London used his observations of the culture of the 
dog-sled team in conjunction with what he knew of the science of animal mind in his day 
to advance an argument that “the other animals” perceive, process, and experience the 
world in ways with which humans can identify. By choosing to explore these ideas 
through the novel, London also chose to circulate them through the most powerful 
medium available to him at the time. In 1902, just one year before The Call of the Wild 
was published, Frank Norris wrote that the novel was “one of the most important factors 
of modern life,” that its influence was “greater than all the pulpits, than all the 
newspapers between the oceans,” and that people “look to-day as they never have looked 
before, as they will never look again, to the writer of fiction to them an idea of Life 
beyond their limits” (176). Asking readers to imagine life from the perspective of a 
nonhuman was, in a most immediate sense, an attempt to give “them an idea of Life 
beyond their limits.” London’s popular novels fixed the problem of animality, and more 
specifically the problem of animal mind, firmly in American culture at the outset of the 
twentieth century. A generation later, Hemingway continued to respond to the problem of 
animality in both literary nonfiction and fiction. Hemingway used focalization strategies 
similar to London’s to develop nonhuman perspectives in some of this fiction, and he did 
so most provocatively in “The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber.” Hemingway 
went farther than London, however, in emphasizing moments of cross-species 
identification and empathy—moments that are present in his writing as early as Green 
Hills of Africa and continue to appear in later works such as The Old Man and the Sea 
and The Garden of Eden. Though his many descriptions of killing are varied, 
  
234 
 
Hemingway’s narrators and human characters regularly recognize the shared experiences 
of vulnerability, suffering, and death as foundations for empathizing with nonhumans. 
That Hemingway appears to have been unable to translate this empathy into some kind of 
coherent, consistent ethics should not detract from the importance of noting his response 
to the problem of animality. If anything, Hemingway’s contradictory thinking about 
animals seems particularly fitting within our current historical moment, a moment that 
Gary L. Francione notes is marked by a “moral schizophrenia” in the way Americans 
treat animals. Even though polling suggests that close to half of the human inhabitants of 
the United States agree that animals are “just like humans in all important ways,” our 
actual treatment of both wild and domestic nonhumans starkly contrasts with the ethical 
consequences of that view.
2
 Perhaps one of the reasons readers respond so viscerally to 
Hemingway’s writing about animals is because we find in ourselves similar 
contradictions between our habits and our ideals, between our words and our actions. 
Even as it served as a considerable productive concept for each of them, the 
problem of animality is not one that any of the writers discussed in the preceding chapters 
were able to solve in any definitive way. Indeed, it seems that the very structure of the 
problem avoids a definitive solution. Because it is organized around understanding 
similarities and differences that proliferate in a multiplicity of directions once one attends 
to the specificity of different forms of animal life on both an individual and species level, 
the problem of animality resists abstract, singular solution. Just as the responses of 
Jeffers, London, Hemingway, and Bishop vary, so to do the particularities of the various 
contexts in which humans and nonhumans continue to encounter each other. What, then, 
might be the importance of considering how this particular group of writers responded to 
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the problem of animality within their respective creative projects? The most immediate 
answer to this question is that their work provides access to important historical aspects 
of the problem of animality—a problem that all too often is framed as a peculiarly late-
twentieth, if not twenty-first, century issue. When the problem of animality is reduced to 
only its modern animal-rights form, it becomes too easy to understand it as tacked onto 
the tail-end of the civil rights movements that shaped the political atmosphere in the 
United States for much of the twentieth century. Understanding the problem from this 
perspective effaces its longer history and has the potential of implying that important 
class, race, and gender inequalities that “preceded” issues of animal rights have been, in 
some sense, solved. This is the narrative that would plot animal rights onto the historical 
trajectory of western humanist political projects, implying that, upon recognizing the 
liberal subject-status of all humans, the force of liberal history might properly turn its 
attention to which (and how) nonhuman forms of life possess the rights and interests that 
have more or less come to be synonymous with the word “human.”  
 The historical narrative that hoists animal rights onto the back of human rights is, 
I would argue, a continually common way of understanding the significance of animal 
studies: animals are the next group of beings in need of humanist political liberation. This 
way of (mis)understanding the history of the problem of animality paradoxically only 
perpetuates “one of the hallmarks of humanism—and even more specifically that kind of 
humanism called liberalism—[in] which the sphere of attention and consideration 
(intellectual or ethical) is broadened and extended to previously marginalized groups, but 
without in the least debstabilizing or throwing into radical question the schema of the 
human who undertakes such pluralization” (Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? 99). It is this 
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approach to the problem of animality that characterized, for example, the ruling in a 
recent lawsuit that PETA brought against the animal park SeaWorld in U.S. federal court. 
PETA’s complaint was predicated on the claim that the park enslaves the orcas it keeps. 
By rhetorically analogizing orcas with human slaves, the suit’s logic implicitly asked the 
court to recognize the orcas as legal persons. But, because legal precedent regarding 
persons is grounded in a tautological paradigm that only humans are people and all 
people are human, the very reasoning behind PETA’s complaint provided the court all it 
needed to dismiss the case on the grounds that sources drawn from the 13
th
 Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution (the precedent on which PETA’s claim was based) “reveal that 
the term ‘slavery’ and ‘involuntary servitude’ refer only to persons,” which in the 
language of this court meant “only to humans” (“Whales Not Slaves”). In the light of 
such a ruling, it is not clear why the court uses the language of personhood in the first 
place. While there may have been some strategic legal sense for why PETA attorneys 
chose to file their claim on these grounds, in doing so they also provided the court with 
convenient grounds for dismissal and left the legal concept of personhood largely 
unexamined. 
The enslavement metaphor PETA chose to ground its suit as well as the judge’s 
response recapitulate the logic of the dolphin case Midgley discusses in “Persons and 
Non-Persons” (1985), which informs the basis of my reading of nonhuman people in the 
poetry of Elizabeth Bishop. In over twenty-five years, then, the legal metaphors and 
language used to address the problem of animality have remained more or less 
unchanged, largely due to an inability to re-frame this kind of issue in a way that does not 
rely on the paradigm of the humanist subject. As it plays out in legal discourse, the result, 
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which has seemingly become inevitable, becomes a zero-sum game where the claims of 
groups such as PETA insist that animals are such subjects and courts continue to reiterate 
that only humans can be such subjects and—by extension—people. In his ruling, federal 
judge Jeffrey Miller found “the goal of PETA attorneys who brought the lawsuit ‘to 
protect the welfare of orcas [was] laudable’ even if the 13th Amendment was not the 
correct way to approach the case.” The point of such legal exercises for PETA, then, 
becomes less about meaningfully re-thinking what it means to be a person and more 
about using the legal system as a stage for garnering public attention. In the end, PETA’s 
claim provided an opportunity for the court to reinforce tautological definitions of who 
counts as a person. 
Responding to the problem of animality in a way that attempts to define certain 
nonhumans as political subjects who are more or less functionally human from a legal 
perspective perpetuates the notion of a singular human-animal divide (even if some 
higher mammals might get grouped onto the human side of that divide), but such a 
response does not ask real questions about the factors that condition the relationships 
between animals and their nonhuman companions. This kind of approach, which to a 
significant degree resembles London’s, relies on what Gary Steiner calls the “similar 
minds theory” (x). In this theory, we can recognize animals as subjects if we can prove, 
or they can prove to us, that their minds are similar enough to ours to be considered, 
basically, human. When the problem of animality is understood as one that appears only 
after human civil rights are achieved, it is easy to imagine animals as the conscious, 
critical, self-making subjects of western liberal humanism waiting for their political 
liberation. The result is an animal studies or animal rights discourse that does little to 
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question the basic presumptions of anthropocentric worldviews and extends an ideology 
that oversimplifies and collapses even human life into a singular category. Such a 
discourse also continues to address social issues only from the view of individualism, 
self-making, and agency. The logic of this paradigm is also not entirely unlike the one 
that Jeffers’s Inhumanism ultimately maintains except that, rather than idealizing 
unconscious animality, we start shipping certain species of animals across that existential 
divide.  
 Historicizing the problem of animality to show that it was an important cultural 
issue well before the end of the twentieth century can problematize simplified, 
progressive historical narratives. Such narratives organize not only highly public groups 
such as PETA but can also be central to how animal studies are practiced within the 
discourses of cultural theory. In his state-of-the-field analysis of animal studies, “Human, 
All Too Human,” Wolfe argues that focusing on animals as critical, liberal subjects “—
commonsensical and attractive as it may be—actually closes off the human from the 
animal of animal studies and thus reinstates the human/animal divide in a less visible but 
more fundamental way while ostensibly gesturing beyond it” (570). These versions of 
animal studies appear, at least initially, to open the category of the human—and they do 
avow certain forms of nonhuman life—by recognizing that other species possess what are 
traditionally held to be exclusively human characteristics. Ultimately, as Wolfe argues, 
such approaches in fact close off the human.  
Because the characteristics valued in such schemas (what Wolfe elsewhere 
discusses as “modalities”) are those associated with the human, the nonhuman versions of 
them become at best weak or rudimentary forms of those possessed or practiced by 
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human beings. This is the posthumanism, such as it is, of London’s “ladder of life” 
metaphor discussed in Chapter II. Where it gestures toward opening the privileged 
concept of the human to serious questions, London’s metaphor finally reifies 
anthropocentric privilege by situating humans (and Euro-American humans in particular) 
“atop the ladder of life.” In this model, nonhuman animals become completely knowable, 
as their modalities and thought processes are but undeveloped, simplified versions of 
those experienced by humans. London’s attempt to safeguard the conceptual domain of 
“reason” and, later, to qualify the reasoning of some animals as “simple” provides 
examples of this “all too human” approach to the problem of animality. Elsewhere, 
however, London’s language also strains under the difficulty of conveying nonhuman 
mental processes—which in his writing turn out to be not so simple after all. Rather than 
confidently reporting the mental experiences of his nonhuman characters, London labors 
to render them accurately in language throughout Call of the Wild only to have to 
backtrack on his narrative with disclaimers that what he says Buck imagines, thinks, or 
feels is not “actually” what he experiences. The trajectory of London’s work involving 
nonhumans complicates the seeming linearity of experience the ladder metaphor 
suggests. His use of the adjectival “man-fashion” and his accelerated exploration of 
defamiliarizing techniques in White Fang establish a greater sense of alterity than he 
seemed comfortable with in the earlier work, even if the polemical writing he did several 
years later in “The Other Animals” formalizes the logic of the ladder of life. 
If one of the central aims of my project is to call attention to the literary history of 
the problem of animality throughout the twentieth century, which can help to disrupt 
critical narratives that frame the problem as an extension of universal human rights, 
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another is to make explicit the distinct imaginative responses to the problem within the 
various works of the writers examined here. The problem of animality, because of the 
multiplicity of forms it takes and contexts in which emerges, is not easily solved. The 
responses to it developed by Jeffers, London, Hemingway, and Bishop have corollaries 
even today. Attending to the structures of their responses can reveal how contemporary 
works continue to wrestle with the ethical, aesthetic, and ontological questions posed by 
the problem that motivated a significant portion of the work of these four writers.   
The method for classifying life that London sketches with the ladder of life 
metaphor, for example, continues to motivate imaginative attempts to understand certain 
forms of nonhuman life. Rupert Wyatt’s 2011 feature film Rise of the Planet of the Apes, 
for example, constructs a story in which a chimpanzee, called Caesar, undergoes gene 
therapy as a test subject for an experimental drug designed to repair the brain damage of 
humans suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. As a result of the therapy, Caesar develops 
an unusually high level of intelligence, which according to the film’s linear logic means 
he develops an unusually high level of human intelligence, specifically. In Caesar’s case, 
however, physiological changes alone do not account for his unusual intelligence and 
self-awareness; cultural factors also at least partially explain his intelligence. He is raised 
from infancy in the home of Will Rodman, the rogue biochemist who experiments on 
Caesar even after the company he works for, Gen-Sys, specifically decommissions his 
program. Rodman, eventually with the help of primatologist Caroline Aranha and his 
father, Charles, raises Caesar in what more or less resembles a nuclear American family. 
Caesar’s ability to communicate in American Sign, his affinity for wearing clothes, and 
his “family” loyalty seem to be, at least in some regards, due to a dynamic interchange of 
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environmental, cultural, and biological factors. Even still, the intelligence Caesar acquires 
is narrowly anthropocentric and suggests that any progress of nonhuman intelligence will 
inevitably proceed in a direction toward the human. In Rodman’s words, “by age three, 
Caesar was displaying cognitive skills that far exceed those of a human counterpart.” 
Caesar ascends the ladder of life right past his human peers; rather than a nonhuman 
character, he becomes an ultra-human one. 
To register the intelligence of its faux nonhuman characters, Rise of the Planet of 
the Apes repeatedly focuses on their eyes and thus participates in the long history of 
imaginative representations of animal life that use the visual organ to represent 
intelligence. Whether in Leopold’s meditation on the “fierce green fire” fading from the 
eyes of a dying wolf, John Berger’s claim that animals are significant because they can 
look back at us (even though, as Bishop would remind us, not all animals will do so), 
David Bourne’s identification with an elephant enabled through his observation of the 
elephant’s eye, or Derrida’s rhetorical use of his experience of his cat gazing upon his 
unclothed body, the eye is a recurrent and privileged locus of meaning and intelligence in 
representations of nonhuman life. Rise of the Planet of the Apes participates in this 
tradition. Early in the film, when discussing a trial version of his therapy, Rodman tells 
the board of Gen-Sys that the only known side effect of the drug are green speckles in the 
eyes of the subjects. The staff even nicknames their prize test subject (Caesar’s mother) 
“Bright Eyes,” a pun that unites the physical and mental mutations the test subjects 
undergo. Throughout the film, cameras continually focus on the graphically enhanced, 
uncannily human eyes of Caesar to convey his emotions. In fact, even before they get 
their green spots, the eyes of the all the computer-generated chimpanzees in the film are 
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crafted to look human, displaying a more defined pupil, a smaller iris, and a more highly 
visible sclera than present in the eye of a chimpanzee.    
Once Caesar is taken into the cruel custody of a San Leandro primate sanctuary, 
however, the film’s internal logic becomes more suspect. In one of the climactic 
moments, Caesar releases the gene-therapy drug at the sanctuary by rolling canisters of it 
between the animal’s cages, releasing a smoky mist into the air. Dispensed from what 
function more or less as—to put it in the language of Christian theology—cans of soul, 
the drug works almost instantly, and overnight the primates acquire intelligence 
approximate to Caesar’s. The following morning, as the apes calmly file from their cages 
to an indoor playground, Caesar looks into the eyes of each chimp to ascertain whether 
the therapy has worked. The apes eventually escape the sanctuary, an event whose 
dramatic pinnacle is achieved when Caesar gains his voice—in the narrowest sense of the 
term—exclaiming “No!” when cattle-prodded by one of the sanctuary staff, who is 
attempting to force Caesar into his cage. After a violent, harrowing escape across Golden 
Gate Bridge, the film’s conflict resolves when Caesar again speaks, this time to Rodman, 
telling him that “Caesar is home” in the redwood forests of the Golden Gate National 
Recreation Area. In the film’s final moments, then, its anthropocentric logic becomes 
fully apparent when it privileges spoken English as the conclusive signal that Caesar has 
attained subject-status and stepped up on the ladder of life. Thus, even as the bodies of 
primates mark them as others—their strength and agility remain key characteristics, as 
does their immunity to the effects of Rodman’s drug that are fatal to humans—the critical 
consciousness (signaled by Caesar’s ability to use spoken English) they’ve attained make 
them safe keepers of humanism even as they usher in a seemingly posthuman era. For all 
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the questions the film calls up concerning pharmaceutical testing on nonhuman subjects, 
metaphors that frame animals as property (how Gen-Sys’s director sees them) versus 
those that frame them as persons (some of the research team), and the conditions of 
animal “sanctuary” (admittedly, this is very shallowly portrayed in this film), the film 
ultimately falls short of giving nonhuman life any real attention. Until they can 
essentially become us, goes the logic of the film, other primates will only ever be 
“stupid,” as one of the sanctuary’s orangutans signs to Caesar at one point.  
But “Chimps Aren’t Humans” 
 If Rise of the Planet of the Apes reboots its earlier sequel, Planet of the Apes 
(1968), in a way that explains why the original’s futuristic earth is not, in fact, inhabited 
by actual nonhuman apes, the cover of a 1975 issue of New York Magazine heralds a 
“First Message from the Planet of the Apes” that turns out to be much closer than the 
future Earth of Franklin J. Schaffner’s imagination. The magazine’s cover story provides 
the backdrop for James Marsh’s 2011 film, Project Nim, which documents a linguistic 
experiment begun in the early 1970s by Herb Terrace and a team of researchers at 
Columbia University. The film, which itself is based on Elizabeth Hess’s 2008 book Nim 
Chimpsky: The Chimp Who Would Be Human, uses a documentary approach to pose 
questions about and—through the voices of its interviews and its careful 
cinematography—respond to the problem of animality. Through a different generic, 
though equally aesthetic, form, the Project Nim documentary presents the story of an 
interspecies social experiment that activates many of the problems of similarity and 
difference I have been suggesting have motivated a long tradition of creative expression 
in the literature and visual culture of the United States.  
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Taken from his mother when he was only about two weeks old, Nim was placed 
by Terrace in the care of Stephanie LaFarge, who was tasked with raising Nim “like one 
of [her] children.” Building on the work of similar experiments, such as Project Washoe, 
the study’s tentative hypothesis was that, if raised as a human child, a chimp might learn 
to communicate with humans through signs in an unprecedented way. What begins as an 
attempt to use sign language to “communicate with another species,” which at one point 
in the film Terrace likens to communicating “with an alien from space,” the experiment 
quickly becomes complicated by thick social dynamics and competing metaphors for 
imagining Nim: as a test subject, as a family member, as a wild animal, as a person. In 
such a context, Terrace admits, it quickly became a challenge for him to do “good 
science.” 
 Even as it presents itself as a documentary film, Project Nim employs some 
familiar zoomorphic focalization strategies. One such series of shots occurs when one of 
Nim’s teachers, Renee Falitz, recounts her experience of being bitten on the face by Nim 
when she was executing a “body-to-body” handoff with another handler. As Falitz 
narrates their procedure for such an exchange, the film interposes footage of her 
interview with scenes of what Nim would have presumably “seen” as he was being 
handed from one handler to another. These brief cut-away scenes show only the headless 
midsection of a human handler, who reaches for and receives a rope (presumably Nim’s 
lead) from hand that appears from behind the camera. The next shot frames the same 
headless handler and focuses in on “her” (again, presumably female because it is Falitz) 
tying off the lead onto her belt. In another scene, the still faceless handler moves close to 
the camera, reaching for it/Nim/the viewer with outstretched, imposing arms. All these 
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scenes are shot in drab coloring, at a narrow angle, and in close proximity to the handler’s 
body to create an ominous, threatening air around the exchange. The film combines its 
assumed authority as a documentary with this other-than-human perspective (technically 
we could still call the perspective “anthropomorphic” since that term could apply to all 
anthropoids) to represent, ostensibly, Nim’s version of the experience, even as it is being 
narrated by the human handler he attacked. What’s more, the close-cropped shots and 
imposing body language of the handler work not only to present Nim’s perspective but to 
rationalize his actions, to an extent, by inducing the viewer to consider his point-of-view.  
 Through Nim, Marsh tells this history in an intriguing, stylized way that invokes 
the problem of animality throughout. The film’s narrations variously refer to Nim as “less 
with language than he was as his unique self” (LaFarge), “becoming more chimp-like” as 
he matured (Terrace), and needing to “work on his chimpanzee” (Ingersoll). Even though 
the experiment was premised on a logic similar to London’s “ladder of life” metaphor, in 
which Nim would have achieved a higher (human) consciousness by virtue of his 
enculturation and language acquisition, what emerges through Marsh’s story is a 
presentation of animality not entirely unlike what I suggest are the nonhuman people that 
populate Bishop’s poetry. Despite his almost complete immersion in human society and 
participation in a thorough educational regime, Nim becomes no more human than the 
dogs or cats whose company he enjoys so much. What he does become, though, is an 
active participant in a dynamic, unique interspecies culture that was able to emphasize, 
despite—or perhaps because of—all of its problems, the fundamental nonhuman 
personhood of other animals. For, even as Terrace concludes that Nim, in the end, was 
nothing more than a “complicated beggar,” a kind of late-century version of Clever Hans, 
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the message of the film is that many of study’s participants (Nim included, I should 
think) “didn’t care about the language argument” (Ingersoll) and felt “no question there 
was communication there.” Project Nim frames the consequence of the experiment less 
as finding about whether Nim could acquire language and more about, as I also discussed 
in the context of Bishop’s poems, whether we can really continue to imagine language as 
(exclusively) human. Ultimately, though, even as the language questions are central to 
the science of the study, the film casts its focus on the experiment’s ethics, and, in the 
end, serves as poignant reprise of the question Bentham asked in the eighteenth century. 
In attempting to make Nim speak (in almost the narrowest humanistic sense possible), 
Terrace and his team also got a lesson in just how much he could suffer.  
Marsh’s film ends where Nim’s life did: the “Black Beauty Ranch” in Murchison, 
Texas. Taking its name from Anna Sewell’s novel, and taking its motto from her equine 
narrator’s closing sentences, the ranch (and the film) give something of a nod to the 
literary and to the constellation of anxiety, emotions, ethics, and knowledge registered by 
imaginative responses to the problem of animality. The most ambitious goal for this 
project, in this and in its future forms, is to develop, through a studied examination of 
four writers for whom the problem of animality figured significantly, a methodology for 
reading nonhumans in a way that emphasizes the existential and ethical questions that 
emerge when they are understood as kinds of persons, even if the metaphor of 
personhood requires some significant revision to be up to the task.  
In both written and visual literatures, the problem of animality continues to 
challenge American audiences. Though not composed by an author from the U.S., Indra 
Sinha’s 2007 novel Animal’s People was written with an audience in the United States at 
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least partly in mind. Sinha’s work responds to the Bhopal gas tragedy of 1984. On the 
night of December 2, a pesticide factory operated by the U.S.-based conglomerate Union 
Carbide unleashed a deadly mix of gases into the city, immediately killing somewhere 
between 5,000 and 10,000 humans and injuring 60,000 more according to some 
estimates. The toll of this toxic cocktail on the plant and animal life in and about Bhopal 
remains largely unmeasured.  
Told through the words of a character who only identifies himself as “Animal”—
because his exposure to the gases deformed his spine and left him unable to stand 
upright—Animal’s People challenges singular, humanist definitions of what it means to 
be a person. Animal, who throughout the text continually refuses to identify as a human 
being, is, according to Upamanyu Pablo Mukherjee, “the location where [human and 
nonhuman personhood] meet, and as such, his very existence is an argument for their 
continuity and their ontological equality” (152). Animal communicates with characters of 
a number of different species, and he develops close, though different, social ties equally 
with a dog (Jara), the scorpions that inhabit his own dwelling place, Ma Franci, Farouq, 
Zafar, and a number of other human characters. No two of the relationships are the same. 
As Animal moves between these human and nonhuman communities—indeed as these 
interspecies communities overlap and constitute one another—Animal’s People advances 
versions of personhood and ethical consideration that, similar to those of Bishop, are 
grounded in multiplicity and difference. The historical and environmental context of 
Animal’s People differs from Bishop’s poems in some important ways, but Sinha also 
shares with Bishop a structure of responding to animality with a concept of equality 
based in difference, relationality, and collectivity.  
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The preceding chapters have identified and discussed four responses to animality 
that continue even today to resonate with cultural relevance. Recognizing the history of 
the problem of animality as it was been shaped and popularized by various disciplines in 
the twentieth century brings attention to its various aspects, but doing so requires a 
reading method that emphasizes how literary animals represent a writer’s, and even an 
audience’s, investment in responding to the problem on its own grounds. Reading 
methods that look beyond animals to determine what it is they stand-in for in a text, while 
interesting for other purposes, risk missing what that text suggests about animals 
themselves and, as a result, risk implicitly turning the problem of animality into a 
uniquely late-twentieth- and early twenty-first-century issue. “Figuring the Beast” offers 
methods of reading animals in the projects of four important twentieth-century American 
writers. In the case of the fiction of London and Hemingway, this has meant emphasizing 
animals as nonhuman characters rather than focusing on them as shallowly coded “men 
in fur” and asking questions about what it might mean if we imagine eating flesh as a 
form of eating people. In the case of poetry, this has meant comparing Jeffers’s use of 
animals as symbols with Bishop’s use of them as figures in the sense that Donna 
Haraway defines them when she writes that “figures have always been where the 
biological and literary or artistic come together with all of the force of lived reality” 
(Species 4). While the readings I’ve developed over these chapters are not intended to 
replace readings that demonstrate how animal symbols get used to make literary 
meaning, they do, I hope, reveal the ethical and theoretical dimensions of literature that 
arise when we ask what nonhumans in literary works might say to us about other forms of 
animal life and how we understand ourselves in relation to it. 
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Notes 
 1. The 32,000-year-old Paleolithic caves, located in modern-day France, Kalouf 
discusses in the opening to her book are dominated by paintings of animals. 
 2. From John Balzar’s “Creatures Great and—Equal?” L.A. Times (Dec. 25, 
1993). Quoted in Francione (26).     
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